Mao with Smart Phones and Internet? A Comparison of Classic Guerrilla Warfare with Fourth and Fifth Generation Warfare Using an Agent-Based Model for Simulation

Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) theory shares many characteristics of classical guerrilla warfare (CGW) theory in security studies literature. Proponents claim that 4GW is a revolution in war that overturns traditional measures of military power, while critics counter that 4GW is simply CGW in an updated context. Another group posits Fifth Generation Warfare (5GW), which adds additional information-age technologies and uses “any and all means,” (military and extra-military) to attack both the enemy’s will and capability to resist. The irregular subset of 5GW strategies appear to be an extension of 4GW with the addition of advanced information-age technologies: mobile phones and internet spreading propaganda instantly to friendly groups as well as national and trans-national enemies, while unconventional tactics such as suicide bombings and terrorist actions attempt to drain the will of opponents to continue the fight. The CGW and 4/5GW strategies are modeled in an agent-based simulation to evaluate similarities and differences in speed to victory, territory controlled, and the identity of the winning side. Emergent behaviors are compared with historical data. Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) as conceptualized by numerous military scholars shares many characteristics of guerrilla tactics in the classical military literature of Sun Tzu, Wellington, Clausewitz, Mao, and Giap. Proponents of 4GW claim that its development has significantly altered the ratio of strength of industrialized and guerrilla forces, and thus the likelihood of weaker forces (as measured in previous military contexts) prevailing against forces assessed by traditional measures as stronger. Critics point to a lack of intellectual rigor in defining the salient characteristics of 4GW and charge that it is simply a re-statement of classical guerrilla war (CGW) tactics, albeit with improved communications and propaganda capabilities in a social media cultural context. This research models CGW and 4GW in conjunction with the irregular subset of 5GW in an agent-based simulation using NetLogo software (Wilensky, 1999) in order to explore differences in time and probability of victory and increased area of territory controlled by 4GW and irregular 5GW forces. These forces are then pitted against their respective industrial-age and information-age opponents. Emergent behaviors offer insights into the similarities and differences of CGW. The outputs are then compared to historical data to help answer the question of whether 4/5GW comprise a significant military revolution that threatens to upend traditional measures of military superiority, or they are merely an adaptation of old tactics to a new context. The results generally favored the rebels in both CGW and 4/5GW scenarios. Increasing Red Communications capability in the 4/5GW scenario overall increased Red Territory controlled as compared to the CGW scenario. However, increasing Blue Communications capability also increased Red Territory gained in both models. This could be interpreted that an overall increase in communications capabilities leads to more aggressive tactics and more engagements for both sides. Blue and Red communications in the 4/5GW scenarios are also associated with a decrease in both Red and Blue time to victory, indicating that the pace of engagements is accelerated in the 4/5GW scenarios. Finally, the model comparing identity of victor after 10 years produced mixed results. An increase in Red Communications was associated with a decrease in the log-odds of Blue Victory after 10 years in 4/5GW model, as expected. However, an increase Blue Communications also appeared to be associated with an increase in the log-odds of Red Victory in the 4/5GW model, a somewhat contradictory result. The addition of 21st century technologies seemed to change the overall dynamic compared to CGW only in specific cases, and usually only marginally. The research project was purposefully designed so that the 4/5GW capabilities would be additions to a basic model of guerrilla warfare. There is danger that these additions were simply insufficient in modeling the true extent of the differences between the two concepts of war, and that 4/5GW tactics are, in fact, revolutionary and not evolutionary. Further study is required to answer the question conclusively

On legitimacy feedback mechanisms in agent-based modeling of civil violence

Epstein's agent-based model (ABM) of civil violence has been very popular and successful due to its formulation soundness, simplicity, and explanatory power. Variants of this model have been proposed for the simulation of different types of social conflict phenomena (worker protest, riots, or urban crime) and for investigating the effect of mechanisms that are not considered in the original model. In a previous work, we introduced imprisonment delay, “news impact,” and legitimacy feedback effects in Epstein's ABM of civil violence. In this paper, we focused specifically on improving the formulation of legitimacy feedback. In the model presented herein, legitimacy varies as a function of subindicators identified in theoretical studies on legitimacy measurement. We considered four different functions for expressing the legitimacy—weighted average, geometric mean, exponentially decaying “system support,” and “justification”—and two different feedback mechanisms: homogeneous (global) perceived legitimacy and heterogeneous (agent-dependent) perceived legitimacy. It was found that, for certain combinations of input parameters, the present model produced solutions with an initial period of calm with small bursts of rebellion, followed by a sudden large-scale rebellion after which intermittent bursts of rebellion occur (as in Epstein's model), where legitimacy drops never returning to the initial level. These results provide an alternative explanation of the mechanisms by which apparently stable authoritarian regimes, when facing an unexpected large-scale uprising, respond with repression and afterward struggle with intermittent bursts of rebellion because they are perceived as illegitimate. The present model can also be used to test theories on the aggregation of legitimacy indicators in a global legitimacy score.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

New general mechanistic model for predicting civil disturbances and their characteristics

Since the wave of civil violence in the USA in the 1960s, many social theorists have tried to explain why riots occur. Despite at least 50 years of research since then, there is still not enough insight to anticipate large events like the 2011 Arab Spring and London riots. The main goal of this thesis is therefore to improve understanding about how underlying conditions influence and drive riot dynamics, such as the intensity, spread, and duration. I develop a new mechanistic and stochastic agent-based model for riots. Previous models have either only targeted general phenomena associated with riots, or aimed at behaviour specific to a single event. In this thesis I combine both approaches: I demonstrate how the model in which the motivation of the agents is based on general concepts, can be applied to the specific situation of the 2011 London riots. The model reproduces the majority of the behaviour observed in the London riots (r = 0.4-0.8). One of the key factors under investigation is the relationship between protests and outbursts of civil violence. Riots are often preceded by protests, such that a large pool of potential rioters is directly available. I find that the number of times a protest is repeated has greater influence on riot dynamics than the protest crowd size. The support shown during demonstrations might incite false confidence in individuals, potentially leading to quicker escalation. Another question is how contact networks and collective identity influence the spread of violence between different locations. The role of online social media (e.g. Twitter) has been a major focus in trying to explain why the violence in the 2011 Arab spring spread so quickly and so far. I investigate the role of social similarity as another factor that might have contributed to the diffusion of unrest, and demonstrate the existence of a critical transition in riot activity when increasing the density of the contact network in the model. Such increases in density beyond the critical thresholds might have been introduced by online social networks. Finally, I explore the sensitivity to cooperation of different potential riot groups. In some cases, mixed populations with different collective identities can form coalitions within neighbourhoods based on shared grievances, which could lead to increases in riot size and riot probability. I examine the influence of the social structure and spread of these populations over different neighbourhoods, as well as the overlap in grievances and different demographic structures