Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science

A collection of papers presented at the First International Summer Institute in Cognitive Science, University at Buffalo, July 1994, including the following papers: ** Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science, Barry Smith ** The Bounds of Axiomatisation, Graham White ** Rethinking Boundaries, Wojciech Zelaniec ** Sheaf Mereology and Space Cognition, Jean Petitot ** A Mereotopological Definition of 'Point', Carola Eschenbach ** Discreteness, Finiteness, and the Structure of Topological Spaces, Christopher Habel ** Mass Reference and the Geometry of Solids, Almerindo E. Ojeda ** Defining a 'Doughnut' Made Difficult, N .M. Gotts ** A Theory of Spatial Regions with Indeterminate Boundaries, A.G. Cohn and N.M. Gotts ** Mereotopological Construction of Time from Events, Fabio Pianesi and Achille C. Varzi ** Computational Mereology: A Study of Part-of Relations for Multi-media Indexing, Wlodek Zadrozny and Michelle Ki

Manifest domains:analysis and description

Abstract We show that manifest domains, an understanding of which are a prerequisite for software requirements prescriptions, can be precisely described: narrated and formalised. We show that such manifest domains can be understood as a collection of endurant, that is, basically spatial entities: parts, components and materials, and perdurant, that is, basically temporal entities: actions, events and behaviours. We show that parts can be modeled in terms of external qualities whether: atomic or composite parts, having internal qualities: unique identifications, mereologies, which model relations between parts, and attributes. We show that the manifest domain analysis endeavour can be supported by a calculus of manifest domain analysis prompts: is_entity, is_endurant, is_perdurant, is_part, is_component, is_material, is_atomic, is_composite, has_components, has_materials, has_concrete_type, attribute_names, is_stationary, etcetera; and show how the manifest domain description endeavour can be supported by a calculus of manifest domain description prompts: observe_part_sorts, observe_part_type, observe_components, observe_materials, observe_unique_identifier, observe_mereology, observe_attributes. We show how to model attributes, essentially following Michael Jackson (Software requirements &amp; specifications: a lexicon of practice, principles and prejudices. ACM Press, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1995 ), but with a twist: The attribute model introduces the attribute analysis prompts is_static_attribute, is_dynamic_attribute, is_inert_attribute, is_reactive_attribute, is_active_attribute, is_autonomous_attribute, is_biddable_attribute and is_programmable_attribute. The twist suggests ways of modeling “access” to the values of these kinds of attributes: the static attributes by simply “copying” them, once, the reactive and programmable attributes by “carrying” them as function parameters whose values are kept always updated, and the remaining, the external_attributes, by inquiring, when needed, as to their value, as if they were always offered on CSP-like channels (Hoare, Communicating sequential processes. C.A.R. Hoare series in computer science. Prentice-Hall International, London, 2004 ). We show how to model essential aspects of perdurants in terms of their signatures based on the concepts of endurants. And we show how one can “compile” descriptions of endurant parts into descriptions of perdurant behaviours. We do not show prompt calculi for perdurants. The above contributions express a method with principles, techniques and tools for constructing domain descriptions. It is important to realise that we do not wish to nor claim that the method can describe all that it is interesting to know about domains. </jats:p

Metaphysics Today and Tomorrow

This text was conceived as a synthetic introduction to the present-day situation of metaphysics and of ontology, to their stakes and their practices in the world and in France, by way of a preamble to the activities of the Atelier de métaphysique et d’ontologie contemporaines [Workshop on Contemporary Metaphysics and Ontology] at the École normale supérieure. It certainly does not claim to replace the more informed and complete works on which it rests, and which are indicated in the bibliography. Nor was it written with the intention of being polemical against whatever conception of metaphysics, even if it goes without saying that the question is approached in a necssarily partisan, though resolutely conciliatory, manner

The Metaphysics of Mental Representation

The representational theory of mind (RTM) explains the phenomenon of intentionality in terms of the existence and nature of mental representations. Despite the typical characterisation of mental representations in terms of their semantics, RTM is best understood as a metaphysical – more specifically formal ontological – theory whose primary defining feature is stipulating the existence of a class of mental particulars called representations. In this regard it is false, since mental representations do not exist. My argument is primarily methodological. Using an extended analysis of mereology and its variants as paradigmatic examples of a formal ontological theory, I argue for a 'synthetic’ approach to ontology which seeks to form a sound descriptive characterisation of the relevant phenomena from empirical data, to which philosophical analysis is applied to produce a rigorous theory. The value and necessity of this method is proved by example in our discussion of mereology which is shown to be defensible given certain assumptions, in particular perdurantism, but still inadequate as an account of parthood without considerable supplementation. We also see that there are viable alternatives which adopt a more synthetic approach and do not require the same assumptions. Having effectively demonstrated the value of a synthetic approach in ontology I critically examine the methodology employed by RTM and find it severely lacking. In the guise of ‘commonsense psychology’ RTM cavalierly imposes a theoretical framework without regard to empirical data, and this results in a severe distortion of the phenomenon of intentionality it purports to explain. RTM is methodologically unsound, and so its commitment to the existence of mental representations is utterly undermined. Furthermore the most attractive aspect of RTM – its semantics – can be separated from any commitment to mental representations existing. Even RTM’s strongest advocates lack motivation to believe that mental representations exist

X—The Mereology of Representation

Mental representations – like many other things – seem to have parts. However, it isn’t clear how to properly understand the idea of a part of a representation. In this paper I shed new light on how representations can have a mereology. In particular, it has been recognized that there is a mereological element to Kant’s distinction between two kinds of representations: intuitions and concepts. A concept depends upon its parts, whereas an intuition is prior to its parts. The paper thus focuses on an exploration of how to make sense of the parts and wholes of intuitions and concepts

Emergent Wholes and the Porosity of Dynamic Objects

Claims in the metaphysics of strong emergence, featuring autonomous and possibly reflexive downward causal capacity, methodologically require, though ultimately ignore, units of analysis qua unified wholes. I argue that this avoidance of mereological and wider metaphysical debates denies the metaphysics of emergence clarity and cohesion and urgent application to conceptions of structure and agency. In this thesis, using a refined, non-linear, irreproducible, non-ontologically reductionist open-system physicalism and empiricism, I show that claims in the metaphysics of emergence hastily assume first the integration and subsequently the individuation of objects that become the subject of these strong claims. These assumptions, I believe, are actually the cause for the insurmountable gap between pure ontological reduction on the one side, and pure ontological and irreducible property emergence on the other. Furthermore, in using this new physicalism in the context of strong emergence, the traditional boundary between ontology and epistemology—going far beyond the standard weak-strong divide in the emergence discourse—can no longer be respected. As such, the nature of emergent properties is critical to assessing the nature of objects qua wholes with respect to the conditions for their integration and individuation. The major contribution to the metaphysics of emergence that this thesis provides is the realisation that, when we assume all physical objects are open and porous, all claims for persisting, emergent wholes are necessarily based on physical assumptions of integration and individuation. Synthetically I offer a method for understanding the individuation of ‘quidditious’ objects via properties when such a physicalist framework is employed