Code trolley: hardware-assisted control flow obfuscation

Many cybersecurity attacks rely on analyzing a binary executable to find exploitable sections of code. Code obfuscation is used to prevent attackers from reverse engineering these executables. In this work, we focus on control flow obfuscation - a technique that prevents attackers from statically determining which code segments are original, and which segments are added in to confuse attackers. We propose a RISC-V-based hardware-assisted deobfuscation technique that deobfuscates code at runtime based on a secret safely stored in hardware, along with an LLVM compiler extension for obfuscating binaries. Unlike conventional tools, our work does not rely on compiling hard-to-reverse-engineer code, but on securing a secret key. As such, it can be seen as a lightweight alternative to on-the-fly binary decryption.Published versio

CodeTrolley: Hardware-Assisted Control Flow Obfuscation

Many cybersecurity attacks rely on analyzing a binary executable to find exploitable sections of code. Code obfuscation is used to prevent attackers from reverse engineering these executables. In this work, we focus on control flow obfuscation - a technique that prevents attackers from statically determining which code segments are original, and which segments are added in to confuse attackers. We propose a RISC-V-based hardware-assisted deobfuscation technique that deobfuscates code at runtime based on a secret safely stored in hardware, along with an LLVM compiler extension for obfuscating binaries. Unlike conventional tools, our work does not rely on compiling hard-to-reverse-engineer code, but on securing a secret key. As such, it can be seen as a lightweight alternative to on-the-fly binary decryption.Comment: 2019 Boston Area Architecture Workshop (BARC'19

Methods to improve debug flow for intellectual property protection

Abstract. Every company wants to protect their intellectual property and limit customer visibility of confidential information. A company may protect its proprietary information by different ways. This thesis will compare different methods that try to protect intellectual property while maintaining the software debugging capability. Working with binary libraries without debug information makes customer support very difficult. When a company is developing a new product, time to market is important. Usually, the last months are very busy resolving urgent customer issues. Especially during this period, the slow process of debugging customer issues without debug information can cause delays and increase time to market. The goal of this thesis is to compare methods that protects intellectual property by making reverse engineering more difficult. Study of the upcoming GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) features related to debug data formats, such as DWARF5, is also carried out while working with the thesis. The approaches tried were split DWARF, injecting ELF files, stripping debug data, and code obfuscation. Also optimisation and their effect on disassembly was studied. The best solution was to compile the software with debug symbols and strip them to a separate file. This way the symbol data can be loaded separately into GDB. The symbol data layout and addresses are also always correct with the solution.Virheiden etsinnän työnkulun parantaminen immateriaaliomaisuudet huomioiden. Tiivistelmä. Yritykset haluavat suojella immateriaaliomaisuuksiaan ja rajoittaa asiakkaiden näkyvyyttä tietylle tasolle asti. Tämä lopputyö vertailee eri metodeja jotka koittavat suojata immateriaaliomaisuuksia, ilman että ohjelmiston virheidenkorjattavuus kärsii. Binäärikirjastot ilman virheenkorjaustietoja vaikeuttavat asiakkaan tukemista. Uutta tuotetta kehitettäessä, markkinoille tuloaika on yritykselle tärkeää. Yleensä viimeiset kuukaudet ovat kiireisiä asiakkaan ongelmien tutkimuksien kanssa ja kyseiset ongelmat tulisi olla ratkaistuna mahdollisimman nopeasti. Tämän lopputyön tavoitteena on vertailla mahdollisia metodeja, jotka suojaavat immateriaaliomaisuutta takaisinmallinnusta vastaan. Tarkoituksena on myös tutkia tulevia GNU kääntäjä-kokoelman (GCC:n) ominaisuuksia liittyen virheenkorjaustietoformaatteihin, kuten DWARF5. Ongelman ratkaisuun koitettiin pilkottuja virheenkorjaustietoja, ELFtiedoston injektointia, virheenkorjaustiedon riisumista ohjelmistosta ja koodin obfuskointia. Myös optimoinnin vaikutusta konekielestä takaisinmallinnettuun Assembly-muotoon tutkittiin. Paras ratkaisu oli kääntää ohjelmisto virheenkorjaustiedolla ja riisua ne omaan erilliseen tiedostoon. Näin ohjelmiston symbolitieto pystytään latamaan erikseen virheenjäljittemänä käytettyyn GNU Debuggeriin (GDB:hen). Näin symbolitietojen rakenne ja osoitteet ovat myös aina paikkansapitävät

On the Feasibility of Malware Authorship Attribution

There are many occasions in which the security community is interested to discover the authorship of malware binaries, either for digital forensics analysis of malware corpora or for thwarting live threats of malware invasion. Such a discovery of authorship might be possible due to stylistic features inherent to software codes written by human programmers. Existing studies of authorship attribution of general purpose software mainly focus on source code, which is typically based on the style of programs and environment. However, those features critically depend on the availability of the program source code, which is usually not the case when dealing with malware binaries. Such program binaries often do not retain many semantic or stylistic features due to the compilation process. Therefore, authorship attribution in the domain of malware binaries based on features and styles that will survive the compilation process is challenging. This paper provides the state of the art in this literature. Further, we analyze the features involved in those techniques. By using a case study, we identify features that can survive the compilation process. Finally, we analyze existing works on binary authorship attribution and study their applicability to real malware binaries.Comment: FPS 201

CIDPro: Custom Instructions for Dynamic Program Diversification

Timing side-channel attacks pose a major threat to embedded systems due to their ease of accessibility. We propose CIDPro, a framework that relies on dynamic program diversification to mitigate timing side-channel leakage. The proposed framework integrates the widely used LLVM compiler infrastructure and the increasingly popular RISC-V FPGA soft-processor. The compiler automatically generates custom instructions in the security critical segments of the program, and the instructions execute on the RISC-V custom co-processor to produce diversified timing characteristics on each execution instance. CIDPro has been implemented on the Zynq7000 XC7Z020 FPGA device to study the performance overhead and security tradeoffs. Experimental results show that our solution can achieve 80% and 86% timing side-channel capacity reduction for two benchmarks with an acceptable performance overhead compared to existing solutions. In addition, the proposed method incurs only a negligible hardware area overhead of 1% slices of the entire RISC-V system

When Are Opaque Predicates Useful?

Opaque predicates are a commonly used technique in program obfuscation, intended to add complexity to control flow and to insert dummy code or watermarks. However, there are many attacks known to detect opaque predicates and remove dummy code. We survey these attacks and argue that many types of programs cannot be securely obfuscated using opaque predicates. In particular we explain that most previous works on control flow obfuscation have introduced predicates that are easily distinguished from naturally occurring predicates in code, and hence easily removed by an attacker. We state two conditions that are necessary for a program to be suitable for control flow obfuscation. We give an integrated approach to control flow obfuscation that simultaneously obfuscates real predicates and introduces opaque predicates. The opaque predicates are indistinguishable from the obfuscated real predicates in the program. If an attacker applies the usual approaches (both static and dynamic) to identify and remove opaque predicates then they are likely to remove critical functionality and introduce errors. We have implemented our obfuscator in LLVM. We provide an analysis of the performance of the resulting obfuscated code

Static Behavioral Malware Detection over LLVM IR

Tato práce se zabývá metodami pro behaviorální detekci malware, které využívají techniky formální analýzy a verifikace. Základem je odvozování stromových automatů z grafů závislostí systémových volání, které jsou získány pomocí statické analýzy LLVM IR. V rámci práce je implementován prototyp detektoru, který využívá překladačovou infrastrukturu LLVM. Pro experimentální ověření detektoru je použit překladač jazyka C/C++, který je schopen generovat mutace malware za pomoci obfuskujících transformací. Výsledky předběžných experimentů a případná budoucí rozšíření detektoru jsou diskutovány v závěru práce.In this thesis we study methods for behavioral malware detection, which use techniques of formal verification. In particular we build on the works, which use inference of tree automata from syscall dependency graphs, obtained by static analysis of LLVM IR. We design and implement a prototype detector using the LLVM compiler framework. For experiments with the detector we use an obfuscating compiler capable of generating mutations of malware from C/C++ source code. We discuss preliminary experiments which show the capabilities of the detector and possible future extensions to the detector.