Your Code Is My Code: Exploiting a Common Weakness in OAuth 2.0 Implementations

Many millions of users routinely use their Google, Facebook and Microsoft accounts to log in to websites supporting OAuth 2.0-based single sign on. The security of OAuth 2.0 is therefore of critical importance, and it has been widely examined both in theory and in practice. In this paper we disclose a new class of practical attacks on OAuth 2.0 implementations, which we call Partial Redirection URI Manipulation Attacks. An attack of this type can be used by an attacker to gain a victim user’s OAuth 2.0 code (a token representing a right to access user data) without the user’s knowledge; this code can then be used to impersonate the user to the relevant relying party website. We examined 27 leading OAuth 2.0 identity providers, and found that 19 of them are vulnerable to these attacks

Analysing the Security of Google's implementation of OpenID Connect

Many millions of users routinely use their Google accounts to log in to relying party (RP) websites supporting the Google OpenID Connect service. OpenID Connect, a newly standardised single-sign-on protocol, builds an identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol, which has itself been widely adopted to support identity management services. It adds identity management functionality to the OAuth 2.0 system and allows an RP to obtain assurances regarding the authenticity of an end user. A number of authors have analysed the security of the OAuth 2.0 protocol, but whether OpenID Connect is secure in practice remains an open question. We report on a large-scale practical study of Google's implementation of OpenID Connect, involving forensic examination of 103 RP websites which support its use for sign-in. Our study reveals serious vulnerabilities of a number of types, all of which allow an attacker to log in to an RP website as a victim user. Further examination suggests that these vulnerabilities are caused by a combination of Google's design of its OpenID Connect service and RP developers making design decisions which sacrifice security for simplicity of implementation. We also give practical recommendations for both RPs and OPs to help improve the security of real world OpenID Connect systems

Resilient Risk based Adaptive Authentication and Authorization (RAD-AA) Framework

In recent cyber attacks, credential theft has emerged as one of the primary vectors of gaining entry into the system. Once attacker(s) have a foothold in the system, they use various techniques including token manipulation to elevate the privileges and access protected resources. This makes authentication and token based authorization a critical component for a secure and resilient cyber system. In this paper we discuss the design considerations for such a secure and resilient authentication and authorization framework capable of self-adapting based on the risk scores and trust profiles. We compare this design with the existing standards such as OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect and SAML 2.0. We then study popular threat models such as STRIDE and PASTA and summarize the resilience of the proposed architecture against common and relevant threat vectors. We call this framework as Resilient Risk based Adaptive Authentication and Authorization (RAD-AA). The proposed framework excessively increases the cost for an adversary to launch and sustain any cyber attack and provides much-needed strength to critical infrastructure. We also discuss the machine learning (ML) approach for the adaptive engine to accurately classify transactions and arrive at risk scores

Do not trust me: Using malicious IdPs for analyzing and attacking Single Sign-On

Single Sign-On (SSO) systems simplify login procedures by using an an Identity Provider (IdP) to issue authentication tokens which can be consumed by Service Providers (SPs). Traditionally, IdPs are modeled as trusted third parties. This is reasonable for SSO systems like Kerberos, MS Passport and SAML, where each SP explicitely specifies which IdP he trusts. However, in open systems like OpenID and OpenID Connect, each user may set up his own IdP, and a discovery phase is added to the protocol flow. Thus it is easy for an attacker to set up its own IdP. In this paper we use a novel approach for analyzing SSO authentication schemes by introducing a malicious IdP. With this approach we evaluate one of the most popular and widely deployed SSO protocols - OpenID. We found four novel attack classes on OpenID, which were not covered by previous research, and show their applicability to real-life implementations. As a result, we were able to compromise 11 out of 16 existing OpenID implementations like Sourceforge, Drupal and ownCloud. We automated discovery of these attacks in a open source tool OpenID Attacker, which additionally allows fine-granular testing of all parameters in OpenID implementations. Our research helps to better understand the message flow in the OpenID protocol, trust assumptions in the different components of the system, and implementation issues in OpenID components. It is applicable to other SSO systems like OpenID Connect and SAML. All OpenID implementations have been informed about their vulnerabilities and we supported them in fixing the issues

Automated Security Testing for Identity Management of Large-scale Digital Infrastructures

Ensuring the security of an organization's digital assets against cyber threats is critical in today's technology-driven world. Regular security testing is one of the measures that can help assess the effectiveness of security controls, identify vulnerabilities, and strengthen the overall cybersecurity posture. Identity Management (IdM) protocols such as Security Assertion Markup Language 2.0, OpenID Connect, and OAuth 2.0 play a crucial role in protecting against identity theft, fraud, and security breaches. Also, following the Best Current Practices introduced by the standards to enhance the security of IdM protocols is essential to minimize the risk of unauthorized access, data breaches, and other security threats and to maintain compliance with regulatory requirements, and build trust with users and stakeholders. However, deploying these protocols can be challenging due to the complexity in designing, developing and implementing cryptographic mechanisms. The implementation of IdM protocols encounters three significant obstacles: fragmented security information, rapidly evolving threat environment, and the need for a controlled testing environment. Security testers must stay up-to-date with emerging threats and establish an appropriate testing infrastructure to guarantee the security and robustness of IdM implementations, while also minimizing the possibility of security incidents that could adversely affect operations. Automated security testing plays a crucial role in addressing security concerns, particularly as the intricate functional aspects of IdM solutions contribute to their complexity. It is essential to prioritize automation to bridge the cybersecurity skills gap among IT professionals. In this thesis, we propose Micro-Id-Gym (MIG), a framework that offers (i) an easy way to configure and reproduce the IdM production environment in a sandbox, allowing hands-on experiences with potentially impactful security tests that may winder availability of services and (ii) automatic security testing of IdM implementations together with suggestions for mitigations to avoid identified vulnerabilities. MIG provides a set of security testing tools for creating, executing, and analyzing security test cases through MIG-L, a declarative test specification language. We have evaluated the effectiveness of MIG by conducting experiments to assess the accuracy in supporting detection of relevant vulnerabilities in the implementation of IdM protocols. We utilized MIG to conduct security analyses across various corporate scenarios and projects, identifying vulnerabilities and responsibly disclosing them through bug bounty programs. Our findings were recognized by the providers, who awarded us both monetary compensation and public recognition. Overall, MIG can help organizations establish a robust and agile security testing strategy, supported by suitable infrastructure and testing procedures, that can ensure the security and resilience of their IdM implementations

Access Management in Lightweight IoT: A Comprehensive review of ACE-OAuth framework

With the expansion of Internet of Things (IoT), the need for secure and scalable authentication and authorization mechanism for resource-constrained devices is becoming increasingly important. This thesis reviews the authentication and authorization mechanisms in resource-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) environments. The thesis focuses on the ACE-OAuth framework, which is a lightweight and scalable solution for access management in IoT. Traditional access management protocols are not well-suited for the resource-constrained environment of IoT devices. This makes the lightweight devices vulnerable to cyber-attacks and unauthorized access. This thesis explores the security mechanisms and standards, the protocol flow and comparison of ACE-OAuth profiles. It underlines their potential risks involved with the implementation. The thesis delves into the existing and emerging trends technologies of resource-constrained IoT and identifies limitations and potential threats in existing authentication and authorization methods. Furthermore, comparative analysis of ACE profiles demonstrated that the DTLS profile enables constrained servers to effectively handle client authentication and authorization. The OSCORE provides enhanced security and non-repudiation due to the Proof-of-Possession (PoP) mechanism, requiring client to prove the possession of cryptographic key to generate the access token. The key findings in this thesis, including security implications, strengths, and weaknesses for ACE OAuth profiles are covered in-depth. It shows that the ACE-OAuth framework’s strengths lie in its customization capabilities and scalability. This thesis demonstrates the practical applications and benefits of ACE-OAuth framework in diverse IoT deployments through implementation in smart home and factory use cases. Through these discussions, the research advances the application of authentication and authorization mechanisms and provides practical insights into overcoming the challenges in constrained IoT settings

Authentication proxy: delegating authentication towards SPID, the italian Public Digital Identity System

SPID, il Sistema Pubblico di Identità Digitale, è la soluzione italiana nata a Marzo 2013 per fornire un accesso unificato tramite identità digitali ai servizi pubblici e privati, messo a disposizione per i cittadini italiani. È un esempio mondiale di una collaborazione vincente tra il settore pubblico e il privato, e viene riconosciuto per la natura open-source del progetto e per la forte adozione tra i cittadini. Lo scopo di questa tesi è di offrire una analisi completa sul sistema SPID, sia da un punto di vista tecnico, sia da un punto di vista applicativo, implementando un sistema di autenticazione in una applicazione web Java Spring per una azienda privata. Andremo a vedere le componenti principali del sistema, il processo di autenticazione, gli aspetti di sicurezza e privacy, e i principali problemi che il sistema deve affrontare.SPID, Public Digital Identity System, is the italian solution born in March 2013 in order to provide a single unified digital identity card, for the citizens, to access public and private services. It is a worldwide example of a successful public-private partnership, and it is recognised for the open-source nature of the project, it also recognised for strong adoption among citizens. The goal of this thesis is to provide a complete analysis of the SPID system, from the technical point of view, to the implementation in a Java Spring web application for a private company. We will see the main components of the system, the authentication process, the security and privacy aspects, and the main problems that the system has to face