4,173 research outputs found

    Dynamic Congestion and Tolls with Mobile Source Emission

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    This paper proposes a dynamic congestion pricing model that takes into account mobile source emissions. We consider a tollable vehicular network where the users selfishly minimize their own travel costs, including travel time, early/late arrival penalties and tolls. On top of that, we assume that part of the network can be tolled by a central authority, whose objective is to minimize both total travel costs of road users and total emission on a network-wide level. The model is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) problem and then reformulated as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC). The MPCC is solved using a quadratic penalty-based gradient projection algorithm. A numerical study on a toy network illustrates the effectiveness of the tolling strategy and reveals a Braess-type paradox in the context of traffic-derived emission.Comment: 23 pages, 9 figures, 5 tables. Current version to appear in the Proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory, 2013, the Netherland

    Modeling the morning commute for urban networks with cruising-for-parking: An MFD approach

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    This study focuses on the morning commute problem with explicit consideration of cruising-for-parking, and its adverse impacts on traffic congestion. The cruising-for-parking is modeled through a dynamic aggregated traffic model for networks: the Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD). Firstly, we formulate the commuting equilibrium in a congested downtown network where travelers have to cruise for curbside parking spaces. The cruising-for-parking would yield longer trip distance and smaller network outflow, and thus can induce severe congestion and lengthen the morning peak. We then develop a dynamic model of pricing for the network to reduce total social cost, which includes cruising time cost, moving time cost (moving or in-transit time, which is the duration during which vehicles move close to the destination but do not cruise for parking yet), and schedule delay cost. We show that under specific assumptions, at the system optimum, the downtown network should be operating at the maximum production of its MFD. However, the cruising effect is not fully eliminated. We also show that the time-dependent toll to support the system optimum has a different shape than the classical fine toll in Vickrey's bottleneck model. In the end, analytical results are illustrated and verified with numerical experiments

    On the global stability of departure time user equilibrium: A Lyapunov approach

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    In (Jin, 2018), a new day-to-day dynamical system was proposed for drivers' departure time choice at a single bottleneck. Based on three behavioral principles, the nonlocal departure and arrival times choice problems were converted to the local scheduling payoff choice problem, whose day-to-day dynamics are described by the Lighthill-Whitham-Richards (LWR) model on an imaginary road of increasing scheduling payoff. Thus the departure time user equilibrium (DTUE), the arrival time user equilibrium (ATUE), and the scheduling payoff user equilibrium (SPUE) are uniquely determined by the stationary state of the LWR model, which was shown to be locally, asymptotically stable with analysis of the discrete approximation of the LWR model and through a numerical example. In this study attempt to analytically prove the global stability of the SPUE, ATUE, and DTUE. We first generalize the conceptual models for arrival time and scheduling payoff choices developed in (Jin, 2018) for a single bottleneck with a generalized scheduling cost function, which includes the cost of the free-flow travel time. Then we present the LWR model for the day-to-day dynamics for the scheduling payoff choice as well as the SPUE. We further formulate a new optimization problem for the SPUE and demonstrate its equivalent to the optimization problem for the ATUE in (Iryo and Yoshii, 2007). Finally we show that the objective functions in the two optimization formulations are equal and can be used as the potential function for the LWR model and prove that the stationary state of the LWR model, and therefore, the SPUE, DTUE, and ATUE, are globally, asymptotically stable, by using Lyapunov's second method. Such a globally stable behavioral model can provide more efficient departure time and route choice guidance for human drivers and connected and autonomous vehicles in more complicated networks.Comment: 17 pages, 3 figure

    A demand model with departure time choice for within-day dynamic traffic assignment

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    A within-clay dynamic demand model is formulated, embodying, in addition to the classic generation, distribution and modal split stages, an actual demand model taking into account departure time choice. The work focuses on this last stage, represented through an extension of the discrete choice framework to a continuous choice set. The dynamic multimodal supply and equilibrium model based on implicit path enumeration, which have been developed in previous work are outlined here, to define within-day dynamic elastic demand stochastic multimodal equilibrium as a fixed point problem on users flows and transit line frequencies. A MSA algorithm capable, in the case of Logit route choice models, of supplying equilibrium flows and frequencies on real dimension networks, is presented, as well as the specific procedures implementing the departure time choice and actual demand models. Finally, the results obtained on a test network are presented and conclusions are drawn. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

    ๊ณต์œ  ์ž์œจ์ฃผํ–‰ ์ฐจ๋Ÿ‰ ์„œ๋น„์Šค๋ฅผ ํ™œ์šฉํ•œ ์ตœ์  ๊ตํ†ต ๊ฒฝ๋กœ ๋ฌธ์ œ

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ(์„์‚ฌ)--์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› :๊ณต๊ณผ๋Œ€ํ•™ ์‚ฐ์—…๊ณตํ•™๊ณผ,2019. 8. Moon, Ilkyeong.This thesis describes a traffic-aware routing problem with shared autonomous vehicles by incorporating jams along traffic flow due to the large population of vehicles in the network. This anticipates that autonomous vehicles will replace privately owned vehicles in the future. To provide an efficient shared common service, the dial-a-ride problem is combined with the traffic flow model to satisfy demand (origin-destination pairs), producing a system-optimal traffic assignment problem solution. Macroscopic traffic flow is modelled via the two--regime transmission model (TTM), utilizing inflow and outflow for each link. The optimal solution demonstrates that an appropriate number of vehicles is utilized regardless of the demand or fleet size due to congestion limitations.๋ณธ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋Š” ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ ๋‚ด ๊ตํ†ต ํ๋ฆ„ ํ˜ผ์žก์„ ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜๋Š” ๊ณต์œ  ์ž์œจ์ฃผํ–‰ ์ฐจ๋Ÿ‰ ๊ฒฝ๋กœ๋ฌธ์ œ(Shared Autonomous Vehicle Routing Problem)๋ฅผ ๋‹ค๋ฃจ๊ณ  ์žˆ๋‹ค. ์ด ๋ฌธ์ œ๋Š” ํ–ฅํ›„ ์ž์œจ์ฃผํ–‰์ฐจ๊ฐ€ ๊ฐœ์ธ ์†Œ์œ ์˜ ์ฐจ๋ฅผ ๋Œ€์ฒดํ•  ๊ฒƒ์ด๋ผ๋Š” ๊ด€์ ์—์„œ ์‹œ์ž‘๋˜์—ˆ๋‹ค. ํšจ์œจ์ ์ธ ๊ณต์œ  ์„œ๋น„์Šค๋ฅผ ์ œ๊ณตํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด, ๊ธฐ์กด์˜ ๋‹ค์ด์–ผ ์–ด ๋ผ์ด๋“œ(Dial-A-Ride) ๋ฌธ์ œ์— ์ถœ๋ฐœ์ง€์™€ ๋„์ฐฉ์ง€ ๊ฐ„์˜ ์ˆ˜์š”๋ฅผ ๋งŒ์กฑํ•˜๋„๋ก ํ•˜๋Š” ๊ตํ†ต ํ๋ฆ„ ๋ชจ๋ธ์„ ๊ฒฐํ•ฉํ•ด ์ตœ์ ์˜ ๊ตํ†ต ํ• ๋‹น ๋ฌธ์ œ๋ฅผ ์ œ์•ˆํ•œ๋‹ค. ๊ฑฐ์‹œ์ ์ธ ๊ตํ†ต ํ๋ฆ„์€ ๋„คํŠธ์›Œํฌ ๊ฐ ๋งํฌ์— ์œ ์ž… ๋ฐ ์œ ์ถœ์„ ํ™œ์šฉํ•œ ์ด์ค‘ ์ฒด์ œ ์ „์†ก(Two Regime Transmission) ๋ชจ๋ธ์„ ํ™œ์šฉํ•œ๋‹ค. ํ˜ผ์žก์œผ๋กœ ์ธํ•œ ์ œ์•ฝ๋“ค๋กœ ์ธํ•ด ์ˆ˜์š” ๋ฐ ์ฐจ๋Ÿ‰ ํฌ๊ธฐ์™€ ๊ด€๊ณ„์—†์ด ์ตœ์ ์˜ ํ•ด์—์„œ๋Š” ์ตœ๋Œ€ ์ฐจ๋Ÿ‰ ์ˆ˜๊ฐ€ ํ™œ์šฉ๋˜๊ณ  ์žˆ์Œ์„ ๋ณด์—ฌ์ค€๋‹ค. ๋˜ํ•œ, ํ”ผํฌ ๊ตํ†ต ์‹œ๊ฐ„๋Œ€์—์„œ๋Š” ์ˆ˜์š”์— ๋”ฐ๋ฅธ ์ตœ์ ์˜ ๊ตํ†ต ํ• ๋‹น๊ณผ ์ฐจ๋Ÿ‰ ํฌ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์–ป์–ด ๊ตํ†ต ํ˜ผ์žก์— ํ™œ์šฉํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค.Chapter 1: Introduction 1 1.1. Background and Purpose 1 1.2. Literature Survey 3 1.2.1. Shared Autonomous Vehicle 3 1.2.2. VRP and DARP 5 1.2.3. Traffic-flow Model 9 Chapter 2: Mathematical Model 15 2.1. Model Development 16 2.2. Traffic Network 17 2.3. Explanations on Constraints 19 2.4. Objective Function 28 2.5. Mathematical Formulation 31 Chapter 3: Computational Experiments 35 3.1. Test Network 35 3.2. Comparison with Static Traffic Assignment Formulation 38 3.3. Experiments 39 3.3.1. Effects of Change in Demand on Utilization Rate 40 3.3.2. Effects of Change in Demand on VMT 41 3.3.3. Effects of Change in Demand on Total Travel Time 42 3.3.4. Effects of Change in Fleet Size on Total Travel Time 44 3.3.5. Effects of Change in Time Intervals on Computational Time and Complexity 45 Chapter 4: Conclusions 49 Acknowledgements 52 ๊ตญ๋ฌธ์ดˆ๋ก 59 Appendix 60 i) IBM CPLEX ILOG Linear Programming Code 60 ii) Two Regime Transmission Model Mathematical Proof 64Maste

    AN INTEGRATED SCORE-BASED TRAFFIC LAW ENFORCEMENT AND NETWORK MANAGEMENT IN CONNECTED VEHICLE ENVIRONMENT

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    The increasing number of traffic accidents and the associated traffic congestion have prompted the development of innovative technologies to curb such problems. This dissertation introduces a novel Score-Based Traffic Law Enforcement and Network Management System (SLEM), which leverages connected vehicle (CV) and telematics technologies. SLEM assigns a score to each driver which reflects her/his driving performance and compliance with traffic laws over a predefined period of time. The proposed system adopts a rewarding mechanism that rewards high-performance drivers and penalizes low-performance drivers who fail to obey traffic laws. The reward mechanism is in the form of a route guidance strategy that restricts low-score drivers from accessing certain roadway sections and time periods that are strategically selected in order to shift the network traffic distribution pattern from the undesirable user equilibrium (UE) pattern to the system optimal (SO) pattern. Hence, it not only incentivizes drivers to improve their driving performance, but it also provides a mechanism to manage network congestion in which high-score drivers experience less congestion and a higher level of safety at the expense of low-performing drivers. This dissertation is divided into twofold. iv First, a nationwide survey study was conducted to measure public acceptance of the SLEM system. Another survey targeted a focused group of traffic operation and safety professionals. Based on the results of these surveys, a set of logistic regression models was developed to examine the sensitivity of public acceptance to policy and behavioral variables. The results showed that about 65 percent of the public and about 60.0 percent of professionals who participated in this study support the real-world implementation of SLEM. Second, we present a modeling framework for the optimal design of SLEMโ€™s routing strategy, which is described in the form of a score threshold for each route. Under SLEMโ€™s routing strategy, drivers are allowed to use a particular route only if their driving scores satisfy the score threshold assigned to that route. The problem is formulated as a bi-level mathematical program in which the upper-level problem minimizes total network travel time, while the lower-level problem captures driversโ€™ route choice behavior under SLEM. An efficient solution methodology developed for the problem is presented. The solution methodology adopts a heuristic-based approach that determines the score thresholds that minimize the difference between the traffic distribution pattern under SLEMโ€™s routing strategy and the SO pattern. The framework was applied to the network of the US-75 Corridor in Dallas, Texas, and a set of simulation-based experiments was conducted to evaluate the network performance given different driver populations, score class aggregation levels, recurrent and non-recurrent congestion scenarios, and driver compliance rates

    CARMA: Fair and efficient bottleneck congestion management via non-tradable karma credits

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    This paper proposes a non-monetary traffic demand management scheme, named CARMA, as a fair solution to the morning commute congestion. We consider heterogeneous commuters traveling through a single bottleneck that differ in both the desired arrival time and Value of Time (VOT). We consider a generalized notion of VOT by allowing it to vary dynamically on each day (e.g., according to trip purpose and urgency), rather than being a static characteristic of each individual. In our CARMA scheme, the bottleneck is divided into a fast lane that is kept in free flow and a slow lane that is subject to congestion. We introduce a non-tradable mobility credit, named karma, that is used by commuters to bid for access to the fast lane. Commuters who get outbid or do not participate in the CARMA scheme instead use the slow lane. At the end of each day, karma collected from the bidders is redistributed, and the process repeats day by day. We model the collective commuter behaviors under CARMA as a Dynamic Population Game (DPG), in which a Stationary Nash Equilibrium (SNE) is guaranteed to exist. Unlike existing monetary schemes, CARMA is demonstrated, both analytically and numerically, to achieve a) an equitable traffic assignment with respect to heterogeneous income classes and b) a strong Pareto improvement in the long-term average travel disutility with respect to no policy intervention. With extensive numerical analysis, we show that CARMA is able to retain the same congestion reduction as an optimal monetary tolling scheme under uniform karma redistribution and even outperform tolling under a well-designed redistribution scheme. We also highlight the privacy-preserving feature of CARMA, i.e., its ability to tailor to the private preferences of commuters without centrally collecting the information
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