966 research outputs found
Everything New Is Old Again: Brain Fingerprinting and Evidentiary Analogy
Brain Fingerprinting uses electroencephalography to ascertain the presence or absence of information in a subject\u27s brain based on his reaction to particular stimuli. As a new forensic tool, Brain Fingerprinting technology stands poised to exert a tremendous impact on the presentation and outcome of selected legal cases in the near future. It also provides a fertile case study to examine the role of analogical reasoning in the process by which lawyers, experts, judges, and the media influence how factjinders perceive and evaluate unfamiliar types of proof When juridical metaphor disguises, distorts, or destroys ideas, it ceases to serve as an aid to understanding and functions instead as an obstacle to knowledge. This Note explores the ways in which evidentiary analogy may insidiously shape how courts treat novel forms of scientific evidence
âIt's the one thing that makes my life tickâ:security perspectives of the smartphone era
As smartphones overtake personal computers as the device of choice for internet access and everyday digital tasks, cybersecurity becomes a pressing issue for the platform. Research has found that smartphone users appear to act less securely than they would on a PC, but the reasons for this are unclear. The technology, the threats, and the role of smartphones have all developed in recent years, and this paper examines what smartphone security looks like to users in the 2020s. We interviewed 27 smartphone users about their security attitudes and behaviours. We find that users place great emphasis on, and take responsibility for, the physical security of their device, but minimise their responsibility for dealing with digital threats. We observe key contextual factors that influence how users protect their smartphones. The increasing monetary cost of smartphones and usersâ functional reliance on them, causes participants to be highly concerned with protecting the physical safety and integrity of their devices. However, users appear to have a high level of trust in apps, based on the vetting processes of official app stores, yet they are still vulnerable to abuse from malicious/unnecessary permissions, and exhibit poor security habits when accessing illegitimate, pirated media outside of their smartphone's app store
Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection
Smart police body cameras and smart glasses worn by law enforcement increasingly reflect state-of-the-art surveillance technology, such as the integration of live-streaming video with facial recognition and artificial intelligence tools, including automated analytics. This Article explores how these emerging cybersurveillance technologies risk the potential for bulk biometric metadata collection. Such collection is likely to fall outside the scope of the types of bulk metadata collection protections regulated by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. The USA FREEDOM Act was intended to bring the practice of bulk telephony metadata collection conducted by the National Security Agency (âNSAâ) under tighter regulation. In the wake of the disclosures by Edward Snowden in June 2013, members of Congress called for statutory reform to eliminate or significantly curtail indiscriminate metadata surveillance of United States citizens. The Snowden revelations illuminated that the bulk telephony metadata collection program had been legally justified under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This Article contends that the USA FREEDOM Act, which amended Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, does not restrict other types of non-telephony bulk metadata collection. This Article concludes that, rather than more tightly regulating metadata surveillance, the Act allows for metadata surveillance to proceed under differing justifications and in more delegated contexts. The potential of ubiquitous and continuous data collection and analysis that may stem from smart body cameras or smart glasses worn by law enforcement offers an important case study on why the USA FREEDOM Act is unable to regulate bulk biometric metadata collection
Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection
Smart police body cameras and smart glasses worn by law enforcement increasingly reflect state-of-the-art surveillance technology, such as the integration of live-streaming video with facial recognition and artificial intelligence tools, including automated analytics. This Article explores how these emerging cybersurveillance technologies risk the potential for bulk biometric metadata collection. Such collection is likely to fall outside the scope of the types of bulk metadata collection protections regulated by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. The USA FREEDOM Act was intended to bring the practice of bulk telephony metadata collection conducted by the National Security Agency (âNSAâ) under tighter regulation. In the wake of the disclosures by Edward Snowden in June 2013, members of Congress called for statutory reform to eliminate or significantly curtail indiscriminate metadata surveillance of United States citizens. The Snowden revelations illuminated that the bulk telephony metadata collection program had been legally justified under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This Article contends that the USA FREEDOM Act, which amended Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, does not restrict other types of non-telephony bulk metadata collection. This Article concludes that, rather than more tightly regulating metadata surveillance, the Act allows for metadata surveillance to proceed under differing justifications and in more delegated contexts. The potential of ubiquitous and continuous data collection and analysis that may stem from smart body cameras or smart glasses worn by law enforcement offers an important case study on why the USA FREEDOM Act is unable to regulate bulk biometric metadata collection
Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection
Smart police body cameras and smart glasses worn by law enforcement increasingly reflect state-of-the-art surveillance technology, such as the integration of live-streaming video with facial recognition and artificial intelligence tools, including automated analytics. This Article explores how these emerging cybersurveillance technologies risk the potential for bulk biometric metadata collection. Such collection is likely to fall outside the scope of the types of bulk metadata collection protections regulated by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. The USA FREEDOM Act was intended to bring the practice of bulk telephony metadata collection conducted by the National Security Agency (âNSAâ) under tighter regulation. In the wake of the disclosures by Edward Snowden in June 2013, members of Congress called for statutory reform to eliminate or significantly curtail indiscriminate metadata surveillance of United States citizens. The Snowden revelations illuminated that the bulk telephony metadata collection program had been legally justified under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This Article contends that the USA FREEDOM Act, which amended Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, does not restrict other types of non-telephony bulk metadata collection. This Article concludes that, rather than more tightly regulating metadata surveillance, the Act allows for metadata surveillance to proceed under differing justifications and in more delegated contexts. The potential of ubiquitous and continuous data collection and analysis that may stem from smart body cameras or smart glasses worn by law enforcement offers an important case study on why the USA FREEDOM Act is unable to regulate bulk biometric metadata collection
Envisioning technology through discourse: a case study of biometrics in the National Identity Scheme in the United Kingdom
Around the globe, governments are pursuing policies that depend on
information technology (IT). The United Kingdomâs National Identity Scheme
was a government proposal for a national identity system, based on
biometrics. These proposals for biometrics provide us with an opportunity to
explore the diverse and shifting discourses that accompany the attempted
diffusion of a controversial IT innovation. This thesis offers a longitudinal case
study of these visionary discourses.
I begin with a critical review of the literature on biometrics, drawing attention to
the lack of in-depth studies that explore the discursive and organizational
dynamics accompanying their implementation on a national scale. I then
devise a theoretical framework to study these speculative and future-directed
discourses based on concepts and ideas from organizing visions theory, the
sociology of expectations, and critical approaches to studying the publicâs
understanding of technology. A methodological discussion ensues in which I
explain my research approach and methods for data collection and analysis,
including techniques for critical discourse analysis. After briefly introducing the
case study, I proceed to the two-part analysis. First is an analysis of
government actorsâ discourses on biometrics, revolving around formal policy
communications; second is an analysis of media discourses and
parliamentary debates around certain critical moments for biometrics in the
Scheme.
The analysis reveals how the uncertain concept of biometrics provided a
strategic rhetorical device whereby government spokespeople were able to
offer a flexible yet incomplete vision for the technology. I contend that, despite being distinctive and offering some practical value to the proposals for
national identity cards, the governmentâs discourses on biometrics remained
insufficiently intelligible, uninformative, and implausible.
The concluding discussion explains the unraveling visions for biometrics in the
case, offers a theoretical contribution based on the case analysis, and
provides insights about discourses on the âpublicsâ of new technology such as
biometrics
Public Video Surveillance and the Separation of Powers
The thesis focuses on the response from the United States government on new challenges brought by the public video surveillance, in particular the privacy threat. Regarding regulating public video surveillance, the United States has gone on a different path, either from Britain with its similar political system or from China with a totally different one. The three branches of government in the U.S. are deadlocked and unable to take any meaningful actions. The Supreme Court, which is in a strong position to set national and uniform standards for privacy protection, has not found a way to break away from its own precedents. The legislative branch can do little on the national level regulations due to federalism and the distribution of law enforcement activities at the state and local level. Local legislative efforts might be helpful, but the process in each place will be complicated by concerns about public security, the interests of industry, and politiciansâ imperative to take visible actions like video surveillance to fight against crimes and protect people, especially in the post-9/11 context. The executive branch might be the weakest point in the deadlock because it already bears responsibility for resolving tensions between privacy and safety. In the absence of action by the judicial and the legislative branches, self-restraint by the executive branch has become crucial in determining the actual privacy protection, however, the possibility of abuse by the executive branch may increase at the same time. Also, the United Statesâ local governments are not accountable to a single national authority. They must be accountable to the people. This thesis concludes that the public participation is the key to breaking through the deadlock in light of the democratic political structure in the United States
Public Video Surveillance and the Separation of Powers
The thesis focuses on the response from the United States government on new challenges brought by the public video surveillance, in particular the privacy threat. Regarding regulating public video surveillance, the United States has gone on a different path, either from Britain with its similar political system or from China with a totally different one. The three branches of government in the U.S. are deadlocked and unable to take any meaningful actions. The Supreme Court, which is in a strong position to set national and uniform standards for privacy protection, has not found a way to break away from its own precedents. The legislative branch can do little on the national level regulations due to federalism and the distribution of law enforcement activities at the state and local level. Local legislative efforts might be helpful, but the process in each place will be complicated by concerns about public security, the interests of industry, and politiciansâ imperative to take visible actions like video surveillance to fight against crimes and protect people, especially in the post-9/11 context. The executive branch might be the weakest point in the deadlock because it already bears responsibility for resolving tensions between privacy and safety. In the absence of action by the judicial and the legislative branches, self-restraint by the executive branch has become crucial in determining the actual privacy protection, however, the possibility of abuse by the executive branch may increase at the same time. Also, the United Statesâ local governments are not accountable to a single national authority. They must be accountable to the people. This thesis concludes that the public participation is the key to breaking through the deadlock in light of the democratic political structure in the United States
The Rise of iWar: Identity, Information, and the Individualization of Modern Warfare
During a decade of global counterterrorism operations and two extended counterinsurgency campaigns, the United States was confronted with a new kind of adversary. Without uniforms, flags, and formations, the task of identifying and targeting these combatants represented an unprecedented operational challenge for which Cold War era doctrinal methods were largely unsuited. This monograph examines the doctrinal, technical, and bureaucratic innovations that evolved in response to these new operational challenges. It discusses the transition from a conventionally focused, Cold War-era targeting process to one optimized for combating networks and conducting identity-based targeting. It analyzes the policy decisions and strategic choices that were the catalysts of this change and concludes with an in depth examination of emerging technologies that are likely to shape how this mode of warfare will be waged in the future.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1436/thumbnail.jp
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