The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence

In this paper, I present and defend a novel account of doubt. In Part 1, I make some preliminary observations about the nature of doubt. In Part 2, I introduce a new puzzle about the relationship between three psychological states: doubt, belief, and confidence. I present this puzzle because my account of doubt emerges as a possible solution to it. Lastly, in Part 3, I elaborate on and defend my account of doubt. Roughly, one has doubt if and only if one believes one might be wrong; I argue that this is superior to the account that says that one has doubt if and only if one has less than the highest degree of confidence

Minds, Brains and Turing

Turing set the agenda for (what would eventually be called) the cognitive sciences. He said, essentially, that cognition is as cognition does (or, more accurately, as cognition is capable of doing): Explain the causal basis of cognitive capacity and you’ve explained cognition. Test your explanation by designing a machine that can do everything a normal human cognizer can do – and do it so veridically that human cognizers cannot tell its performance apart from a real human cognizer’s – and you really cannot ask for anything more. Or can you? Neither Turing modelling nor any other kind of computational r dynamical modelling will explain how or why cognizers feel

'The good man is the measure of all things': objectivity without world-centredness in Aristotle's moral epistemology

I begin by contrasting Aristotle's 'world-centred' general epistemology, and his 'mind-centred' (more exactly, 'agathos-centred�) moral epistemology. I argue that Aristotle takes this approach, not because he doubts the objectivity of ethics, nor because he is an 'ethical particularist' (whatever one of those is), but because of the reflexive nature of ethics as a study. I further argue that, by taking the notion that 'the good man is the measure of all things' as central to Aristotle's ethics, we can see how to unify coherently the rather embarrassingly diverse ethical resources that Aristotle offers us

Sentenced for a “Crime” the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather Than Elements of the Offense

Priester argues that the Constitution does restrict the power of the legislature by requiring that certain facts be proved as elements of the offense. He notes the Supreme Court\u27s missed opportunity in Jones v. United States to adopt the test proposed by Justice Scalia

Humean Effective Strategies

In a now-classic paper, Nancy Cartwright argued that the Humean conception of causation as mere regular co-occurrence is too weak to make sense of our everyday and scientific practices. Specifically she claimed that in order to understand our reasoning about, and uses of, effective strategies, we need a metaphysically stronger notion of causation and causal laws than Humeanism allows. Cartwright’s arguments were formulated in the framework of probabilistic causation, and it is precisely in the domain of (objective) probabilities that I am interested in defending a form of Humeanism. In this paper I will unpack some examples of effective strategies and discuss how well they fit the framework of causal laws and criteria such as CC from Cartwright’s and others’ works on probabilistic causality. As part of this discussion, I will also consider the concept or concepts of objective probability presupposed in these works. I will argue that Cartwright’s notion of a nomological machine, or a mechanism as defined by Stuart Glennan, is better suited for making sense of effective strategies, and therefore that a metaphysically primitive notion of causal law (or singular causation, or capacity, as Cartwright argues in (1989)) is not – here, at least – needed. These conclusions, as well as the concept of objective probabilities I defend, are largely in harmony with claims Cartwright defends in The Dappled World. My discussion aims, thus, to bring out into the open how far Cartwright’s current views are from a radically anti-Humean, causal-fundamentalist picture

Doing, Feeling, Meaning And Explaining

It is “easy” to explain doing, “hard” to explain feeling. Turing has set the agenda for the easy explanation (though it will be a long time coming). I will try to explain why and how explaining feeling will not only be hard, but impossible. Explaining meaning will prove almost as hard because meaning is a hybrid of know-how and what it feels like to know how

Sentenced for a “Crime” the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather Than Elements of the Offense

Priester argues that the Constitution does restrict the power of the legislature by requiring that certain facts be proved as elements of the offense. He notes the Supreme Court\u27s missed opportunity in Jones v. United States to adopt the test proposed by Justice Scalia

What is tested when experiments test that quantum dynamics is linear

Experiments that look for nonlinear quantum dynamics test the fundamental premise of physics that one of two separate systems can influence the physical behavior of the other only if there is a force between them, an interaction that involves momentum and energy. The premise is tested because it is the assumption of a proof that quantum dynamics must be linear. Here variations of a familiar example are used to show how results of nonlinear dynamics in one system can depend on correlations with the other. Effects of one system on the other, influence without interaction between separate systems, not previously considered possible, would be expected with nonlinear quantum dynamics. Whether it is possible or not is subject to experimental tests together with the linearity of quantum dynamics. Concluding comments and questions consider directions our thinking might take in response to this surprising unprecedented situation.Comment: 14 pages, Title changed, sentences adde

Hume’s Academic Scepticism: A Reappraisal of His Philosophy of Human Understanding

A philosopher once wrote the following words:If I examine the PTOLOMAIC and COPERNICAN systems, I endeavour only, by my enquiries, to know the real situation of the planets; that is, in other words, I endeavour to give them, in my conception, the same relations, that they bear towards each other in the heavens. To this operation of the mind, therefore, there seems to be always a real, though often an unknown standard, in the nature of things; nor is truth or falsehood variable by the various apprehensions of mankind. Though all human race should for ever conclude, that the sun moves, and the earth remains at rest, the sun stirs not an inch from his place for all these reasonings; and such conclusions are eternally false and erroneous