7,413 research outputs found
The Prediction value
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational
importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and
a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player 's prediction
value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of when
cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member
of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a
consistency property. Every -player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV
for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV
can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some
semivalues -- including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value -- can be
interpreted in terms of informational importance.Comment: 26 pages, 2 table
A Theory of Attribution
Attribution of economic joint effects is achieved with a random order model of their relative importance. Random order consistency and elementary axioms uniquely identify linear and proportional marginal attribution. These are the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999, 2002) and Ortmann (2000)) values of the dual of the implied cooperative game. Random order consistency does not use a reduced game. Restricted potentials facilitate identification of proportional value derivatives and coalition formation results. Attributions of econometric model performance, using data from Fair (1978), show stability across models. Proportional marginal attribution (PMA) is found to correctly identify factor relative importance and to have a role in model construction. A portfolio attribution example illuminates basic issues regarding utility attribution and demonstrates investment applications. PMA is also shown to mitigate concerns (e.g., Thomas (1977)) regarding strategic behavior induced by linear cost attribution.Coalition formation; consistency; cost allocation; joint effects; proportional value; random order model; relative importance; restricted potential; Shapley value and variance decomposition
An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version)
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.Non-Transferable utility games, Shapley value, Ordinal Shapley value, consistency, fairness.
An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.Non-Transferable utility games, Shapley value, consistency, fairness
Taxation and stability in cooperative games
Cooperative games are a useful framework for modeling multi-agent behavior in environments where agents must collaborate in order to complete tasks. Having jointly completed a task and generated revenue, agents need to agree on some reasonable method of sharing their profits. One particularly appealing family of payoff divisions is the core, which consists of all coalitionally rational (or, stable) payoff divisions. Unfortunately, it is often the case that the core of a game is empty, i.e. there is no payoff scheme guaranteeing each group of agents a total payoff higher than what they can get on their own. As stability is a highly attractive property, there have been various methods of achieving it proposed in the literature. One natural way of stabilizing a game is via taxation, i.e. reducing the value of some coalitions in order to decrease their bargaining power. Existing taxation methods include the ε-core, the least-core and several others. However, taxing coalitions is in general undesirable: one would not wish to overly tamper with a given coalitional game, or overly tax the agents. Thus, in this work we study minimal taxation policies, i.e. those minimizing the amount of tax required in order to stabilize a given game. We show that games that minimize the total tax are to some extent a linear approximation of the original games, and explore their properties. We demonstrate connections between the minimal tax and the cost of stability, and characterize the types of games for which it is possible to obtain a tax-minimizing policy using variants of notion of the ε-core, as well as those for which it is possible to do so using reliability extensions. Copyright © 2013, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved
On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games
We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative
solutions that satisfy these axioms. However, when considering an assignment game as a communication graph game where the game is simply the assignment game and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph buyers are connected with sellers only, we show that
Myerson's component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, these
two axioms have a natural interpretation for assignment games. Component
efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that submarket,
where a submarket is a set of buyers and sellers such that
all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations
for the goods offered by sellers inside the set. Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that only
changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the
same amount
A Dual Model of Cooperative Value
An expanded model of value in cooperative games is presented in which value has either a linear or a proportional mode, and NTU value has either an input or an output basis. In TU games, the modes correspond to the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999) and Ortmann (2000)) values. In NTU games, the Nash (1950) bargaining solution and the Owen- Maschler (1989, 1992) value have a linear mode and an input basis. The egalitarian value (Kalai and Samet (1985)) has a linear mode and an output basis. The output-basis NTU proportional value (Feldman (1999)) and the input-basis variant, identified here, complete the model. The TU proportional value is shown to have a random marginal contribution representation and to be in the core of a positive convex game. The output-basis NTU variant is shown to be the unique efficient Hart and Mas-Colell consistent NTU value based on equal proportional gain in two-player TU games. Both NTU proportional values are shown to be equilibrium payoffs in variations of the bargaining game of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). In these variations, players' probabilities of participation at any point in the game are a function of their expected payoff at that time. Limit results determine conditions under which players with zero individual worth receive zero value. Further results show the distinctive nature of proportional allocations to players with small individual worths. In an example with a continuum of players bargaining with a monopolist, the monopolist obtains the entire surplus.cooperative game, value, mode, basis, bilateral cooperation, endogenous bargaining power, potential, equal proportional gain, consistency, noncooperative bargaining, zero players, monopoly
BARGAINING, VOTING, AND VALUE
This paper addresses the following issue: If a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives 'in the shadow' of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a 'winning coalition' supports it, what general agreements are likely to arise? In other words: What influence can the voting rule used to settle (possibly non-unanimous) agreements have on the outcome of negotiations? To give an answer we model the situation as an extension of the Nash bargaining problem in which an arbitrary voting rule replaces unanimity to settle agreements by n players. This provides a setting in which a natural extension of Nash's solution is obtained axiomatically. Two extensions admitting randomization on voting rules based on two informational scenarios are considered.Bargaining, voting, value, bargaining in committees.
Subjective Equilibria under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty
We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium
under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in
which each player chooses its decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a
stochastic environment process driving the system is exogenous whereas in
actuality this process is a solution of closed-loop dynamics affected by each
individual player. Players observe past realizations of the environment
variables and their local information. At equilibrium, if players are given the
full distribution of the stochastic environment process as if it were an
exogenous process, they would have no incentive to unilaterally deviate from
their strategies. This notion thus generalizes what is known as the
price-taking equilibrium in prior literature to a stochastic and dynamic setup.
We establish existence of SEBEU, study various properties and present explicit
solutions. We obtain the -Nash equilibrium property of SEBEU when
there are many players
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