Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games

In a scheduling game, each player owns a job and chooses a machine to execute it. While the social cost is the maximal load over all machines (makespan), the cost (disutility) of each player is the completion time of its own job. In the game, players may follow selfish strategies to optimize their cost and therefore their behaviors do not necessarily lead the game to an equilibrium. Even in the case there is an equilibrium, its makespan might be much larger than the social optimum, and this inefficiency is measured by the price of anarchy -- the worst ratio between the makespan of an equilibrium and the optimum. Coordination mechanisms aim to reduce the price of anarchy by designing scheduling policies that specify how jobs assigned to a same machine are to be scheduled. Typically these policies define the schedule according to the processing times as announced by the jobs. One could wonder if there are policies that do not require this knowledge, and still provide a good price of anarchy. This would make the processing times be private information and avoid the problem of truthfulness. In this paper we study these so-called non-clairvoyant policies. In particular, we study the RANDOM policy that schedules the jobs in a random order without preemption, and the EQUI policy that schedules the jobs in parallel using time-multiplexing, assigning each job an equal fraction of CPU time

Smooth Inequalities and Equilibrium Inefficiency in Scheduling Games

We study coordination mechanisms for Scheduling Games (with unrelated machines). In these games, each job represents a player, who needs to choose a machine for its execution, and intends to complete earliest possible. Our goal is to design scheduling policies that always admit a pure Nash equilibrium and guarantee a small price of anarchy for the l_k-norm social cost --- the objective balances overall quality of service and fairness. We consider policies with different amount of knowledge about jobs: non-clairvoyant, strongly-local and local. The analysis relies on the smooth argument together with adequate inequalities, called smooth inequalities. With this unified framework, we are able to prove the following results. First, we study the inefficiency in l_k-norm social costs of a strongly-local policy SPT and a non-clairvoyant policy EQUI. We show that the price of anarchy of policy SPT is O(k). We also prove a lower bound of Omega(k/log k) for all deterministic, non-preemptive, strongly-local and non-waiting policies (non-waiting policies produce schedules without idle times). These results ensure that SPT is close to optimal with respect to the class of l_k-norm social costs. Moreover, we prove that the non-clairvoyant policy EQUI has price of anarchy O(2^k). Second, we consider the makespan (l_infty-norm) social cost by making connection within the l_k-norm functions. We revisit some local policies and provide simpler, unified proofs from the framework's point of view. With the highlight of the approach, we derive a local policy Balance. This policy guarantees a price of anarchy of O(log m), which makes it the currently best known policy among the anonymous local policies that always admit a pure Nash equilibrium.Comment: 25 pages, 1 figur

SELFISHMIGRATE: A Scalable Algorithm for Non-clairvoyantly Scheduling Heterogeneous Processors

We consider the classical problem of minimizing the total weighted flow-time for unrelated machines in the online \emph{non-clairvoyant} setting. In this problem, a set of jobs $J$ arrive over time to be scheduled on a set of $M$ machines. Each job $j$ has processing length $p_j$, weight $w_j$, and is processed at a rate of $\ell_{ij}$ when scheduled on machine $i$. The online scheduler knows the values of $w_j$ and $\ell_{ij}$ upon arrival of the job, but is not aware of the quantity $p_j$. We present the {\em first} online algorithm that is {\em scalable} ((1+\eps)-speed $O(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2})$-competitive for any constant \eps > 0) for the total weighted flow-time objective. No non-trivial results were known for this setting, except for the most basic case of identical machines. Our result resolves a major open problem in online scheduling theory. Moreover, we also show that no job needs more than a logarithmic number of migrations. We further extend our result and give a scalable algorithm for the objective of minimizing total weighted flow-time plus energy cost for the case of unrelated machines and obtain a scalable algorithm. The key algorithmic idea is to let jobs migrate selfishly until they converge to an equilibrium. Towards this end, we define a game where each job's utility which is closely tied to the instantaneous increase in the objective the job is responsible for, and each machine declares a policy that assigns priorities to jobs based on when they migrate to it, and the execution speeds. This has a spirit similar to coordination mechanisms that attempt to achieve near optimum welfare in the presence of selfish agents (jobs). To the best our knowledge, this is the first work that demonstrates the usefulness of ideas from coordination mechanisms and Nash equilibria for designing and analyzing online algorithms

Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling

We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with an arrival time, deadline, length, and value. The service provider's goal is to implement a truthful online mechanism for scheduling jobs so as to maximize the social welfare of the schedule. Recent work shows that under a stochastic assumption on job arrivals, there is a single-parameter family of mechanisms that achieves near-optimal social welfare. We show that given any such family of near-optimal online mechanisms, there exists an online mechanism that in the worst case performs nearly as well as the best of the given mechanisms. Our mechanism is truthful whenever the mechanisms in the given family are truthful and prompt, and achieves optimal (within constant factors) regret. We model the problem of competing against a family of online scheduling mechanisms as one of learning from expert advice. A primary challenge is that any scheduling decisions we make affect not only the payoff at the current step, but also the resource availability and payoffs in future steps. Furthermore, switching from one algorithm (a.k.a. expert) to another in an online fashion is challenging both because it requires synchronization with the state of the latter algorithm as well as because it affects the incentive structure of the algorithms. We further show how to adapt our algorithm to a non-clairvoyant setting where job lengths are unknown until jobs are run to completion. Once again, in this setting, we obtain truthfulness along with asymptotically optimal regret (within poly-logarithmic factors)

Automated competitive analysis of real time scheduling with graph games

This paper is devoted to automatic competitive analysis of real-time scheduling algorithms for firm-deadline tasksets, where only completed tasks con- tribute some utility to the system. Given such a taskset T , the competitive ratio of an on-line scheduling algorithm A for T is the worst-case utility ratio of A over the utility achieved by a clairvoyant algorithm. We leverage the theory of quantitative graph games to address the competitive analysis and competitive synthesis problems. For the competitive analysis case, given any taskset T and any finite-memory on- line scheduling algorithm A , we show that the competitive ratio of A in T can be computed in polynomial time in the size of the state space of A . Our approach is flexible as it also provides ways to model meaningful constraints on the released task sequences that determine the competitive ratio. We provide an experimental study of many well-known on-line scheduling algorithms, which demonstrates the feasibility of our competitive analysis approach that effectively replaces human ingenuity (required Preliminary versions of this paper have appeared in Chatterjee et al. ( 2013 , 2014 ). B Andreas Pavlogiannis [email protected] Krishnendu Chatterjee [email protected] Alexander Kößler [email protected] Ulrich Schmid [email protected] 1 IST Austria (Institute of Science and Technology Austria), Am Campus 1, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria 2 Embedded Computing Systems Group, Vienna University of Technology, Treitlstrasse 3, 1040 Vienna, Austria 123 Real-Time Syst for finding worst-case scenarios) by computing power. For the competitive synthesis case, we are just given a taskset T , and the goal is to automatically synthesize an opti- mal on-line scheduling algorithm A , i.e., one that guarantees the largest competitive ratio possible for T . We show how the competitive synthesis problem can be reduced to a two-player graph game with partial information, and establish that the compu- tational complexity of solving this game is Np -complete. The competitive synthesis problem is hence in Np in the size of the state space of the non-deterministic labeled transition system encoding the taskset. Overall, the proposed framework assists in the selection of suitable scheduling algorithms for a given taskset, which is in fact the most common situation in real-time systems design

IST Austria Technical Report

We present a flexible framework for the automated competitive analysis of on-line scheduling algorithms for firm- deadline real-time tasks based on multi-objective graphs: Given a taskset and an on-line scheduling algorithm specified as a labeled transition system, along with some optional safety, liveness, and/or limit-average constraints for the adversary, we automatically compute the competitive ratio of the algorithm w.r.t. a clairvoyant scheduler. We demonstrate the flexibility and power of our approach by comparing the competitive ratio of several on-line algorithms, including D(over), that have been proposed in the past, for various tasksets. Our experimental results reveal that none of these algorithms is universally optimal, in the sense that there are tasksets where other schedulers provide better performance. Our framework is hence a very useful design tool for selecting optimal algorithms for a given application

Probabilistic alternatives for competitive analysis

In the last 20 years competitive analysis has become the main tool for analyzing the quality of online algorithms. Despite of this, competitive analysis has also been criticized: it sometimes cannot discriminate between algorithms that exhibit significantly different empirical behavior or it even favors an algorithm that is worse from an empirical point of view. Therefore, there have been several approaches to circumvent these drawbacks. In this survey, we discuss probabilistic alternatives for competitive analysis.operations research and management science;

Distributed dispatchers for partially clairvoyant schedulers

This work focuses on the empirical evaluation of distributed dispatching strategies on shared and distributed memory architectures for hard real-time systems. The dispatching model accommodates process parameter variability and analyzes the effect of variable execution times.;Hard real-time systems are modeled in the E-T-C scheduling framework and dispatched if a valid schedule exists. We examine the dispatchability of Partially Clairvoyant schedules of different sizes and varying deadlines under reasonable assumptions. The effect of scaling up the number of processors used by the dispatcher is also studied. The results validate the superiority of the distributed strategies over sequential dispatching and scalability of the distributed strategies. Certain system limitations which lead to Loss of Dispatchability in the experiments were pointed out.;The model finds applications in diverse areas like safety critical systems, robotics and machine control, real-time data management, and this approach is targeted at powering up the controllers