The Price of Anarchy in Cooperative Network Creation Games

In general, the games are played on a host graph, where each node is a selfish independent agent (player) and each edge has a fixed link creation cost \alpha. Together the agents create a network (a subgraph of the host graph) while selfishly minimizing the link creation costs plus the sum of the distances to all other players (usage cost). In this paper, we pursue two important facets of the network creation game. First, we study extensively a natural version of the game, called the cooperative model, where nodes can collaborate and share the cost of creating any edge in the host graph. We prove the first nontrivial bounds in this model, establishing that the price of anarchy is polylogarithmic in n for all values of α in complete host graphs. This bound is the first result of this type for any version of the network creation game; most previous general upper bounds are polynomial in n. Interestingly, we also show that equilibrium graphs have polylogarithmic diameter for the most natural range of \alpha (at most n polylg n). Second, we study the impact of the natural assumption that the host graph is a general graph, not necessarily complete. This model is a simple example of nonuniform creation costs among the edges (effectively allowing weights of \alpha and \infty). We prove the first assemblage of upper and lower bounds for this context, stablishing nontrivial tight bounds for many ranges of \alpha, for both the unilateral and cooperative versions of network creation. In particular, we establish polynomial lower bounds for both versions and many ranges of \alpha, even for this simple nonuniform cost model, which sharply contrasts the conjectured constant bounds for these games in complete (uniform) graphs

Accelerating Cooperative Planning for Automated Vehicles with Learned Heuristics and Monte Carlo Tree Search

Efficient driving in urban traffic scenarios requires foresight. The observation of other traffic participants and the inference of their possible next actions depending on the own action is considered cooperative prediction and planning. Humans are well equipped with the capability to predict the actions of multiple interacting traffic participants and plan accordingly, without the need to directly communicate with others. Prior work has shown that it is possible to achieve effective cooperative planning without the need for explicit communication. However, the search space for cooperative plans is so large that most of the computational budget is spent on exploring the search space in unpromising regions that are far away from the solution. To accelerate the planning process, we combined learned heuristics with a cooperative planning method to guide the search towards regions with promising actions, yielding better solutions at lower computational costs

Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games

We consider an alternative expression of the Shapley value that reveals a system of compensations: each player receives an equal share of the worth of each coalition he belongs to, and has to compensate an equal share of the worth of any coalition he does not belong to. We give an interpretation in terms of formation of the grand coalition according to an ordering of the players and define the corresponding compensation vector. Then, we generalize this idea to cooperative games with a communication graph. Firstly, we consider cooperative games with a forest (cycle-free graph). We extend the compensation vector by considering all rooted spanning trees of the forest (see Demange 2004) instead of orderings of the players. The associated allocation rule, called the compensation solution, is characterized by component efficiency and relative fairness. The latter axiom takes into account the relative position of a player with respect to his component. Secondly, we consider cooperative games with arbitrary graphs and construct rooted spanning trees by using the classical algorithms DFS and BFS. If the graph is complete, we show that the compensation solutions associated with DFS and BFS coincide with the Shapley value and the equal surplus division respectively.

Research report : Collaborative Peer 2 Peer Edition: Avoiding Conflicts is Better than Solving Conflicts

Collaborative edition is achieved by distinct sites that work independently on (a copy of) a shared document. Conflicts may arise during this process and must be solved by the collaborative editor. In pure Peer to Peer collaborative editing, no centralization nor locks nor time-stamps are used which make conflict resolution difficult. We propose an algorithm which relies on the notion or semantics dependence and avoids the need of any integration transformation to solve conflicts. Furthermore, it doesn't use any history file recording operations performed since starting the edition process. We show how to define editing operations for semi-structured documents i.e. XML-like trees, that are enriched with informations derived for free from the editing process. Then we define the semantics dependence relation required by the algorithm and we present preliminary results obtained by a prototype implementation.Comment: 12 page

Promoting Land Conservation in the Coastal Watershed through Local Faces, Special Places

The Piscataqua Region Estuaries Partnership provided nearly $3,300.00 to support the Southeast Land Trust of New Hampshire’s (SELTNH) promotion of donated conservation easements in the coastal watershed of Rockingham County. The Southeast Land Trust produced three short web-friendly videos, explaining land conservation from the perspective of a tree farmer, vineyard owner, and a community leader. In addition, the Land Trust hosted two workshops in Kingston and Epping for landowners interested in learning more about the tax and financial benefits of land conservation. Workshop invitations were mailed to more than 1,200 current use landowners within the region. Twenty-two landowners attended the two workshops. From these workshops, the Land Trust generated one donated and one bargain sale conservation easement in 2011 and one potential bargain sale conservation easement in 2012. While originally intended to be part of the grant funded project, the Land Trust was unable to complete a mobile tabletop display or a brochure on the enhanced federal tax incentive for donated conservation easements

Inequality and Network Formation Games

This paper addresses the matter of inequality in network formation games. We employ a quantity that we are calling the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR), defined as the maximal ratio between the highest and lowest costs incurred to individual agents in a Nash equilibrium strategy, to characterize the extent to which inequality is possible in equilibrium. We give tight upper bounds on the NIR for the network formation games of Fabrikant et al. (PODC '03) and Ehsani et al. (SPAA '11). With respect to the relationship between equality and social efficiency, we show that, contrary to common expectations, efficiency does not necessarily come at the expense of increased inequality.Comment: 27 pages. 4 figures. Accepted to Internet Mathematics (2014

Proceedings of the ECSCW'95 Workshop on the Role of Version Control in CSCW Applications

The workshop entitled "The Role of Version Control in Computer Supported Cooperative Work Applications" was held on September 10, 1995 in Stockholm, Sweden in conjunction with the ECSCW'95 conference. Version control, the ability to manage relationships between successive instances of artifacts, organize those instances into meaningful structures, and support navigation and other operations on those structures, is an important problem in CSCW applications. It has long been recognized as a critical issue for inherently cooperative tasks such as software engineering, technical documentation, and authoring. The primary challenge for versioning in these areas is to support opportunistic, open-ended design processes requiring the preservation of historical perspectives in the design process, the reuse of previous designs, and the exploitation of alternative designs. The primary goal of this workshop was to bring together a diverse group of individuals interested in examining the role of versioning in Computer Supported Cooperative Work. Participation was encouraged from members of the research community currently investigating the versioning process in CSCW as well as application designers and developers who are familiar with the real-world requirements for versioning in CSCW. Both groups were represented at the workshop resulting in an exchange of ideas and information that helped to familiarize developers with the most recent research results in the area, and to provide researchers with an updated view of the needs and challenges faced by application developers. In preparing for this workshop, the organizers were able to build upon the results of their previous one entitled "The Workshop on Versioning in Hypertext" held in conjunction with the ECHT'94 conference. The following section of this report contains a summary in which the workshop organizers report the major results of the workshop. The summary is followed by a section that contains the position papers that were accepted to the workshop. The position papers provide more detailed information describing recent research efforts of the workshop participants as well as current challenges that are being encountered in the development of CSCW applications. A list of workshop participants is provided at the end of the report. The organizers would like to thank all of the participants for their contributions which were, of course, vital to the success of the workshop. We would also like to thank the ECSCW'95 conference organizers for providing a forum in which this workshop was possible