5,517 research outputs found
New Collision attacks Against Up To 24-step SHA-2
In this work, we provide new and improved attacks against 22, 23 and 24-step SHA-2 family using a local collision given by Sanadhya and Sarkar (SS) at ACISP \u2708. The success probability of our 22-step attack is 1 for both SHA-256 and SHA-512.
The computational efforts for the 23-step and 24-step SHA-256 attacks
are respectively and calls to the corresponding step reduced SHA-256. The corresponding values for the 23 and 24-step SHA-512 attack are respectively and calls.
Using a look-up table having (resp. ) entries the computational effort for finding 24-step SHA-256 (resp. SHA-512)
collisions can be reduced to (resp. ) calls.
We exhibit colliding message pairs for 22, 23 and 24-step SHA-256 and SHA-512. This is the \emph{first} time that a colliding message pair for 24-step SHA-512 is provided.
The previous work on 23 and 24-step SHA-2 attacks is due to Indesteege et al. and utilizes the local collision presented by Nikolić and Biryukov NB) at FSE \u2708. The reported computational efforts are and for 23 and 24-step SHA-256 respectively and and for 23 and 24-step SHA-512. The previous 23 and 24-step attacks first constructed a pseudo-collision and later converted it into a collision for the reduced round SHA-2 family. We show that this two step procedure is unnecessary. Although these attacks improve upon the existing reduced round SHA-2 attacks, they do not threaten the security of the full SHA-2 family
Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non-ITS authentication
We demonstrate how adversaries with unbounded computing resources can break
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols which employ a particular message
authentication code suggested previously. This authentication code, featuring
low key consumption, is not Information-Theoretically Secure (ITS) since for
each message the eavesdropper has intercepted she is able to send a different
message from a set of messages that she can calculate by finding collisions of
a cryptographic hash function. However, when this authentication code was
introduced it was shown to prevent straightforward Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
attacks against QKD protocols.
In this paper, we prove that the set of messages that collide with any given
message under this authentication code contains with high probability a message
that has small Hamming distance to any other given message. Based on this fact
we present extended MITM attacks against different versions of BB84 QKD
protocols using the addressed authentication code; for three protocols we
describe every single action taken by the adversary. For all protocols the
adversary can obtain complete knowledge of the key, and for most protocols her
success probability in doing so approaches unity.
Since the attacks work against all authentication methods which allow to
calculate colliding messages, the underlying building blocks of the presented
attacks expose the potential pitfalls arising as a consequence of non-ITS
authentication in QKD-postprocessing. We propose countermeasures, increasing
the eavesdroppers demand for computational power, and also prove necessary and
sufficient conditions for upgrading the discussed authentication code to the
ITS level.Comment: 34 page
REISCH: incorporating lightweight and reliable algorithms into healthcare applications of WSNs
Healthcare institutions require advanced technology to collect patients' data accurately and continuously. The tradition technologies still suffer from two problems: performance and security efficiency. The existing research has serious drawbacks when using public-key mechanisms such as digital signature algorithms. In this paper, we propose Reliable and Efficient Integrity Scheme for Data Collection in HWSN (REISCH) to alleviate these problems by using secure and lightweight signature algorithms. The results of the performance analysis indicate that our scheme provides high efficiency in data integration between sensors and server (saves more than 24% of alive sensors compared to traditional algorithms). Additionally, we use Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) to validate the security procedures in our scheme. Security analysis results confirm that REISCH is safe against some well-known attacks
On The Cost of ASIC Hardware Crackers: A SHA-1 Case Study
International audienceIn February 2017, the SHA-1 hashing algorithm was practically broken using an identical-prefix collision attack implemented on a GPU cluster, and in January 2020 a chosen-prefix collision was first computed with practical implications on various security protocols. These advances opened the door for several research questions, such as the minimal cost to perform these attacks in practice. In particular, one may wonder what is the best technology for software/hardware cryptanalysis of such primitives. In this paper, we address some of these questions by studying the challenges and costs of building an ASIC cluster for performing attacks against a hash function. Our study takes into account different scenarios and includes two cryptanalytic strategies that can be used to find such collisions: a classical generic birthday search, and a state-of-the-art differential attack using neutral bits for SHA-1. We show that for generic attacks, GPU and ASIC poses a serious practical threat to primitives with security level ∼ 64 bits, with rented GPU a good solution for a one-off attack, and ASICs more efficient if the attack has to be run a few times. ASICs also pose a non-negligible security risk for primitives with 80-bit security. For differential attacks, GPUs (purchased or rented) are often a very cost-effective choice, but ASIC provides an alternative for organizations that can afford the initial cost and look for a compact, energy-efficient, reusable solution. In the case of SHA-1, we show that an ASIC cluster costing a few millions would be able to generate chosen-prefix collisions in a day or even in a minute. This extends the attack surface to TLS and SSH, for which the chosen-prefix collision would need to be generated very quickly
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