New approaches for studying cortical representations

All rights reserved. We review two new approaches for studying cortical representations of sensory stimuli. These exploit optimization algorithms and auto-encoders from machine learning and high resolution electrophysiology data. We show how these approaches can shed new light into the information processing and maintenance taking place in neuronal populations. These approaches allow us to study: 1. Changes in the precision of error representations as a result of neuromodulation. 2. Differences in the cortical connectivity underlying memory representations for different stimuli

The Structure of Sensorimotor Explanation

The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same theses of the dynamical hypothesis and that it affords covering-law explanations. This however exposes the theory to the mere description worry and generates a puzzle about the role of representations. I then argue that the sensorimotor theory is compatible with a mechanistic framework, and show how this can overcome the mere description worry and solve the problem of the explanatory role of representations. By doing so, it will be shown that the theory should be understood as an enrichment of the orthodoxy, rather than an alternative

On Neuromechanical Approaches for the Study of Biological Grasp and Manipulation

Biological and robotic grasp and manipulation are undeniably similar at the level of mechanical task performance. However, their underlying fundamental biological vs. engineering mechanisms are, by definition, dramatically different and can even be antithetical. Even our approach to each is diametrically opposite: inductive science for the study of biological systems vs. engineering synthesis for the design and construction of robotic systems. The past 20 years have seen several conceptual advances in both fields and the quest to unify them. Chief among them is the reluctant recognition that their underlying fundamental mechanisms may actually share limited common ground, while exhibiting many fundamental differences. This recognition is particularly liberating because it allows us to resolve and move beyond multiple paradoxes and contradictions that arose from the initial reasonable assumption of a large common ground. Here, we begin by introducing the perspective of neuromechanics, which emphasizes that real-world behavior emerges from the intimate interactions among the physical structure of the system, the mechanical requirements of a task, the feasible neural control actions to produce it, and the ability of the neuromuscular system to adapt through interactions with the environment. This allows us to articulate a succinct overview of a few salient conceptual paradoxes and contradictions regarding under-determined vs. over-determined mechanics, under- vs. over-actuated control, prescribed vs. emergent function, learning vs. implementation vs. adaptation, prescriptive vs. descriptive synergies, and optimal vs. habitual performance. We conclude by presenting open questions and suggesting directions for future research. We hope this frank assessment of the state-of-the-art will encourage and guide these communities to continue to interact and make progress in these important areas

An introduction to time-resolved decoding analysis for M/EEG

The human brain is constantly processing and integrating information in order to make decisions and interact with the world, for tasks from recognizing a familiar face to playing a game of tennis. These complex cognitive processes require communication between large populations of neurons. The non-invasive neuroimaging methods of electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) provide population measures of neural activity with millisecond precision that allow us to study the temporal dynamics of cognitive processes. However, multi-sensor M/EEG data is inherently high dimensional, making it difficult to parse important signal from noise. Multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) or "decoding" methods offer vast potential for understanding high-dimensional M/EEG neural data. MVPA can be used to distinguish between different conditions and map the time courses of various neural processes, from basic sensory processing to high-level cognitive processes. In this chapter, we discuss the practical aspects of performing decoding analyses on M/EEG data as well as the limitations of the method, and then we discuss some applications for understanding representational dynamics in the human brain

On staying grounded and avoiding Quixotic dead ends

The 15 articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area. Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing. I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail. In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them. Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations. This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing

Precis of neuroconstructivism: how the brain constructs cognition

Neuroconstructivism: How the Brain Constructs Cognition proposes a unifying framework for the study of cognitive development that brings together (1) constructivism (which views development as the progressive elaboration of increasingly complex structures), (2) cognitive neuroscience (which aims to understand the neural mechanisms underlying behavior), and (3) computational modeling (which proposes formal and explicit specifications of information processing). The guiding principle of our approach is context dependence, within and (in contrast to Marr [1982]) between levels of organization. We propose that three mechanisms guide the emergence of representations: competition, cooperation, and chronotopy; which themselves allow for two central processes: proactivity and progressive specialization. We suggest that the main outcome of development is partial representations, distributed across distinct functional circuits. This framework is derived by examining development at the level of single neurons, brain systems, and whole organisms. We use the terms encellment, embrainment, and embodiment to describe the higher-level contextual influences that act at each of these levels of organization. To illustrate these mechanisms in operation we provide case studies in early visual perception, infant habituation, phonological development, and object representations in infancy. Three further case studies are concerned with interactions between levels of explanation: social development, atypical development and within that, developmental dyslexia. We conclude that cognitive development arises from a dynamic, contextual change in embodied neural structures leading to partial representations across multiple brain regions and timescales, in response to proactively specified physical and social environment

The homuncular jigsaw: investigations of phantom limb and body awareness following brachial plexus block or avulsion

Many neuropsychological theories agree that the brain maintains a relatively persistent representation of one's own body, as indicated by vivid "phantom" experiences. It remains unclear how the loss of sensory and motor information contributes to the presence of this representation. Here, we focus on new empirical and theoretical evidence of phantom sensations following damage to or an anesthetic block of the brachial plexus. We suggest a crucial role of this structure in understanding the interaction between peripheral and central mechanisms in health and in pathology. Studies of brachial plexus function have shed new light on how neuroplasticity enables "somatotopic interferences", including pain and body awareness. Understanding the relations among clinical disorders, their neural substrate, and behavioral outcomes may enhance methods of sensory rehabilitation for phantom limbs