The shape of the utility function under risk in the loss domain and the "ruinous losses" hypothesis: some experimental results

This paper reports some preliminary experimental results as regards the shape of the utility function for losses when elicited over a wide interval of consequences. Individual utility functions are elicited using the trade-off method, which, unlike standard elicitation procedures, is robust to probability weighting (and avoids most cognitive biases). Even though most utility functions exhibit the usual convex shape, nearly 25% of them appear to be inverse-S shaped, with convexity over moderate losses changing to concavity as losses grow. Though not conclusive (due mainly to the small size of our subject pool), this result brings some new support to the old idea that ruinous or unacceptable losses may induce some abrupt change in the shape of the utility function. Most importantly, it paves the way for more systematic investigation of the "ruinous losses" hypothesis.utility under risk, large losses, ruin, trade-off method, individual decision making under risk

Time discounting (delta) and pain anticipation: Experimental evidence

To be published in: Revista Internacional de Sociología (2011), Special Issue on Experimental and Behavioral Economics.

Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics

Neuroeconomics uses knowledge about brain mechanisms to inform economic analysis, and roots economics in biology. It opens up the "black box" of the brain, much as organizational economics adds detail to the theory of the firm. Neuroscientists use many tools— including brain imaging, behavior of patients with localized brain lesions, animal behavior, and recording single neuron activity. The key insight for economics is that the brain is composed of multiple systems which interact. Controlled systems ("executive function") interrupt automatic ones. Emotions and cognition both guide decisions. Just as prices and allocations emerge from the interaction of two processes—supply and demand— individual decisions can be modeled as the result of two (or more) processes interacting. Indeed, "dual-process" models of this sort are better rooted in neuroscientific fact, and more empirically accurate, than single-process models (such as utility-maximization). We discuss how brain evidence complicates standard assumptions about basic preference, to include homeostasis and other kinds of state-dependence. We also discuss applications to intertemporal choice, risk and decision making, and game theory. Intertemporal choice appears to be domain-specific and heavily influenced by emotion. The simplified ß-d of quasi-hyperbolic discounting is supported by activation in distinct regions of limbic and cortical systems. In risky decision, imaging data tentatively support the idea that gains and losses are coded separately, and that ambiguity is distinct from risk, because it activates fear and discomfort regions. (Ironically, lesion patients who do not receive fear signals in prefrontal cortex are "rationally" neutral toward ambiguity.) Game theory studies show the effect of brain regions implicated in "theory of mind", correlates of strategic skill, and effects of hormones and other biological variables. Finally, economics can contribute to neuroscience because simple rational-choice models are useful for understanding highly-evolved behavior like motor actions that earn rewards, and Bayesian integration of sensorimotor information

NeuroEconomics

Over the last two years a research field has developed under the banner of 'neuroeconomics' in which recent neuroscientific methods are deploid to analyze economically relevant processes. This paper aims to provide an overview of the methodology and current state of neuroeconomic research by giving a brief definition of the concept of neuroeconomics, outlining relevant methodologies, and describing studies undertaken in the current research areas to date. Finally, some future prospects are considered.

Time discounting (d) and pain anticipation: experimental evidence

This paper deals with pain anticipation experienced before medical procedures. Our experimental results show that individuals with lower discount factors are more prone to suffer pain in advance. We provide a framework to rationalize the connection between pain anticipation and impatience. In this set up, more impatient subjects, who only value very near events, take into account mainly the negative effects of medical procedures (just the costs) whereas more patient individuals have a net positive valuation of medical events (given that they value both the cost incurred now and all the benefits accrued in the future).Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (SEJ2007-62081 and ECO2009-09120), the Government of Andalusia Project for Excellence in Research (P07.SEJ.02547), Gobierno Vasco-DEUI (IT-313-07) and the Women’s Institute of Spain (2008.031). (2008.031)

The shape of the utility function under risk in the loss domain and the 'ruinous losses' hypothesis: some experimental results

International audienceThis paper reports some preliminary experimental results as regards the shape of the utility function for losses when elicited over a wide interval of consequences. Individual utility functions are elicited using the trade-off method, which, unlike standard elicitation procedures, is robust to probability weighting (and avoids most cognitive biases). Even though most utility functions exhibit the usual convex shape, nearly 25% of them appear to be inverse-S shaped, with convexity over moderate losses changing to concavity as losses grow. Though not conclusive (due mainly to the small size of our subject pool), this result brings some new support to the old idea that ruinous or unacceptable losses may induce some abrupt change in the shape of the utility function. Most importantly, it paves the way for more systematic investigation of the "ruinous losses" hypothesis

Some Considerations Regarding the Problem of Multidimensional Utility

The concept of 'utility' is often used in ambiguous ways in economics, from having substantive psychological connotations to being a formal placeholder representing a person's preferences. In the accounts of the early utilitarians, it was a multidimensional measure that has been condensed during the marginalist revolution into the unidimensional measure we know today. But can we compare different pleasures? This paper assesses the evidence from psychology and neurosciences on how to best conceive of utility. It turns out that empirical evidence does not favor a view of multidimensional utility. This does not eliminate the possibility to make a normative argument supporting a multidimensional notion of utility.utility, pleasures, neuroeconomics, multidimensionality of utility

Time discounting and pain anticipation: experimental evidence

This paper deals with pain anticipation experienced before medical procedures. Our experimental results show that individuals with lower time discount factors are more prone to suffer pain in advance. We provide a framework to rationalize the connection between pain anticipation and impatience. In this set up, more impatient subjects, who only value very near events, mainly take into account the present negative effects of medical procedures (the costs), whereas more patient individuals have a net positive valuation of medical events,given that they are able to value both the cost incurred now and all the benefits to be accrued in the future

Philosophical foundations of neuroeconomics: economics and the revolutionary challenge from neuroscience.

This PhD thesis focuses on the philosophical foundations of Neuroeconomics, an innovative research program which combines findings and modelling tools from economics, psychology and neuroscience to account for human choice behaviour. The proponents of Neuroeconomics often manifest the ambition to foster radical modifications in the accounts of choice behaviour developed by its parent disciplines. This enquiry provides a philosophically informed appraisal of the potential for success and the relevance of neuroeconomic research for economics. My central claim is that neuroeconomists can help other economists to build more predictive and explanatory models, yet are unlikely to foster revolutionary modifications in the economic theory of choice. The contents are organized as follows. In chapters 1-2, I present neuroeconomists’ investigative tools, distinguish the most influential approaches to neuroeconomic research and reconstruct the case in favour of a neural enrichment of economic theory. In chapters 3-7, I combine insights from neuro-psychology, economic methodology and philosophy of science to develop a systematic critique of Neuroeconomics. In particular, I articulate four lines of argument to demonstrate that economists are provisionally justified in retaining a methodologically distinctive approach to the modelling of decision making. My first argument points to several evidential and epistemological concerns which complicate the interpretation of neural data and cast doubt on the inferences neuroeconomists often make in their studies. My second argument aims to show that the trade-offs between the modelling desiderata that neuroeconomists and other economists respectively value severely constrain the incorporation of neural insights into economic models. My third argument questions neuroeconomists’ attempts to develop a unified theory of choice behaviour by identifying some central issues on which they hold contrasting positions. My fourth argument differentiates various senses of the term ‘revolution’ and illustrates that neuroeconomists are unlikely to provide revolutionary contributions to economic theory in any of these senses