Efficient Methods for Automated Multi-Issue Negotiation: Negotiating over a Two-Part Tariff

In this article, we consider the novel approach of a seller and customer negotiating bilaterally about a two-part tariff, using autonomous software agents. An advantage of this approach is that win-win opportunities can be generated while keeping the problem of preference elicitation as simple as possible. We develop bargaining strategies that software agents can use to conduct the actual bilateral negotiation on behalf of their owners. We present a decomposition of bargaining strategies into concession strategies and Pareto-efficient-search methods: Concession and Pareto-search strategies focus on the conceding and win-win aspect of bargaining, respectively. An important technical contribution of this article lies in the development of two Pareto-search methods. Computer experiments show, for various concession strategies, that the respective use of these two Pareto-search methods by the two negotiators results in very efficient bargaining outcomes while negotiators concede the amount specified by their concession strategy

Agent based mobile negotiation for personalized pricing of last minute theatre tickets

This is the post-print version of the final paper published in Expert Systems with Applications. The published article is available from the link below. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. Copyright @ 2012 Elsevier B.V.This paper proposes an agent based mobile negotiation framework for personalized pricing of last minutes theatre tickets whose values are dependent on the time remaining to the performance and the locations of potential customers. In particular, case based reasoning and fuzzy cognitive map techniques are adopted in the negotiation framework to identify the best initial offer zone and adopt multi criteria decision in the scoring function to evaluate offers. The proposed framework is tested via a computer simulation in which personalized pricing policy shows higher market performance than other policies therefore the validity of the proposed negotiation framework.The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (Korea

Rules and Disciplines in Government Procurement Agreements

The negotiation of rules and disciplines established in the normative body of government procurement agreements has the aim of ensuring that the principles of national treatment and non-discrimination are fully enforced in all the steps and procedures that are present in the tendering processes carried out by governments.Integration & Trade :: Trade Agreements, Integration & Trade, Integration & Trade :: Globalization & Regionalization, Compras del sector público, Public sector acquisitions, Rules and Disciplines in Government Procurement Agreements

An economic theory of GATT

GATT;economic theory

Inspectorate Supervision in Applying Competitive Principles in Managing Procurement of Goods / Services in Government of North Sulawesi Province

This paper examines the supervision of the Inspectorate on the application of the principle of competitiveness in the management of government goods/services procurement. This research was conducted at the North Sulawesi Provincial Government. The essence of this paper aims to find out whether the Inspectorate has supervised the application of the principle of competitiveness in the management of procurement of goods/services to the North Sulawesi Provincial Government. The methodology used in this study is qualitative. The techniques and procedures for collecting data through in-depth interviews with a number of informants related to the application of the principle of competitiveness in the management of procurement of goods/services. Activities in the analysis include data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. The results of this study indicate that the Inspectorate has been maximal enough to carry out supervision of the application of the principle of competitiveness in the procurement of goods/services in North Sulawesi Province

Implementing the Codes of Conducts: a real provocation for the Romanian Garment Industry Case Study field research in 2 Romanian work wear producing companies

CCC_08_08_26_eng_ROMANIAN_STUDY.pdf: 154 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

Trade in the balance: reconciling trade and climate policy: report of the Working Group on Trade, Investment, and Climate Policy

This repository item contains a report published by the Working Group on Trade, Investment, and Climate Policy at The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University, and the Global Economic Governance Initiative at Boston University.This report outlines the general tensions between the trade and investment regime and climate policy, and outlines a framework toward making trade and investment rules more climate friendly. Members of the working group have contributed short pieces addressing a range of issues related to the intersection of trade and climate policy. The first two are by natural scientists. Anthony Janetos discusses the need to address the effects of international trade on efforts to limit the increase in global annual temperature to no more than 2oC over preindustrial levels. James J. Corbett examines the failure of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to adequately address the environmental implications of shipping and maritime transport. The next two pieces are by economists who examine economic aspects of the trade-climate linkage. Irene Monasterolo and Marco Raberto discuss the potential impacts of including fossil fuel subsidies reduction under the TTIP. Frank Ackerman explores the economic costs of efforts to promote convergence of regulatory standards between the United States and the European Union under the TTIP. The following two contributions are by legal scholars. Brooke Güven and Lise Johnson explore the potential for international investment treaties to redirect investment flows to support climate change mitigation and adaptation, particularly with regard to China and India. Matt Porterfield provides an overview of the ways in which both existing and proposed trade and investment agreements could have either “climate positive” or “climate negative” effects on mitigation policies. The final article is by Tao Hu, a former WTO trade and environment expert advisor for China and currently at the World Wildlife Fund, arguing that the definition of environmental goods and services’ under the WTO negotiations needs to be expanded to better incorporate climate change

Price Discrimination and Customer Behaviour: Empirical Evidence from Marseille

We analyse the interaction between a seller and customers in a shop on the fruits and vegetables wholesale market in Marseille using an unique data set. We find that customers' bargaining activity is correlated with the kind and location of the business. To determine how the interactions between the seller and the customers influence prices, we compare the price each customer pays for a given good with the daily average price. We find that a customer of the shop is more likely to pay a price higher than other customers for the same good if---ceteris paribus---the customer is unknown to the shop assistants, buys only a small quantity, or buys goods sold on commission. If the customer is known to the shop assistants, then loyalty and bargaining make it more likely that the customer gets better than average price.Face-to-face bargaining ; customer loyalty

Price Discrimination between Retailers with and without Market Power

Some retail markets are more competitive than others. A manufacturer with market power in the wholesale market who sells his product to competing retailers in cities and monopolistic ones in each of various towns must set the wholesale price difference between towns and cities to be smaller than the transportation cost to prevent “grey market” arbitrage. If he uses linear pricing, the town retail price will be even higher than under single-retailer double marginalization. Two-part tariffs do not solve the problem as they would if there were a single retailer, because the wholesale unit price must be higher than marginal cost to prevent arbitrage to the cities. If transportation costs are low, price discrimination is difficult and two- part tariffs come to resemble inefficient linear monopoly pricing. High transportation costs allow greater efficiency in contracting, and this can outweigh the negative direct effect on welfare.price discrimination, double marginalization, retail network, transportation costs, two-part tariffs, vertical restraints

GATT-Think

We describe recent work on the theory of trade agreements that speaks to the purpose and design of GATT. Our discussion proceeds in three steps. First, we examine the purpose of a trade agreement. In both the traditional economic and the political-economy approaches to the study of trade agreements, the problem for a trade agreement to solve is the excessive protection that arises in the absence of an agreement as a consequence of the terms-of-trade externality. Second, we consider the origin and design of GATT. We note that GATT is a rules-based institution whose origin can be traced to the disastrous economic performance that accompanied the high tariffs of the 1920's and 1930's. Finally, we review the theoretical literature that interprets and evaluates the institutional features found in GATT. We consider in particular whether GATT articles can be interpreted as offering negotiation rules that help governments undo the inefficient restrictions in trade that are caused by the terms-of-trade externality. On the whole, our review suggests that the core principles of GATT indeed may be interpreted in this manner. Specifically, we report findings that indicate that the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination work in concert to remedy the inefficiency created by the terms-of-trade externality. We also extract a variety of predictions from the literature on enforcement and trade policy, and we argue that these predictions are broadly compatible with both the design of GATT and certain historical experiences in trade-policy conduct. We thus interpret the literature reviewed here as providing a strong presumption for the view that GATT can be understood as an institution whose central principles are well-designed to assist governments in their attempt to escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners' Dilemma. Our review therefore offers support for the (politically-augmented) terms-of-trade theory as an appropriate framework within which to interpret and evaluate GATT.