Evolution and information : an overview

Postprin

Deception as cooperation

I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories

Deception as Cooperation

I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories

Consequences of a functional account of information

An interpretation of information in terms of the function of its user is presented and defended. Throughout, the causal interpretation is treated as a foil. The advantages of a functional interpretation are threefold: (1) Traditional emphasis on the indicative aspect of information is supplemented with its counterpart instructional aspect, nudging information closer to the contemporary conception of subpersonal content; (2) An influential distinction between causal and semantic information, argued recently to be misconceived, is further denigrated; (3) Mathematical results adverting to utility are recast in terms of function, justifying the application of information theory in cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and elsewhere

The role of information in evolutionary biology

The Modern Synthesis has received criticism for its purported gene-centrism. That criticism relies on a concept of the gene as a unit of instructional information. In this paper I discuss information concepts and endorse one, developed from Floridi, that sees information as a functional relationship between data and context. I use this concept to inspect developmental criticisms of the Modern Synthesis and ar- gue that the instructional gene arose as an idealization practice when evolutionary biologists made comment on development. However, a closer inspection of key claims shows that at least some associated with the Modern Synthesis were in fact adopting the data led definition I favour and made clear arguments for the role of developmental processes beyond genetic input. There was no instructional gene

Deception as Cooperation

I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories

Deception as Cooperation

I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with `functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories

Consequences of a Functional Account of Information

This paper aims to establish several interconnected points. First, a particular interpretation of the mathematical definition of information, known as the causal interpretation, is supported largely by misunderstandings of the engineering context from which it was taken. A better interpretation, which makes the definition and quantification of information relative to the function of its user, is outlined. The first half of the paper is given over to introducing communication theory and its competing interpretations. The second half explores three consequences of the main thesis. First, a popular claim that the quantification of information in a signal is irrelevant for the meaning of that signal is exposed as fallacious. Second, a popular distinction between causal and semantic information is shown to be misleading, and I argue it should be replaced with a related distinction between natural and intentional signs. Finally, I argue that recent empirical work from microbiology and cognitive science drawing on resources of mathematical communication theory is best interpreted by the functional account. Overall, a functional approach is shown to be both theoretically and empirically well-supported

Natural Information, Factivity and Nomicity

Biological and cognitive sciences rely heavily on the idea of information transmitted between natural events or processes. This paper critically assesses some current philosophical views of natural information and defends a view of natural information as Nomic and Factive. Dretske (1981) offered a Factive view of information, and recent work on the topic has tended to reject this aspect of his view in favor of a non-Factive, probabilistic approach. This paper argues that the reasoning behind this move to non-Factivity is flawed and mixes up different problems with Dretske’s original view. I show that one of these problems – strictness – has to do with Nomicity rather than Factivity. The other problem – reference class ambiguity – is not solvable just in terms of a theory of natural information. On the Dretske-inspired view I defend, natural information is Factive and Nomic but is insufficient to determine the cognitive or biological content of a natural process. In sum I present an examination what natural information is and what role it can (and cannot) play in our understanding of living and thinking things

The role of information in evolutionary biology

The Modern Synthesis has received criticism for its purported gene-centrism. That criticism relies on a concept of the gene as a unit of instructional information. In this paper I discuss information concepts and endorse one, developed from Floridi, that sees information as a functional relationship between data and context. I use this concept to inspect developmental criticisms of the Modern Synthesis and argue that the instructional gene arose as an idealization practice when evolutionary biologists made comment on development. However, a closer inspection of key claims shows that at least some associated with the Modern Synthesis were in fact adopting the data led definition I favour and made clear arguments for the role of developmental processes beyond genetic input. There was no instructional gene