85 research outputs found
Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis is an important tool for studying the security of symmetric ciphers. In 1993 Matsui proposed two algorithms, called Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, for recovering information about the secret key of a block cipher. The algorithms exploit a biased probabilistic relation between the input and output of the cipher. This relation is called the (one-dimensional) linear approximation of the cipher. Mathematically, the problem of key recovery is a binary hypothesis testing problem that can be solved with appropriate statistical tools.
The same mathematical tools can be used for realising a distinguishing attack against a stream cipher. The distinguisher outputs whether the given sequence of keystream bits is derived from a cipher or a random source. Sometimes, it is even possible to recover a part of the initial state of the LFSR used in a key stream generator.
Several authors considered using many one-dimensional linear approximations simultaneously in a key recovery attack and various solutions have been proposed. In this thesis a unified methodology for using multiple linear approximations in distinguishing and key recovery attacks is presented. This methodology, which we call multidimensional linear cryptanalysis, allows removing unnecessary and restrictive assumptions. We model the key recovery problems mathematically as hypothesis testing problems and show how to use standard statistical tools for solving them. We also show how the data complexity of linear cryptanalysis on stream ciphers and block ciphers can be reduced by using multiple approximations.
We use well-known mathematical theory for comparing different statistical methods for solving the key recovery problems. We also test the theory in practice with reduced round Serpent. Based on our results, we give recommendations on how multidimensional linear cryptanalysis should be used
Separable Statistics and Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis
Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis of block ciphers is improved in this work by introducing a number of new ideas. Firstly, formulae is given to compute approximate multidimensional distributions of the encryption algorithm internal bits. Conventional statistics like LLR (Logarithmic Likelihood Ratio) do not fit to work in Matsui’s Algorithm 2 for large dimension data, as the observation may depend on too many cipher key bits. So, secondly, a new statistic which reflects the structure of the cipher round is constructed instead. Thirdly, computing the statistic values that will fall into a critical region is presented as an optimisation problem for which an efficient algorithm is suggested. The algorithm works much faster than brute forcing all relevant key bits to compute the statistic. An attack for 16-round DES was implemented. We got an improvement over Matsui’s attack on DES in data and time complexity keeping success probability the same. With 241.81 plaintext blocks and success rate 0.83 (computed theoretically) we found 241.46 (which is close to the theoretically predicted number 241.81) key-candidates to 56-bit DES key. Search tree to compute the statistic values which fall into the critical region incorporated 245.45 nodes in the experiment and that is at least theoretically inferior in comparison with the final brute force. To get success probability 0.85, which is a fairer comparison to Matsui’s results, we would need 241.85 data and to brute force 241.85 key-candidates. That compares favourably with 243 achieved by Matsui
Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis of Feistel Ciphers
This paper presents new generic attacks on Feistel ciphers that incorporate the key addition at the input of the non-invertible round function only. This feature leads to a specific vulnerability that can be exploited using multidimensional linear cryptanalysis. More specifically, our approach involves using key-independent linear trails so that the distribution of a combination of the plaintext and ciphertext can be computed. This makes it possible to use the likelihood-ratio test as opposed to the χ2 test. We provide theoretical estimates of the cost of our generic attacks and verify these experimentally by applying the attacks to CAST-128 and LOKI91. The theoretical and experimental findings demonstrate that the proposed attacks lead to significant reductions in data-complexity in several interesting cases
Multivariate Profiling of Hulls for Linear Cryptanalysis
Extensions of linear cryptanalysis making use of multiple approximations, such as multiple and multidimensional linear cryptanalysis, are an important tool in symmetric-key cryptanalysis, among others being responsible for the best known attacks on ciphers such as Serpent and present. At CRYPTO 2015, Huang et al. provided a refined analysis of the key-dependent capacity leading to a refined key equivalence hypothesis, however at the cost of additional assumptions. Their analysis was extended by Blondeau and Nyberg to also cover an updated wrong key randomization hypothesis, using similar assumptions. However, a recent result by Nyberg shows the equivalence of linear dependence and statistical dependence of linear approximations, which essentially invalidates a crucial assumption on which all these multidimensional models are based. In this paper, we develop a model for linear cryptanalysis using multiple linearly independent approximations which takes key-dependence into account and complies with Nyberg’s result. Our model considers an arbitrary multivariate joint distribution of the correlations, and in particular avoids any assumptions regarding normality. The analysis of this distribution is then tailored to concrete ciphers in a practically feasible way by combining a signal/noise decomposition approach for the linear hulls with a profiling of the actual multivariate distribution of the signal correlations for a large number of keys, thereby entirely avoiding assumptions regarding the shape of this distribution. As an application of our model, we provide an attack on 26 rounds of present which is faster and requires less data than previous attacks, while using more realistic assumptions and far fewer approximations. We successfully extend the attack to present the first 27-round attack which takes key-dependence into account
Success Probability of Multiple/Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis Under General Key Randomisation Hypotheses
This work considers statistical analysis of attacks on block ciphers using several linear approximations. A general and unified
approach is adopted. To this end, the general key randomisation hypotheses for multidimensional and multiple linear cryptanalysis
are introduced. Expressions for the success probability in terms of the data complexity and the advantage are obtained using the
general key randomisation hypotheses for both multidimensional and multiple linear cryptanalysis and under the settings where the
plaintexts are sampled with or without replacement. Particularising to standard/adjusted key randomisation hypotheses gives rise
to success probabilities in 16 different cases out of which in only five cases expressions for success probabilities have been previously
reported. Even in these five cases, the expressions for success probabilities that we obtain are more general than what was previously
obtained. A crucial step
in the analysis is the derivation of the distributions of the underlying test statistics. While we carry out the analysis formally
to the extent possible, there are certain inherently heuristic assumptions that need to be made. In contrast to previous works which
have implicitly made such assumptions, we carefully highlight these and discuss why they are unavoidable. Finally, we provide a complete
characterisation of the dependence of the success probability on the data complexity
Improved Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round MIBS
MIBS is a 32-round lightweight block cipher with 64-bit block size and two different key sizes, namely 64-bit and 80-bit keys. Bay et al. provided the first impossible differential, differential and linear cryptanalyses of MIBS. Their best attack was a linear attack on the 18-round MIBS-80. In this paper, we significantly improve their attack by discovering more approximations and mounting Hermelin et al.'s multidimensional linear cryptanalysis. We also use Nguyen et al.'s technique to have less time complexity. We attack on 19 rounds of MIBS-80 with a time complexity of 2^{74.23} 19-round MIBS-80 encryptions by using 2^{57.87} plaintext-ciphertext pairs. To the best of our knowledge, the result proposed in this paper is the best cryptanalytic result for MIBS, so far
Linear Approximations of Random Functions and Permutations
The goal of this paper is to investigate the linear cryptanalysis of random functions and permutations. The motivation of this work is twofold. First, before a practical cipher can be distinguished from an ideal one, the cryptanalyst must have an accurate understanding of the statistical behavior of the ideal cipher. Secondly, this issue has been neglected both in old and in more recent studies, particularly when multiple linear approximations are being used simultaneously. Traditionally, the models have been based on the average behavior and simplified using other artificial assumptions such as independence of the linear approximations. The new models given in this paper are realistic, accurate and easy to use. They are backed up by standard statistical tools such as Pearson\u27s chi-squared test and finite population correction and shown to work well in small practical examples
Multiple Differential Cryptanalysis using \LLR and Statistics
Recent block ciphers have been designed to be resistant against differential
cryptanalysis. Nevertheless it has been shown that such resistance claims
may not be as tight as wished due to recent advances in this field.
One of the main improvements to differential cryptanalysis is the use of many differentials to reduce the data complexity. In this paper we propose a general model for understanding multiple differential cryptanalysis and propose new attacks based on tools used in multidimensional linear cryptanalysis (namely \LLR and \CHI statistical tests). Practical cases are considered on a reduced version of the cipher PRESENT to evaluate different approaches for selecting and combining the differentials considered. We also consider the tightness of the theoretical estimates corresponding to these attacks
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