436 research outputs found
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Combining a Baiting and a User Search Profiling Techniques for Masquerade Detection
Masquerade attacks are characterized by an adversary stealing a legitimate user's credentials and using them to impersonate the victim and perform malicious activities, such as stealing information. Prior work on masquerade attack detection has focused on profiling legitimate user behavior and detecting abnormal behavior indicative of a masquerade attack. Like any anomaly-detection based techniques, detecting masquerade attacks by profiling user behavior suffers from a significant number of false positives. We extend prior work and provide a novel integrated detection approach in this paper. We combine a user behavior profiling technique with a baiting technique in order to more accurately detect masquerade activity. We show that using this integrated approach reduces the false positives by 36% when compared to user behavior profiling alone, while achieving almost perfect detection results. We also show how this combined detection approach serves as a mechanism for hardening the masquerade attack detector against mimicry attacks
Modeling User Search Behavior for Masquerade Detection
Masquerade attacks are a common security problem that is a consequence of identity theft. This paper extends prior work by modeling user search behavior to detect deviations indicating a masquerade attack. We hypothesize that each individual user knows their own file system well enough to search in a limited, targeted and unique fashion in order to find information germane to their current task. Masqueraders, on the other hand, will likely not know the file system and layout of another user's desktop, and would likely search more extensively and broadly in a manner that is different than the victim user being impersonated. We identify actions linked to search and information access activities, and use them to build user models. The experimental results show that modeling search behavior reliably detects all masqueraders with a very low false positive rate of 1.1%, far better than prior published results. The limited set of features used for search behavior modeling also results in large performance gains over the same modeling techniques that use larger sets of features
Modeling User Search-Behavior for Masquerade Detection
Masquerade attacks are a common security problem that is a consequence of identity theft. Prior work has focused on user command modeling to identify abnormal behavior indicative of impersonation. This paper extends prior work by modeling user search behavior to detect deviations indicating a masquerade attack. We hypothesize that each individual user knows their own file system well enough to search in a limited, targeted and unique fashion in order to find information germane to their current task. Masqueraders, on the other hand, will likely not know the file system and layout of another user's desktop, and would likely search more extensively and broadly in a manner that is different than the victim user being impersonated. We extend prior research by devising taxonomies of UNIX commands and Windows applications that are used to abstract sequences of user commands and actions. The experimental results show that modeling search behavior reliably detects all masqueraders with a very low false positive rate of 0.13%, far better than prior published results. The limited set of features used for search behavior modeling also results in large performance gains over the same modeling techniques that use larger sets of features
Masquerade Attack Detection Using a Search-Behavior Modeling Approach
Masquerade attacks are unfortunately a familiar security problem that is a consequence of identity theft. Detecting masqueraders is very hard. Prior work has focused on user command modeling to identify abnormal behavior indicative of impersonation. This paper extends prior work by presenting one-class Hellinger distance-based and one-class SVM modeling techniques that use a set of novel features to reveal user intent. The specific objective is to model user search profiles and detect deviations indicating a masquerade attack. We hypothesize that each individual user knows their own file system well enough to search in a limited, targeted and unique fashion in order to find information germane to their current task. Masqueraders, on the other hand, will likely not know the file system and layout of another user's desktop, and would likely search more extensively and broadly in a manner that is different than the victim user being impersonated. We extend prior research that uses UNIX command sequences issued by users as the audit source by relying upon an abstraction of commands. We devise taxonomies of UNIX commands and Windows applications that are used to abstract sequences of user commands and actions. We also gathered our own normal and masquerader data sets captured in a Windows environment for evaluation. The datasets are publicly available for other researchers who wish to study masquerade attack rather than author identification as in much of the prior reported work. The experimental results show that modeling search behavior reliably detects all masqueraders with a very low false positive rate of 0.1%, far better than prior published results. The limited set of features used for search behavior modeling also results in huge performance gains over the same modeling techniques that use larger sets of features
The Wolf of SUTD (TWOS): A dataset of malicious insider threat behavior based on a gamified competition
In this paper we present open research questions and options for data analysis of our previously designed dataset called TWOS: The Wolf of SUTD. In specified research questions, we illustrate the potential use of the TWOS dataset in multiple areas of cyber security, which does not limit only to malicious insider threat detection but are also related to authorship verification and identification, continuous authentication, and sentiment analysis. For the purpose of investigating the research questions, we present several state-of-the-art features applicable to collected data sources, and thus we provide researchers with a guidance how to start with data analysis. The TWOS dataset was collected during a gamified competition that was devised in order to obtain realistic instances of malicious insider threat. The competition simulated user interactions in/among competing companies, where two types of behaviors (normal and malicious) were incentivized. For the case of malicious behavior,we designed two types of malicious periods that was intended to capture the behavior of two types of insiders – masqueraders and traitors. The game involved the participation of 6 teams consisting of 4 students who competed with each other for a period of 5 days. Their activities were monitored by several data collection agents and producing data for mouse, keyboard, process and file-system monitor, network traffic, emails, and login/logout data sources. In total, we obtained 320 hours of active participation that included 18 hours of masquerader data and at least two instances of traitor data. In addition to expected malicious behaviors, students explored various defensive and offensive strategies such as denial of service attacks and obfuscation techniques, in an effort to get ahead in the competition. The TWOS dataset was made publicly accessible for further research purposes. In this paper we present the TWOS dataset that contains realistic instances of insider threats based on a gamified competition. The competition simulated user interactions in/among competing companies, where two types of behaviors (normal and malicious) were incentivized. For the case of malicious behavior, we designed sessions for two types of insider threats (masqueraders and traitors). The game involved the participation of 6 teams consisting of 4 students who competed with each other for a period of 5 days, while their activities were monitored considering several heterogeneous sources (mouse, keyboard, process and file-system monitor, network traffic, emails and login/logout). In total, we obtained 320 hours of active participation that included 18 hours of masquerader data and at least two instances of traitor data. In addition to expected malicious behaviors, students explored various defensive and offensive strategies such as denial of service attacks and obfuscation techniques, in an effort to get ahead in the competition. Furthermore, we illustrate the potential use of the TWOS dataset in multiple areas of cyber security, which does not limit to malicious insider threat detection, but also areas such as authorship verification and identification, continuous authentication, and sentiment analysis. We also present several state-of-the-art features that can be extracted from different data sources in order to guide researchers in the analysis of the dataset. The TWOS dataset is publicly accessible for further research purposes. © 2018, Innovative Information Science and Technology Research Group. All rights reserved
The Feasibility of Using Behavioural Profiling Technique for Mitigating Insider Threats: Review
Insider threat has become a serious issue to the many organizations. Various companies are increasingly deploying many information technologies to prevent unauthorized access to getting inside their system. Biometrics approaches have some techniques that contribute towards controlling the point of entry. However, these methods mainly are not able to continuously
validate the users reliability. In contrast behavioral profiling is one of the biometrics technologies but it focusing on the activities of the users during using the system and comparing that with a previous history. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis, literature review and limitations on behavioral profiling approach and to what extent that can be used for mitigating insider misuse
User Profiling in GUI based Windows Systems for Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection is the process of identifying any unauthorized access to a sys- tem. This process inspects user behavior to identify any possible attack or intrusion. There exists two type of intrusion detection systems (IDSs): signature-based IDS and anomaly-based IDS. This project concentrates on anomaly-based intrusion detection technique. This technique is based on the deviation of intruder’s actions from the authenticated user’s actions. Much previous research has focused on the deviation of command line input in UNIX systems. However, these techniques fail to detect attacks on modern GUI- based systems, where typical user activities include mouse movements and keystrokes. Our project aims to create a dataset suitable for testing intrusion detection strate- gies on GUI-based operating systems. We have developed an event logging tool to capture GUI-based user data on Windows systems. We have collected a large dataset which we analyze using a intrusion detection strategy based on hidden Markov models (HMM)
Obfuscation of Malicious Behaviors for Thwarting Masquerade Detection Systems Based on Locality Features
In recent years, dynamic user verification has become one of the basic pillars for insider threat detection. From these threats, the research presented in this paper focuses on masquerader attacks, a category of insiders characterized by being intentionally conducted by persons outside the organization that somehow were able to impersonate legitimate users. Consequently, it is assumed that masqueraders are unaware of the protected environment within the targeted organization, so it is expected that they move in a more erratic manner than legitimate users along the compromised systems. This feature makes them susceptible to being discovered by dynamic user verification methods based on user profiling and anomaly-based intrusion detection. However, these approaches are susceptible to evasion through the imitation of the normal legitimate usage of the protected system (mimicry), which is being widely exploited by intruders. In order to contribute to their understanding, as well as anticipating their evolution, the conducted research focuses on the study of mimicry from the standpoint of an uncharted terrain: the masquerade detection based on analyzing locality traits. With this purpose, the problem is widely stated, and a pair of novel obfuscation methods are introduced: locality-based mimicry by action pruning and locality-based mimicry by noise generation. Their modus operandi, effectiveness, and impact are evaluated by a collection of well-known classifiers typically implemented for masquerade detection. The simplicity and effectiveness demonstrated suggest that they entail attack vectors that should be taken into consideration for the proper hardening of real organizations
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Towards Effective Masquerade Attack Detection
Data theft has been the main goal of the cybercrime community for many years, and more and more so as the cybercrime community gets more motivated by financial gain establishing a thriving underground economy. Masquerade attacks are a common security problem that is a consequence of identity theft and that is generally motivated by data theft. Such attacks are characterized by a system user illegitimately posing as another legitimate user. Prevention-focused solutions such as access control solutions and Data Loss Prevention tools have failed in preventing these attacks, making detection not a mere desideratum, but rather a necessity. Detecting masqueraders, however, is very hard. Prior work has focused on user command modeling to identify abnormal behavior indicative of impersonation. These approaches suffered from high miss and false positive rates. None of these approaches could be packaged into an easily-deployable, privacy-preserving, and effective masquerade attack detector. In this thesis, I present a machine learning-based technique using a set of novel features that aim to reveal user intent. I hypothesize that each individual user knows his or her own file system well enough to search in a limited, targeted, and unique fashion in order to find information germane to their current task. Masqueraders, on the other hand, are not likely to know the file system and layout of another user's desktop, and would likely search more extensively and broadly in a manner that is different from that of the victim user being impersonated. Based on this assumption, I model a user's search behavior and monitor deviations from it that could indicate fraudulent behavior. I identify user search events using a taxonomy of Windows applications, DLLs, and user commands. The taxonomy abstracts the user commands and actions and enriches them with contextual information. Experimental results show that modeling search behavior reliably detects all simulated masquerade activity with a very low false positive rate of 1.12%, far better than any previously published results. The limited set of features used for search behavior modeling also results in considerable performance gains over the same modeling techniques that use larger sets of features, both during sensor training and deployment. While an anomaly- or profiling-based detection approach, such as the one used in the user search profiling sensor, has the advantage of detecting unknown attacks and fraudulent masquerade behaviors, it suffers from a relatively high number of false positives and remains potentially vulnerable to mimicry attacks. To further improve the accuracy of the user search profiling approach, I supplement it with a trap-based detection approach. I monitor user actions directed at decoy documents embedded in the user's local file system. The decoy documents, which contain enticing information to the attacker, are known to the legitimate user of the system, and therefore should not be touched by him or her. Access to these decoy files, therefore, should highly suggest the presence of a masquerader. A decoy document access sensor detects any action that requires loading the decoy document into memory such as reading the document, copying it, or zipping it. I conducted human subject studies to investigate the deployment-related properties of decoy documents and to determine how decoys should be strategically deployed in a file system in order to maximize their masquerade detection ability. Our user study results show that effective deployment of decoys allows for the detection of all masquerade activity within ten minutes of its onset at most. I use the decoy access sensor as an oracle for the user search profiling sensor. If abnormal search behavior is detected, I hypothesize that suspicious activity is taking place and validate the hypothesis by checking for accesses to decoy documents. Combining the two sensors and detection techniques reduces the false positive rate to 0.77%, and hardens the sensor against mimicry attacks. The overall sensor has very limited resource requirements (40 KB) and does not introduce any noticeable delay to the user when performing its monitoring actions. Finally, I seek to expand the search behavior profiling technique to detect, not only malicious masqueraders, but any other system users. I propose a diversified and personalized user behavior profiling approach to improve the accuracy of user behavior models. The ultimate goal is to augment existing computer security features such as passwords with user behavior models, as behavior information is not readily available to be stolen and its use could substantially raise the bar for malefactors seeking to perpetrate masquerade attacks
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