Ontology of sentential moods

In this paper ontological implications of the Barcan formula and its converse will be discussed at the conceptual and technical level. The thesis that will be defended is that sentential moods are not ontologically neutral since the rejection of ontological implications of Barcan formula and its converse is a condition of a possibility of the imperative mood. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section a systematization of semantical systems of quantified modal logic is introduced for the purpose of making explicit their ontological presuppositions. In this context Jadacki's ontological difference between being and existence is discussed and analyzed within the framework of hereby proposed system of quantified modal logic. The second section discusses ontological implications of the Barcan formula and its converse within the system accommodating the difference between being and existence. The third section presents a proof of incompatibility of the Barcan formula and its converse with the use of imperatives. In the concluding section, a thesis on logical pragmatics foreclosing the dilemma between necessitism and contingentism is put forward and defended against some objections

The Many Moods of Emotion

This paper presents a novel approach to the facial expression generation problem. Building upon the assumption of the psychological community that emotion is intrinsically continuous, we first design our own continuous emotion representation with a 3-dimensional latent space issued from a neural network trained on discrete emotion classification. The so-obtained representation can be used to annotate large in the wild datasets and later used to trained a Generative Adversarial Network. We first show that our model is able to map back to discrete emotion classes with a objectively and subjectively better quality of the images than usual discrete approaches. But also that we are able to pave the larger space of possible facial expressions, generating the many moods of emotion. Moreover, two axis in this space may be found to generate similar expression changes as in traditional continuous representations such as arousal-valence. Finally we show from visual interpretation, that the third remaining dimension is highly related to the well-known dominance dimension from psychology

Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility

Are individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases? One reason to think not is that implicit biases are often advertised as unconscious, ‘introspectively inaccessible’ attitudes. However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, although often in partial and inarticulate ways. Here I explore the implications of this evidence of partial awareness for individuals’ moral responsibility. First, I argue that responsibility comes in degrees. Second, I argue that individuals’ partial awareness of their implicit biases makes them (partially) morally responsible for them. I argue by analogy to a close relative of implicit bias: moods

Abstract structures for moods in Greek

It is my intention to make two major points in this paper: 1. The first has to do with finding a frame within which the modal expressions of one particular Ancient IE [Indoeuropean] language – I have chosen Classical Greek – can be best described. I shall try to point out that the regularities which we find in these expressions must depend on an underlying principle, represented by abstract structures. These structures are semanto-syntactic, which means that the semantic properties or bundles of properties are arranged not in a linear order but in a hierarchical order, analogous to a bracketing in a PS structure. The abstract structures we propose have, of course, a very tentative character. They can only be accepted as far as evidence for them can be furnished. 2. My second point has to do with the modal verb forms that were the object of the studies of most Indo-Europeanists. If in the innermost bracket of a semanto-syntactic structure two semantic properties or bundles of properties can be exchanged without any further change in the total structure, and if this change is correlated with a change in verbal mood forms and nothing else, then I think we are faced with a case where these forms can be said to have a meaning of their own. I shall also try to show how these meanings are to be understood as bundles of features rather than as unanalyzed terms. In my final remarks: I shall try to outline the bearing these views have on comparative IE linguistics

Your Morals Are Your Moods

We test the effect of players' moods on their behavior in a gift-exchange game. In the first stage of the game, player 1 chooses a transfer to player 2. In the second stage, player 2 chooses an effort level. Higher effort is more costly for player 2, but it increases player 1's payoff. We say that player 2 reciprocates if effort is increasing in the transfer received. Player 2 is generous if an effort is incurred even when no transfer is received. Subjects play this game in two different moods. To induce a `bad mood', subjects in the role of player 2 watched a sad movie before playing the game; to induce a `good mood', they watched a funny movie. Mood induction was effective: subjects who saw the funny movie reported a significantly better mood than those who saw the sad movie. These two moods lead to significant differences in player 2's behavior. We find that a bad mood implies more reciprocity while a good mood implies more generosity. Since high transfers are relatively more common, player 1 makes more money when second movers are in a bad mood.

Your Morals are Your Moods

We test the effect of players' moods on their behavior in a gift-exchange game.In the first stage of the game, player 1 chooses a transfer to player 2.In the second stage, player 2 chooses an effort level.Higher effort is more costly for player 2, but it increases player 1's payoff.We say that player 2 reciprocates if effort is increasing in the transfer received.Player 2 is generous if an effort is incurred even when no transfer is received.Subjects play this game in two different moods.To induce a `bad mood', subjects in the role of player 2 watched a sad movie before playing the game; to induce a `good mood', they watched a funny movie.Mood induction was effective: subjects who saw the funny movie reported a significantly better mood than those who saw the sad movie.These two moods lead to significant differences in player 2's behavior.We find that a bad mood implies more reciprocity while a good mood implies more generosity.Since high transfers are relatively more common, player 1 make more money when second movers are in a bad mood.rationality;motivation;game theory;emotions;reciprocity;gift giving

In the mood to innovate : a multilevel study on the interaction of entrepreneurs' innovative work behaviour and affect : a dissertation presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Studies in Management, Massey University, Wellington, New Zealand

Affect is a hot topic in entrepreneurial research. However, extant literature is lagging behind in its use of affective theory and methodology, and furthermore, attention resides in isolated topics of inquiry, rendering the field stunted and disjointed. The purpose of this research is to adopt burgeoning affective theoretical perspectives to anticipate daily fluctuation in entrepreneurs’ innovative behaviour. The circumplex model of affect is utilised in this research to challenge the rhetoric that all spectrum of pleasant moods lead to beneficial work behaviour. Though multilevel modelling based on 3360 data points nested within 160 entrepreneurs (21 surveys per participant, completed over two weeks), support is found for the proposition that pleasant moods do not necessarily result in productive behaviour. Specifically, activation (the energising dimension of affect) has greater influence on propelling entrepreneurs’ innovative behaviour than valence (affect’s pleasant or unpleasant nature), such that high activation unpleasant and pleasant affect (worried, anxious, inspired, enthusiastic) predicts innovative work behaviour, while low activation pleasant affect (calm, relaxed) does not. The affect-behaviour relationship is examined from several perspectives resulting in a feedback model between high activation moods and innovative work behaviour engagement. Engagement in innovative work behaviour positively correlated to entrepreneurs’ experience of high activation unpleasant affect, and negatively related to high and low activation pleasant affect. Thus although innovative work behaviour benefits from high activation pleasant moods, engagement essentially decreases them. Affective dispositions correlated with daily affective experiences also, as such entrepreneurs with low levels of trait negative affect experienced more pleasant moods during the day and visa versa. Findings confirmed the hypothesis that the quality of previous night’s sleep both moderates the link between affect and innovative work behaviour, plus predisposes entrepreneurs to pleasant or conversely unpleasant affective daily experiences – illustrating the importance of sleep in affective research. Additionally innovative work behaviour was predicted via “the affective shift model”, which was adapted to include the influence of activation. The results further attest to the relevance of temporal dynamics of affect perspectives in entrepreneurial research. Specifically, the model demonstrated that innovative work behaviour ensued when high activation unpleasant affect was followed by high activation pleasant affect, or simply with an increase in the level of high activation affect, of either valence between morning and afternoon. Empirical, theoretical, and practical implications of the findings are discussed