Exploiting simple corporate memory in iterative coalition games

Amongst the challenging problems that must be addressed in order to create increasingly automated electronic commerce systems are those which involve forming coalitions of agents to exploit a particular market opportunity. Furthermore economic systems are normally continuous dynamic systems generating many instances of the same or similar problems (the regular calls for tender, regular emergence of new markets etc.).The work described in this paper explores how simple forms of memory can be exploited by agents over time to guide decision making in iterative sequences of coalition formation problems enabling them to build up social knowledge in order to improve their own utility and the ability of the population to produce increasingly well suited coalitions for a simple call-for-tender economy.Postprint (published version

Induced Technological Change in a Limited Foresight Optimization Model

The threat of global warming calls for a major transformation of the energy system the coming century. Modeling technological change is an important factor in energy systems modeling. Technological change may be treated as induced by climate policy or as exogenous. We investigate the importance of induced technological change (ITC) in GET-LFL, an iterative optimization model with limited foresight that includes learning-by-doing. Scenarios for stabilization of atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 400, 450, 500 and 550 ppm are studied. We find that the introduction of ITC reduces the total net present value of the abatement cost over this century by 3-9% compared to a case where technological learning is exogenous. Technology specific polices which force the introduction of fuel cell cars and solar PV in combination with ITC reduce the costs further by 4-7% and lead to significantly different technological solutions in different sectors, primarily in the transport sector.Energy system model, Limited foresight, Climate policy, Endougenous learning, Technological lock-in

Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac

Diffusion of shared goods in consumer coalitions. An agent-based model

This paper focuses on the process of coalition formation conditioning the common decision to adopt a shared good, which cannot be afforded by an average single consumer and whose use cannot be exhausted by any single consumer. An agent based model is developed to study the interplay between these two processes: coalition formation and diffusion of shared goods. Coalition formation is modelled in an evolutionary game theoretic setting, while adoption uses elements from both the Bass and the threshold models. Coalitions formation sets the conditions for adoption, while diffusion influences the consequent formation of coalitions. Results show that both coalitions and diffusion are subject to network effects and have an impact on the information flow though the population of consumers. Large coalitions are preferred over small ones since individual cost is lower, although it increases if higher quantities are purchased collectively. The paper concludes by connecting the model conceptualisation to the on-going discussion of diffusion of sustainable goods, discussing related policy implications

Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues

The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water related issues – which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that to, on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their characteristics; and, on the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the “rules of the game” that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially of trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, this paper first discusses the non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Particular attention will be given to those directly modelling the process of negotiation, although some attempts at finding strategies to maintain the efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. In addition, this paper will focus on Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process of negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not yet found much use in real life negotiation. The paper will conclude by highlighting the key remaining gaps in the literature.Negotiation theory, Water, Agreeements, Stochasticity, Stakeholders

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Climate policy, Transfers

Informing Coalition Structure Generation in Multi-Agent Systems Through Emotion Modelling

We propose a hybrid coalition formation method for multi-agent systems that combines a rational mechanism and an emotionally-inspired mechanism to reduce the associated computational cost. To initialise coalition formation, the rational mechanism is used and in subsequent iterations, the emotional mechanism (that forms coalitions resulting from emotional reactions to aspects of interactions between agents) is used. The emotions of anger and gratitude are modelled and used as a basis to model trust which is in turn used to restrict the coalition state-space. We offer some discussion as to how this hybrid method offers an improvement over using a method that only considers payoff maximisation and we propose some direction for future work

Chapter Cooperative Game Theory and Its Application in Localization Algorithms

Complementary medicin

One-deviation principle in coalition formation

We study coalitional one-deviation principle in a framework a la Chwe (1994). The principle requires that an active coalition or any of its subcoalition will not benefit from a single deviation to a strategy that specifies, for each history of coalitional moves, an active coalition and its move. A strategy meeting the one-deviation property is characterized. Moreover, it is shown to exist. Finally, the results are compared to the existing theories of coalitional games.one-deviation principle, coalition formation

Cooperative Game Theory and Its Application in Localization Algorithms

Complementary medicin