31,933 research outputs found

    MCMAS-SLK: A Model Checker for the Verification of Strategy Logic Specifications

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    We introduce MCMAS-SLK, a BDD-based model checker for the verification of systems against specifications expressed in a novel, epistemic variant of strategy logic. We give syntax and semantics of the specification language and introduce a labelling algorithm for epistemic and strategy logic modalities. We provide details of the checker which can also be used for synthesising agents' strategies so that a specification is satisfied by the system. We evaluate the efficiency of the implementation by discussing the results obtained for the dining cryptographers protocol and a variant of the cake-cutting problem

    A Backward-traversal-based Approach for Symbolic Model Checking of Uniform Strategies for Constrained Reachability

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    Since the introduction of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL), many logics have been proposed to reason about different strategic capabilities of the agents of a system. In particular, some logics have been designed to reason about the uniform memoryless strategies of such agents. These strategies are the ones the agents can effectively play by only looking at what they observe from the current state. ATL_ir can be seen as the core logic to reason about such uniform strategies. Nevertheless, its model-checking problem is difficult (it requires a polynomial number of calls to an NP oracle), and practical algorithms to solve it appeared only recently. This paper proposes a technique for model checking uniform memoryless strategies. Existing techniques build the strategies from the states of interest, such as the initial states, through a forward traversal of the system. On the other hand, the proposed approach builds the winning strategies from the target states through a backward traversal, making sure that only uniform strategies are explored. Nevertheless, building the strategies from the ground up limits its applicability to constrained reachability objectives only. This paper describes the approach in details and compares it experimentally with existing approaches implemented into a BDD-based framework. These experiments show that the technique is competitive on the cases it can handle.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2017, arXiv:1709.0176

    Strategy Logic with Imperfect Information

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    We introduce an extension of Strategy Logic for the imperfect-information setting, called SLii, and study its model-checking problem. As this logic naturally captures multi-player games with imperfect information, the problem turns out to be undecidable. We introduce a syntactical class of "hierarchical instances" for which, intuitively, as one goes down the syntactic tree of the formula, strategy quantifications are concerned with finer observations of the model. We prove that model-checking SLii restricted to hierarchical instances is decidable. This result, because it allows for complex patterns of existential and universal quantification on strategies, greatly generalises previous ones, such as decidability of multi-player games with imperfect information and hierarchical observations, and decidability of distributed synthesis for hierarchical systems. To establish the decidability result, we introduce and study QCTL*ii, an extension of QCTL* (itself an extension of CTL* with second-order quantification over atomic propositions) by parameterising its quantifiers with observations. The simple syntax of QCTL* ii allows us to provide a conceptually neat reduction of SLii to QCTL*ii that separates concerns, allowing one to forget about strategies and players and focus solely on second-order quantification. While the model-checking problem of QCTL*ii is, in general, undecidable, we identify a syntactic fragment of hierarchical formulas and prove, using an automata-theoretic approach, that it is decidable. The decidability result for SLii follows since the reduction maps hierarchical instances of SLii to hierarchical formulas of QCTL*ii

    Possibilistic Boolean games: strategic reasoning under incomplete information

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    Boolean games offer a compact alternative to normal-form games, by encoding the goal of each agent as a propositional formula. In this paper, we show how this framework can be naturally extended to model situations in which agents are uncertain about other agents' goals. We first use uncertainty measures from possibility theory to semantically define (solution concepts to) Boolean games with incomplete information. Then we present a syntactic characterization of these semantics, which can readily be implemented, and we characterize the computational complexity

    Simple Coalitional Games with Beliefs

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    We introduce coalitional games with beliefs (CGBs), a natural generalization of coalitional games to environments where agents possess private beliefs regarding the capabilities (or types) of others. We put forward a model to capture such agent-type uncertainty, and study coalitional stability in this setting. Specifically, we introduce a notion of the core for CGBs, both with and without coalition structures. For simple games without coalition structures, we then provide a characterization of the core that matches the one for the full information case, and use it to derive a polynomial-time algorithm to check core nonemptiness. In contrast, we demonstrate that in games with coalition structures allowing beliefs increases the computational complexity of stability-related problems. In doing so, we introduce and analyze weighted voting games with beliefs, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we discuss connections between our model and other classes of coalitional games

    Reasoning about Knowledge and Strategies under Hierarchical Information

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    Two distinct semantics have been considered for knowledge in the context of strategic reasoning, depending on whether players know each other's strategy or not. The problem of distributed synthesis for epistemic temporal specifications is known to be undecidable for the latter semantics, already on systems with hierarchical information. However, for the other, uninformed semantics, the problem is decidable on such systems. In this work we generalise this result by introducing an epistemic extension of Strategy Logic with imperfect information. The semantics of knowledge operators is uninformed, and captures agents that can change observation power when they change strategies. We solve the model-checking problem on a class of "hierarchical instances", which provides a solution to a vast class of strategic problems with epistemic temporal specifications on hierarchical systems, such as distributed synthesis or rational synthesis

    Infinite games with finite knowledge gaps

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    Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning strategies can be constructed effectively without restricting the direction of information flow. Instead, our condition requires that the players attain common knowledge about the actual state of the game over and over again along every play. We show that it is decidable whether a given game satisfies the condition, and prove tight complexity bounds for the strategy synthesis problem under ω\omega-regular winning conditions given by parity automata.Comment: 39 pages; 2nd revision; submitted to Information and Computatio

    The Complexity of Synthesizing Uniform Strategies

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    We investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve sets of plays in order to express useful constraints on strategies that are not \mu-calculus definable. Typically, we can state that a strategy is observation-based. We propose a formal language to specify uniformity properties, interpreted over two-player turn-based arenas equipped with a binary relation between plays. This way, we capture e.g. games with winning conditions expressible in epistemic temporal logic, whose underlying equivalence relation between plays reflects the observational capabilities of agents (for example, synchronous perfect recall). Our framework naturally generalizes many other situations from the literature. We establish that the problem of synthesizing strategies under uniformity constraints based on regular binary relations between plays is non-elementary complete.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2013, arXiv:1303.007
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