Illusions of gunk

The possibility of gunk has been used to argue against mereological nihilism. This paper explores two responses on the part of the microphysical mereological nihilist: (1) the contingency defence, which maintains that nihilism is true of the actual world; but that at other worlds, composition occurs; (2) the impossibility defence, which maintains that nihilism is necessary true, and so gunk worlds are impossible. The former is argued to be ultimately unstable; the latter faces the explanatorily burden of explaining the illusion that gunk is possible. It is argued that we can discharge this burden by focussing on the contingency of the microphysicalist aspect of microphysical mereological nihilism. The upshot is that gunk-based arguments against microphysical mereological nihilism can be resisted

Mereological Nihilism and Personal Ontology

Mereological nihilists hold that composition never occurs, so that nothing is ever a proper part of anything else. Substance dualists generally hold that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper, I argue that every popular objection to substance dualism has a parallel objection to composition. This thesis has some interesting implications. First, many of those who reject composition, but accept substance dualism, or who reject substance dualism and accept composition, have some explaining to do. Secondly, one popular objection to mereological nihilism, one which contends that mereological nihilism is objectionable insofar as it is incompatible with the existence of people, is untenable

A Psychological Approach to the Special Composition Question

When does composition occur? There are historical accounts that claim there are no composite objects, or that composite objects can consist of any given objects. These views fail to preserve our intuitions and warrant a different understanding of the term “object”. I present a psychological approach wherein observers ascribe objecthood to an arrangement in the form of a secondary quality. This subjective behavior can be traced back to the development of our perceptual capacities in our natural history

Perception, abductive methodology and compositional universalism

In this thesis I will argue for compositional universalism, according to which, any plurality of objects composes an object. In the first part of the thesis I will argue that if ordinary objects—the ones that are typically perceived by humans’ perceptual system as objects—exist, then so do extraordinary objects. I appeal to certain metaphysical accounts of perception to argue for a great number of extraordinary objects in a similar way that some conservatives about composition would argue for ordinary objects, which in turn suggests that such conservative views are either false or insufficient. I then use abductive methodology to argue that universalism is the best theory that respects the assumption of existence of ordinary objects, and further explains the existence of the ordinary and extraordinary objects which are argued for. The second part takes into consideration the fact the compositional nihilist, who denies occurrence of composition, refuses to accept the assumption that ordinary objects exist, hence blocks my argument for universalism. I lay out a detailed analysis of ideological and ontological commitments of different species of nihilism and universalism about composition, and argue on abductive grounds that universalism is the simplest theory of composition among many of them.https://www.ester.ee/record=b5247945*es

All The Small Things: Contingent Mereological Nihilism

Scientists and metaphysicians alike often accept that the best theory is that which best exhibits familiar theoretical virtues such as empirical testability, fruitfulness, conservatism, explanatory power, and parsimony. In this dissertation, I assume this naturalistically respectable methodology and explore whether it can help decide between competing metaphysical theories. I argue it can. In chapter 1, I present my version of mereological nihilism, Minimal Truthmaker Nihilism (MTN). According to MTN, only the minimal truthmakers for all true sentences are included in the correct ontology and composite objects are not among the minimal truthmakers. I argue that the proponent of MTN can claim ‘hands exist’ is true, even though hands don’t really exist. In chapter 2, I argue we can use the theoretical virtues to answer the Special Composition question (SCQ), which asks what the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions are under which two or more objects come together to compose a further object. The first four virtues don’t give us any reason to prefer one theory of composition over another. But, I argue, on any plausible understanding of parsimony we have reason to prefer MTN, according to which two or more objects never really compose a further object. Suppose I’m right about that. It’s metaphysical orthodoxy that true metaphysical theories, such as MTN, are necessarily true. Against this orthodoxy -- using the same commonly accepted methodology -- I show that MTN is contingently true. In chapter 3, I argue for what I’ll call the ‘Nomological Account of Objecthood’ or ‘NAO’ for short. If I’m right, NAO gives us answers to the SCQ and the Simple Question, which asks what the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions are for being a simple. I argue that if we assume the aforementioned methodology and that simples are possibly extended, then NAO is the best theory of objecthood. In chapter 4, I show how we can put Minimal Truthmaker Nihilism (MTN), to work for us. There is a long-standing problem of how it is that mental properties can cause physical events given that it is widely accepted in the scientific community that every physical event has a sufficient completely physical cause. MTN solves this problem by explaining how microphysical properties and objects located in space-time alone can serve as truth-makers for sentences about the causality of mental properties just as, I argue, microphysical properties and objects can serve as truth-makers for sentences about composite objects such as tables. Each chapter in the dissertation is written as a stand-alone paper

Emergence for Nihilists

I defend mereological nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects, against a challenge from ontological emergence, the view that some things have properties that are ‘something over and above’ the properties of their parts. As the nihilist does not believe in composite wholes, there is nothing in the nihilist’s ontology to instantiate emergent properties – or so the challenge goes. However, I argue that some simples (taken together) can collectively instantiate an emergent property, so the nihilist’s ontology can in fact accommodate emergent properties. Furthermore, I show that employing plural instantiation does not bloat the nihilist’s ontology or ideology

NIHILIST PERDURANTISM: A NEW ONTOLOGY OF MATERIAL OBJECTS

Ordinary material objects, such as guitars and houses, do not seem to pose any serious philosophical problems. However, the nature of the material objects and their part-whole relation raises serious questions about fundamental ontologies. Furthermore, part-whole relations are not necessarily spatial; they can be temporal as well. My dissertation investigates the problems posed by ordinary material objects, and the different ontological views that attempt to provide answers to these problems. I then present a new and radical view, which I call Nihilist Perdurantism (NP). NP claims that objects have temporal parts, but not spatial parts. I arrive at this view by first exploring and arguing against different views on composition, with a focus on arguments against common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. I then discuss the nature of mereological simples and argue against several views that claim that qualitatively heterogeneous simples are possible (Markosian and McDaniel). Next, I present my arguments against perdurantist, endurantist, and presentist view of persistence. I especially focus on endurantism, and use the aforementioned argument against the possibility of qualitatively heterogeneous simples to construct a similar argument against endurantism. Finally, I argue in favor of my view, NP. This view combines a mereological nihilist view (defended at various times by Unger, Van Inwagen, Merricks, and Sider) about spatial parts with a perdurantist view (defended at various times by Lewis, Hawley, Heller, and Sider) of temporal parts. Therefore, according to NP, there are no guitars, trees, or houses. The only objects that exist are NP objects; these are line-shaped objects that extend through spacetime. With respect to the three spatial dimensions, these objects have no parts. However, with respect to the temporal dimension, NP objects do have parts in the form of points and line segments. My work shows that NP has better solutions to many of the puzzles and problems posed by material objects, such as the puzzle of change, over the three standard views. Hinchliff argues that change is puzzling because in order for there to be real change, then the following four intuitions must be true: (1) The candle persists through the change. It existed when it was straight, and it exists now when it is bent…(2) Shapes are properties not relations. They are one-placed, not many-placed…(3) The candle itself has the shapes. Not just a part but the candle itself was straight, and not just a part but the candle itself is bent…(4) The shapes are incompatible. If the shapes were compatible, there need not have been a change. The puzzle of change is the mutual inconsistency of these four intuitions. I argue that perdurantists must deny intuition (3), endurantists must deny intuition (2), and presentists must deny intuition (1). I then argue that only NP can accommodate all four intuitions about both macroscopic and microscopic change while resolving the inconsistency of the four intuitions. My dissertation presents a new view that provides a fresh perspective on the debate about the nature of material objects. My development of NP touches on a number of other philosophical problems. In Chapter One, I discuss the role of intuitions in metaphysics, and argue that many supposedly “common sense” intuitions are already philosophical positions. In Chapter 2, I argue against Korman’s and Markosian’s common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. In Chapter 3, I argue that the endurantist view of persistence is inconsistent and should be rejected. In addition to making the case for NP and its solution to the puzzle of change in Chapter 4, I also argue that NP can solve the problem of motion in a homogenous substance. Finally, in Chapter Five, I argue against the possibility of both gunky and junky material objects

Material Composition

A material composite object is an object composed of two or more material parts. The world, it seems, is simply awash with such things. The Eiffel Tower, for instance, is composed of iron girders, nuts and bolts, and so on. You and I, as human beings, are composed of flesh and bone, and various organs. Moreover, these parts themselves are composed of further parts, such as molecules, which themselves are composed of atoms, which are composed of sub-atomic particles. Material composite objects are, it seems, ubiquitous. However, despite their ubiquity, a little philosophical reflection on the matter, as is so often the case, reveals that they are also deeply puzzling. The question which has received most attention from philosophers interested in material composition is: under what circumstances do two or more material objects compose a further object? Why is it, for instance, that a collection of iron girders that are bolted together in the centre of Paris do compose an object (i.e. the Eiffel Tower), but that there is no object composed of the Eiffel Tower and the Moon? What conditions are satisfied by the first set of objects, and not by the second set of objects, which make this the case? In short, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for composition to occur? Over the last thirty years or so, philosophers have devoted a lot of attention to this question, and it has proved much more difficult to answer than one may have initially thought. This entry will provide a survey of the various answers that have been given to this question, and the arguments that have been offered in their defence