Mean-payoff games and propositional proofs

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The Incorrect Usage of Propositional Logic in Game Theory: The Case of Disproving Oneself

Recently, we had to realize that more and more game theoretical articles have been published in peer-reviewed journals with severe logical deficiencies. In particular, we observed that the indirect proof was not applied correctly. These authors confuse between statements of propositional logic. They apply an indirect proof while assuming a prerequisite in order to get a contradiction. For instance, to find out that "if A then B" is valid, they suppose that the assumptions "A and not B" are valid to derive a contradiction in order to deduce "if A then B". Hence, they want to establish the equivalent proposition "A and not B implies A and not A" to conclude that "if A then B" is valid. In fact, they prove that a truth implies a falsehood, which is a wrong statement. As a consequence, "if A then B" is invalid, disproving their own results. We present and discuss some selected cases from the literature with severe logical flaws, invalidating the articles.Comment: 16 pages, 2 table

Symmetric Strategy Improvement

Symmetry is inherent in the definition of most of the two-player zero-sum games, including parity, mean-payoff, and discounted-payoff games. It is therefore quite surprising that no symmetric analysis techniques for these games exist. We develop a novel symmetric strategy improvement algorithm where, in each iteration, the strategies of both players are improved simultaneously. We show that symmetric strategy improvement defies Friedmann's traps, which shook the belief in the potential of classic strategy improvement to be polynomial

Parameterized Linear Temporal Logics Meet Costs: Still not Costlier than LTL

We continue the investigation of parameterized extensions of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) that retain the attractive algorithmic properties of LTL: a polynomial space model checking algorithm and a doubly-exponential time algorithm for solving games. Alur et al. and Kupferman et al. showed that this is the case for Parametric LTL (PLTL) and PROMPT-LTL respectively, which have temporal operators equipped with variables that bound their scope in time. Later, this was also shown to be true for Parametric LDL (PLDL), which extends PLTL to be able to express all omega-regular properties. Here, we generalize PLTL to systems with costs, i.e., we do not bound the scope of operators in time, but bound the scope in terms of the cost accumulated during time. Again, we show that model checking and solving games for specifications in PLTL with costs is not harder than the corresponding problems for LTL. Finally, we discuss PLDL with costs and extensions to multiple cost functions.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2015, arXiv:1509.0685

Automating Resolution is NP-Hard

We show that the problem of finding a Resolution refutation that is at most polynomially longer than a shortest one is NP-hard. In the parlance of proof complexity, Resolution is not automatizable unless P = NP. Indeed, we show it is NP-hard to distinguish between formulas that have Resolution refutations of polynomial length and those that do not have subexponential length refutations. This also implies that Resolution is not automatizable in subexponential time or quasi-polynomial time unless NP is included in SUBEXP or QP, respectively

Sparser Random 3SAT Refutation Algorithms and the Interpolation Problem:Extended Abstract

We formalize a combinatorial principle, called the 3XOR principle, due to Feige, Kim and Ofek [12], as a family of unsatisfiable propositional formulas for which refutations of small size in any propo-sitional proof system that possesses the feasible interpolation property imply an efficient deterministic refutation algorithm for random 3SAT with n variables and Ω(n1.4) clauses. Such small size refutations would improve the state of the art (with respect to the clause density) efficient refutation algorithm, which works only for Ω(n1.5) many clauses [13]. We demonstrate polynomial-size refutations of the 3XOR principle in resolution operating with disjunctions of quadratic equations with small integer coefficients, denoted R(quad); this is a weak extension of cutting planes with small coefficients. We show that R(quad) is weakly autom-atizable iff R(lin) is weakly automatizable, where R(lin) is similar to R(quad) but with linear instead of quadratic equations (introduced in [25]). This reduces the problem of refuting random 3CNF with n vari-ables and Ω(n1.4) clauses to the interpolation problem of R(quad) and to the weak automatizability of R(lin)

Proof-theoretic Analysis of Rationality for Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets

In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Rationality here means playing only strategies one believes to be best responses. This involves looking at two formal languages. One is first-order, and is used to formalise optimality conditions, like avoiding strictly dominated strategies, or playing a best response. The other is a modal fixpoint language with expressions for optimality, rationality and belief. Fixpoints are used to form expressions for common belief and for iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies.Comment: 16 pages, Proc. 11th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XI). To appea