Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty

Innomhuspositioneringssystem kan med fördel användas i många olika tillämpningar, allt från sjukhus till shoppingcenter. Denna rapport behandlar olika tekniker och lösningar för att designa ett positioneringssystem. Rapporten tar även upp i detalj hur ett system kan konstrueras av ZigBee kombinerat med dödräkning

Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty

This Lecture begins with a puzzle about Albert Hirschman’s famous work Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Why do we make much of exit and voice but utterly neglect loyalty? It’s a question that goes well beyond Hirschman’s book. For example, much of constitutional theory is preoccupied with a single question: What doesademocracy owe its minorities? And most of the answers to this question fit naturally into the two categories Hirschman made famous: voice and exit. On both the rights side and the structural side of constitutional theory, scholars worry about providing minorities with an adequate level of influence. And the solutions they propose almost inevitably offer minorities a chance at voice or exit, ] as if no other option exists. The First Amendment, for instance, offers minorities the right to free speech (voice) and private association (exit). Similarly, structural arrangements give minorities the chance to vote in national elections (voice) and in state elections (exit)

The Conditional Electoral Connection in the European Parliament

This paper introduces a model of the electoral connection in the European Parliament. Emphasizing the problem of common agency – wherein agents are beholden to multiple principals who cannot coordinate – it assumes that national parties, European party groups, and voters are “latent principals” that differentially constrain members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The model proposes that the degree to which each of these principals constrain MEPs depends upon signals that MEPs receive from the national political arena about their electoral vulnerability. Re-election seeking MEPs will in turn cultivate closer connections with the principal whose support is most important for reducing electoral vulnerability. Drawing on the second-order election model, signals about MEP vulnerability are measured as a national party‟s success in the most recent national election, given the party‟s average size, governing status, and time remaining until the European election. The model predicts three broad outcomes. First, MEPs from large or governing parties will generally be more vulnerable as their party label suffers in European elections. Expecting losses, they should cultivate closer connections to their constituents by emphasizing personal record rather than party affiliation. Second, MEPs from small or opposition parties will generally be less vulnerable as their party label is more successful in European elections. Expecting gains, these MEPs will seek to appeal to their party leaders in order to secure the safest (often only the top) place on the electoral list. Finally, the model predicts that systemic-level attributes such as voters‟ right to re-order the ballot should contribute to variation in the first two outcomes. The model‟s propositions are tested empirically with qualitative and quantitative evidence from 30 interviews with MEPs in 2008 and an original dataset of MEPs‟ non-roll-call position taking in plenary sessions during the 6th European Parliament term

Electoral poaching and party identification

This paper studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of party strength based on the sizes and intensities of a party’s loyal voter segments and demonstrate how party behavior varies with the two parties’ strengths. In equilibrium, parties target or poach a strict subset of the opposition party’s loyal voters: offering those voters a high expected transfer, while freezing out the remainder with a zero transfer. The size of the subset of opposition voters frozen out and, consequently, the level of inequality in utilities generated by a party’s equilibrium redistribution schedule is increasing in the opposition party’s strength. We also construct a measure of political polarization that is increasing in the sum and symmetry of the parties’ strengths, and find that the expected ex-post inequality in utilities of the implemented policy is increasing in political polarization. -- In dieser Studie wird der Wahlkampf in einem Modellrahmen mit umverteilender Politik untersucht. Dabei gehen wir von den Annahmen deterministischen Wahlverhaltens und heterogenen Wählerbindung an die politischen Parteien aus. Wir generieren eine natürliche Messgröße für die Stärke einer Partei. Sie beruht auf der Größe und Intensität der parteiloyalen Wählersegmente und zeigt wie sich das Verhalten der Parteien verändert in Abhängigkeit von der Stärke der beiden Parteien. Im Gleichgewicht versuchen die Parteien einen Teil der loyalen Wählerschaft der Gegenpartei mit dem Versprechen hoher Transferzahlungen abzuwerben, während den restlichen Teilen der gegnerischen Wählerschaft Null-Transfers in Aussicht gestellt werden. Die Anzahl dieser letzteren Oppositionswähler, die keine Transferzahlungen erhalten werden, und das Niveau der Ungleichverteilung der Nutzen durch die im Gleichgewicht resultierende Umverteilung steigen in Abhängigkeit von der Stärke der Oppositionspartei. Des weiteren wird eine Messgröße der politischen Polarisierung konstruiert, das mit der Summe und Symmetrie der Parteienstärke steigt. Als Ergebnis lässt sich feststellen, dass das erwartete ex-post Ungleichgewicht des Nutzens der implementierten Politik ansteigt, je stärker die politische Polarisierung ist.

After the Arab Spring: power shift in the Middle East?: Syria’s bloody Arab Spring

When the dictatorial regimes of Tunisia and Egypt were toppled by popular unrest few expected Syria to follow. Despite suffering under dictatorship for over 40 years and facing similar economic and social challenges that had prompted rebellion elsewhere, Syrians appeared to support their young president, Bashar al-Assad, who had cultivated an image as a populist anti-western moderniser. When protests did eventually reach Syria in March 2011, in the southern town of Deraa, they called on Assad to reform not resign. Yet any faith in Assad as a reformer soon evaporated. His security forces responded with live fire, killing hundreds in Deraa and elsewhere, while the president offered only piecemeal reforms. The regime fashioned a narrative that protests were led by criminal armed gangs, intent on stirring up sectarian divisions within Syria’s heterogeneous population. Yet in these early stages it was mostly regime-backed Shabiha militia from Assad’s own Alawi sect that were responsible for any violence, while most protestors remained peaceful and inclusive. Tragically, as regime violence continued and protests spread, with over 9,000 deaths in the first year, that narrative became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Not only have some taken up arms against Assad, but sectarianism is increasing, with the Alawi community as a whole blamed for Assad’s excesses

The Other 20 Cents Isn’t Worth It: The Inadequacy of Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Framework

This Article examines the framework for resolving Title VII retaliation disputes through the lens of gender pay disparity and proposes that the current framework is inadequate. The Article begins by illustrating the issue and the impact of retaliatory conduct in the workplace through the stories of two female workers. It also explains the Title VII retaliation standard and explores the process for filing and pursuing an anti-retaliation claim under this framework. Ultimately, the current framework is inadequate for two reasons. First, it does little to discourage retaliatory conduct by employers or co-workers because what amounts to “retaliation” under the law is under-inclusive and difficult to prove. Second, the employment relationship is among the most important in American society, but instead of seeking to salvage it, the current litigation-driven anti-retaliation framework destroys it. Consequently, the Article proposes an alternative dispute resolution method for solving retaliation disputes and provides examples from the transformative mediation and ombudsman models

Voting Behavior, Coalitions and Government Strength through a Complex Network Analysis

We analyze the network of relations between parliament members according to their voting behavior. In particular, we examine the emergent community structure with respect to political coalitions and government alliances. We rely on tools developed in the Complex Network literature to explore the core of these communities and use their topological features to develop new metrics for party polarization, internal coalition cohesiveness and government strength. As a case study, we focus on the Chamber of Deputies of the Italian Parliament, for which we are able to characterize the heterogeneity of the ruling coalition as well as parties specific contributions to the stability of the government over time. We find sharp contrast in the political debate which surprisingly does not imply a relevant structure based on establised parties. We take a closer look to changes in the community structure after parties split up and their effect on the position of single deputies within communities. Finally, we introduce a way to track the stability of the government coalition over time that is able to discern the contribution of each member along with the impact of its possible defection. While our case study relies on the Italian parliament, whose relevance has come into the international spotlight in the present economic downturn, the methods developed here are entirely general and can therefore be applied to a multitude of other scenarios.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figure

What Workers Want

[Excerpt] This updated edition of What Workers Want keeps the core text and chapter structure of the first edition (Chapters 1-7 in the current book), while eliminating its appendices. The appendices reported the methodology, telephone questionnaires, and written materials used in the two waves of the Worker Representation and Participation Survey (WRPS), all of which is no available online at www.nber.org/~freeman/wrps.html. That site also offers an integrated dataset of all findings, ready for download by interested researchers, and links to other national surveys, modeled on the WRPS, conducted since. New to the updated edition are a new introduction and conclusion. The Introduction examines how our original findings stand up in light of the survey research that others have done since the WRPS. The Conclusion offers suggestions on how to reform our labor relations system so that it delivers to workers what they want in the form of workplace representation and participation

The Catholic Doctor, the Catholic Hospital and Contraception

In the following article, he reviews the position of the Catholic Church on contraception . After affirming the Pope\u27s supreme teaching authority, he outlines the papal attitude toward contraception and stresses the objective evil of artificial birth control. The role of Catholic doctors and hospitals in combating a contraceptive mentality is also examined

The case for offshore wind farms, artificial reefs and sustainable tourism in the French Mediterranean

As the French government strives to achieve their offshore renewable energy target, the impact of offshore wind farms on coastal tourism in the Languedoc Rousillon is now being questioned. To assess this issue, a choice experiment was undertaken to elicit tourist preferences for wind turbines at different distances from the shore. We also examined whether potential visual nuisances may be compensated by wind farm associated reef-recreation or by adopting a coherent environmental policy. The findings indicate that age, nationality, vacation activities and their destination loyalty influence attitudes toward compensatory policies. Two policy recommendations are suggested. First, everything else being equal, wind farms should be located 12 km offshore. Second, and alternatively, a wind farm can be located from 5 km and outwards without a loss in tourism revenues if accompanied by a coherent environmental policy and wind farm associated recreational activities.