A Finite Representation of the Narrowing Space

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14125-1_4Narrowing basically extends rewriting by allowing free variables in terms and by replacing matching with unification. As a consequence, the search space of narrowing becomes usually infinite, as in logic programming. In this paper, we introduce the use of some operators that allow one to always produce a finite data structure that still represents all the narrowing derivations. Furthermore, we extract from this data structure a novel, compact equational representation of the (possibly infinite) answers computed by narrowing for a given initial term. Both the finite data structure and the equational representation of the computed answers might be useful in a number of areas, like program comprehension, static analysis, program transformation, etc.Nishida, N.; Vidal, G. (2013). A Finite Representation of the Narrowing Space. En Logic-Based Program Synthesis and Transformation. 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Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy by Paul Horwich 248p (2013) (review revised 2019)

Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. Likewise, the use of the French word 'repertoire' where the English 'repertory' will do quite well. The major deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to employ what I see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searle’s framework which I have outlined above. This is especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (especially in footnotes 2-7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary of the import of W’s anti-theoretical stance on p65. He needs to give more emphasis to ‘On Certainty’, recently the subject of much effort by Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva and others and summarized in my recent articles. Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on academia dot edu and philpapers dot org , but for PMS Hacker see his papers on his Oxford page. He gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. “There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019

Reasoning about Minimal Belief and Negation as Failure

We investigate the problem of reasoning in the propositional fragment of MBNF, the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure introduced by Lifschitz, which can be considered as a unifying framework for several nonmonotonic formalisms, including default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, epistemic queries, and logic programming. We characterize the complexity and provide algorithms for reasoning in propositional MBNF. In particular, we show that entailment in propositional MBNF lies at the third level of the polynomial hierarchy, hence it is harder than reasoning in all the above mentioned propositional formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning. We also prove the exact correspondence between negation as failure in MBNF and negative introspection in Moore's autoepistemic logic

Logical realism and the metaphysics of logic

‘Logical Realism’ is taken to mean many different things. I argue that if reality has a privileged structure, then a view I call metaphysical logical realism is true. The view says that, first, there is ‘One True Logic’; second, that the One True Logic is made true by the mind‐and‐language‐independent world; and third, that the mind‐and‐language‐independent world makes it the case that the One True Logic is better than any other logic at capturing the structure of reality. Along the way, I discuss a few alternatives, and clarify two distinct kinds of metaphysical logical realism.Accepted manuscrip

What Makes Logical Truths True?

The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control the process of deduction in inquiry, i.e., they are prescriptive for the use of language and thought in inquiry, I argue that logic may, and should, be seen as an instrument or as a way of proceeding (modus procedendi) in inquiry

A Formal Framework for Concrete Reputation Systems

In a reputation-based trust-management system, agents maintain information about the past behaviour of other agents. This information is used to guide future trust-based decisions about interaction. However, while trust management is a component in security decision-making, many existing reputation-based trust-management systems provide no formal security-guarantees. In this extended abstract, we describe a mathematical framework for a class of simple reputation-based systems. In these systems, decisions about interaction are taken based on policies that are exact requirements on agents’ past histories. We present a basic declarative language, based on pure-past linear temporal logic, intended for writing simple policies. While the basic language is reasonably expressive (encoding e.g. Chinese Wall policies) we show how one can extend it with quantification and parameterized events. This allows us to encode other policies known from the literature, e.g., ‘one-out-of-k’. The problem of checking a history with respect to a policy is efficient for the basic language, and tractable for the quantified language when policies do not have too many variables

Constraint Logic Programming for Natural Language Processing

This paper proposes an evaluation of the adequacy of the constraint logic programming paradigm for natural language processing. Theoretical aspects of this question have been discussed in several works. We adopt here a pragmatic point of view and our argumentation relies on concrete solutions. Using actual contraints (in the CLP sense) is neither easy nor direct. However, CLP can improve parsing techniques in several aspects such as concision, control, efficiency or direct representation of linguistic formalism. This discussion is illustrated by several examples and the presentation of an HPSG parser.Comment: 15 pages, uuencoded and compressed postscript to appear in Proceedings of the 5th Int. Workshop on Natural Language Understanding and Logic Programming. Lisbon, Portugal. 199

Actors, actions, and initiative in normative system specification

The logic of norms, called deontic logic, has been used to specify normative constraints for information systems. For example, one can specify in deontic logic the constraints that a book borrowed from a library should be returned within three weeks, and that if it is not returned, the library should send a reminder. Thus, the notion of obligation to perform an action arises naturally in system specification. Intuitively, deontic logic presupposes the concept of anactor who undertakes actions and is responsible for fulfilling obligations. However, the concept of an actor has not been formalized until now in deontic logic. We present a formalization in dynamic logic, which allows us to express the actor who initiates actions or choices. This is then combined with a formalization, presented earlier, of deontic logic in dynamic logic, which allows us to specify obligations, permissions, and prohibitions to perform an action. The addition of actors allows us to expresswho has the responsibility to perform an action. In addition to the application of the concept of an actor in deontic logic, we discuss two other applications of actors. First, we show how to generalize an approach taken up by De Nicola and Hennessy, who eliminate from CCS in favor of internal and external choice. We show that our generalization allows a more accurate specification of system behavior than is possible without it. Second, we show that actors can be used to resolve a long-standing paradox of deontic logic, called the paradox of free-choice permission. Towards the end of the paper, we discuss whether the concept of an actor can be combined with that of an object to formalize the concept of active objects