Learning agent's spatial configuration from sensorimotor invariants

The design of robotic systems is largely dictated by our purely human intuition about how we perceive the world. This intuition has been proven incorrect with regard to a number of critical issues, such as visual change blindness. In order to develop truly autonomous robots, we must step away from this intuition and let robotic agents develop their own way of perceiving. The robot should start from scratch and gradually develop perceptual notions, under no prior assumptions, exclusively by looking into its sensorimotor experience and identifying repetitive patterns and invariants. One of the most fundamental perceptual notions, space, cannot be an exception to this requirement. In this paper we look into the prerequisites for the emergence of simplified spatial notions on the basis of a robot's sensorimotor flow. We show that the notion of space as environment-independent cannot be deduced solely from exteroceptive information, which is highly variable and is mainly determined by the contents of the environment. The environment-independent definition of space can be approached by looking into the functions that link the motor commands to changes in exteroceptive inputs. In a sufficiently rich environment, the kernels of these functions correspond uniquely to the spatial configuration of the agent's exteroceptors. We simulate a redundant robotic arm with a retina installed at its end-point and show how this agent can learn the configuration space of its retina. The resulting manifold has the topology of the Cartesian product of a plane and a circle, and corresponds to the planar position and orientation of the retina.Comment: 26 pages, 5 images, published in Robotics and Autonomous System

A situated cognition perspective on presence

During interaction with computer-based 3-D simulations like virtual reality, users may experience a sense of involvement called presence. Presence is commonly defined as the subjective feeling of "being there". We discuss the state of the art in this inno vative research area and introduce a situated cognition perspective on presence. We argue that presence depends on the proper integration of aspects relevant to an agent's movement and perception, to her actions, and to her conception of the overall situ a tion in which she finds herself, as well as on how these aspects mesh with the possibilities for action afforded in the interaction with the artifact. We also aim at showing that studies of presence offer a test-bed for different theories of situated co gnition.

Ecological Interface Design for Flexible Manufacturing Systems: An Empirical Assessment of Direct Perception and Direct Manipulation in the Interface

Four interfaces were developed to factorially apply two principles of ecological interface design (EID; direct perception and direct manipulation) to a flexible manufacturing system (FMS). The theoretical foundation and concepts employed during their development, with findings related to more significant issues regarding interface design for complex socio-technical systems, are discussed. Key aspects of cognitive systems engineering (CSE) and EID are also discussed. An FMS synthetic task environment was developed, and an experiment was conducted to evaluate real-time decision support during supervisory operations. Participants used all four interfaces to supervise and maintain daily part production at systematically varied levels of difficulty across sessions. Significant results provide evidence that the incorporation of direct perception and direct manipulation in interface design produced an additive effect, allowing for greater support for the supervisory agents

Interaction dynamics and autonomy in cognitive systems

The concept of autonomy is of crucial importance for understanding life and cognition. Whereas cellular and organismic autonomy is based in the self-production of the material infrastructure sustaining the existence of living beings as such, we are interested in how biological autonomy can be expanded into forms of autonomous agency, where autonomy as a form of organization is extended into the behaviour of an agent in interaction with its environment (and not its material self-production). In this thesis, we focus on the development of operational models of sensorimotor agency, exploring the construction of a domain of interactions creating a dynamical interface between agent and environment. We present two main contributions to the study of autonomous agency: First, we contribute to the development of a modelling route for testing, comparing and validating hypotheses about neurocognitive autonomy. Through the design and analysis of specific neurodynamical models embedded in robotic agents, we explore how an agent is constituted in a sensorimotor space as an autonomous entity able to adaptively sustain its own organization. Using two simulation models and different dynamical analysis and measurement of complex patterns in their behaviour, we are able to tackle some theoretical obstacles preventing the understanding of sensorimotor autonomy, and to generate new predictions about the nature of autonomous agency in the neurocognitive domain. Second, we explore the extension of sensorimotor forms of autonomy into the social realm. We analyse two cases from an experimental perspective: the constitution of a collective subject in a sensorimotor social interactive task, and the emergence of an autonomous social identity in a large-scale technologically-mediated social system. Through the analysis of coordination mechanisms and emergent complex patterns, we are able to gather experimental evidence indicating that in some cases social autonomy might emerge based on mechanisms of coordinated sensorimotor activity and interaction, constituting forms of collective autonomous agency

Drama, a connectionist model for robot learning: experiments on grounding communication through imitation in autonomous robots

The present dissertation addresses problems related to robot learning from demonstra¬ tion. It presents the building of a connectionist architecture, which provides the robot with the necessary cognitive and behavioural mechanisms for learning a synthetic lan¬ guage taught by an external teacher agent. This thesis considers three main issues: 1) learning of spatio-temporal invariance in a dynamic noisy environment, 2) symbol grounding of a robot's actions and perceptions, 3) development of a common symbolic representation of the world by heterogeneous agents.We build our approach on the assumption that grounding of symbolic communication creates constraints not only on the cognitive capabilities of the agent but also and especially on its behavioural capacities. Behavioural skills, such as imitation, which allow the agent to co-ordinate its actionn to that of the teacher agent, are required aside to general cognitive abilities of associativity, in order to constrain the agent's attention to making relevant perceptions, onto which it grounds the teacher agent's symbolic expression. In addition, the agent should be provided with the cognitive capacity for extracting spatial and temporal invariance in the continuous flow of its perceptions. Based on this requirement, we develop a connectionist architecture for learning time series. The model is a Dynamical Recurrent Associative Memory Architecture, called DRAMA. It is a fully connected recurrent neural network using Hebbian update rules. Learning is dynamic and unsupervised. The performance of the architecture is analysed theoretically, through numerical simulations and through physical and simulated robotic experiments. Training of the network is computationally fast and inexpensive, which allows its implementation for real time computation and on-line learning in a inexpensive hardware system. Robotic experiments are carried out with different learning tasks involving recognition of spatial and temporal invariance, namely landmark recognition and prediction of perception-action sequence in maze travelling.The architecture is applied to experiments on robot learning by imitation. A learner robot is taught by a teacher agent, a human instructor and another robot, a vocabulary to describe its perceptions and actions. The experiments are based on an imitative strategy, whereby the learner robot reproduces the teacher's actions. While imitating the teacher's movements, the learner robot makes similar proprio and exteroceptions to those of the teacher. The learner robot grounds the teacher's words onto the set of common perceptions they share. We carry out experiments in simulated and physical environments, using different robotic set-ups, increasing gradually the complexity of the task. In a first set of experiments, we study transmission of a vocabulary to designate actions and perception of a robot. Further, we carry out simulation studies, in which we investigate transmission and use of the vocabulary among a group of robotic agents. In a third set of experiments, we investigate learning sequences of the robot's perceptions, while wandering in a physically constrained environment. Finally, we present the implementation of DRAMA in Robota, a doll-like robot, which can imitate the arms and head movements of a human instructor. Through this imitative game, Robota is taught to perform and label dance patterns. Further, Robota is taught a basic language, including a lexicon and syntactical rules for the combination of words of the lexicon, to describe its actions and perception of touch onto its body

\u3cem\u3eGRASP News\u3c/em\u3e, Volume 8, Number 1

A report of the General Robotics and Active Sensory Perception (GRASP) Laboratory. Edited by Thomas Lindsay

The primacy of Knowing-how : cognition, know-how and an enactive action first epistemology

The Enactive Approach (EA) is a project of naturalization of the mind. EA should be able to offer a naturalization of knowledge, such underlying naturalization is what is found in this dissertation. The result is an epistemology where the most basal aspect of knowledge is not to accurately represent. For an enactive epistemology, the primary relation is how knowers relate, contact or engage with what is known. I argue in the final chapter that knowing is a perspectival, affectively entangled, historically situated relation between knower and known. Knower, known and knowing are characterized in broad naturalistic terms. EA is first presented in the context of a larger trend of studying cognition in an ecological way. The understanding of mind in the context of the living leads me to argue that living systems and precarious autonomous systems in general are intrinsically teleological systems whose defining activity consists in being responsive to the viability boundaries or conditions of their own existence. Cognitive systems skillfully change in adaptive manners to not disintegrate, even if their changes are not optimal. The account provides a relational account of adaptive behavior as the basis for an account of know-how. The more general notion of know-how can be articulated from the notion of perception as mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. Know how in general is understood as the organization and reorganization of bodily processes and structures that enables reliable successful action. Know-how as the bodily sensitivities and capabilities relative to the cognitive domain that reliably result in the success of action is a feature of all forms of cognitive engagement. The cognition or knowing-how of languaging consists in acquiring, producing, interpreting and modifying the know-how shared within linguistic communities. Crucially, the influence of the interactive context in a participant’s sense-making varies in a continuum of participation. In one end of the spectrum one finds sense-making that remains largely (but not absolutely) individual and in the other end where what characterizes the activity is a joint process of sense-making. Knowing-how to language is knowing-how to be in dialogue with plural and idiosyncratic identities while being both yourself. A shared community of practices emerges as the basis of objectivity; knowing-how is a communal affair. If cognition is the skillful and not necessarily optimal adaptation of a precarious systemic identity to an always changing environment, all cognition rests on know how. Cognition rests on know-how in the sense that all cognition is understood in terms of skillful transition between states of a system struggling with possible disintegration. Intelligent behavior is not based on symbolic structures and context-free knowledge, it is based on richly detailed, context-specific know-how. The knowledgeable interaction with the world is the responsiveness to the now that incorporates the history leading up to it.A Abordagem Enativa (AE) é um projeto de naturalização da mente. AE deveria ser capaz de oferecer uma naturalização do conhecimento, tal naturalização subjacente é o que apresento ao leitor nesta tese. O resultado é uma epistemologia na qual o aspecto mais básico do conhecimento não é representar acuradamente. Para uma epistemologia enativa, a relação privilegiada é como conhecedores se relacionam, entram em contato ou engajam com o que é conhecido. Argumento no capítulo final que o conhecimento é uma relação perspectival, afectivamente emaranhada, historicamente situada entre conhecedor e conhecido. Conhecedor, conhecido e conhecer são caracterizados em termos liberalmente naturalistas. AE é primeiro apresentada no contexto de uma ampla tendência de estudar-se ecologicamente a cognição. O entendimento da vida no contexto do vivo me leva a argumentar que sistemas vivos e sistemas autônomos precários em geral são teleológicos e sua atividade definidora consiste em ser responsivo às fronteiras de viabilidade de sua própria existência. Sistemas cognitivos habilidosamente mudam de modos adaptativos evitando a desintegração, mesmo que as mudanças não sejam optimais. A abordagem provê uma visão relacional do comportamento adaptativo como base para o conhecimento prático [know-how]. A noção mais geral de conhecimento prático pode ser elaborada a partir da noção de percepção como maestria de contingências sensório-motoras. Conhecimento prático em geral é compreendido como a organização e reorganização de processos e estruturas corporais que possibilita de modo confiável a ação bem-sucedida. Conhecimento prático como as sensibilidades e capacidades corporais para o confiável sucesso da ação é uma característica de todas as formas de engajamento cognitivo. A cognição ou o sabendo-fazer do lingueajear consiste em adquirir, produzir, interpretar e modificar o conhecimento prático compartilhado entre comunidades linguísticas. Crucialmente, a influência do contexto interativo na produção de sentido de um participante de uma comunidade varia em um contínuo de participação. Num extremo encontra-se produção de sentido que permanece majoritariamente (mas não absolutamente individual, e no outro encontra-se atividades caracterizadas como processos conjuntos de produção de sentido. Sabendo-fazer linguagem é saber como estar em diálogo com identidades plurais e idiossincráticas enquanto se é uma você mesmo. Uma comunidade de práticas compartilhadas emerge como a base da objetividade, saber-como é um assunto comunal. Se a cognição é a adaptação habilidosa e não necessariamente optimal de uma identidade sistêmica precária em um ambiente constantemente mudando, toda cognição apoia se em conhecimento prático. Cognição apoia-se em conhecimento prático na medida que toda cognição é entendida em termos da transição habilidosa entre estados de um sistema sob a possibilidade de desintegração Comportamento inteligente não é baseado em estruturas simbólicas e conhecimento geral, baseia-se em conhecimento prático ricamente detalhado e relevante ao contexto específico. A interação com o mundo dotada de conhecimento é a responsividade para o agora que incorpora a história que nos levou até aqui

Visual routines and attention

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 1998.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-93).by Satyajit Rao.Ph.D