The lattice of Belnapian modal logics: Special extensions and counterparts

Let K be the least normal modal logic and BK its Belnapian version, which enriches K with ‘strong negation’. We carry out a systematic study of the lattice of logics containing BK based on:• introducing the classes (or rather sublattices) of so-called explosive, complete and classical Belnapian modal logics;• assigning to every normal modal logic three special conservative extensions in these classes;• associating with every Belnapian modal logic its explosive, complete and classical counterparts.We investigate the relationships between special extensions and counterparts, provide certain handy characterisations and suggest a useful decomposition of the lattice of logics containing BK

Fuzzy bi-G\"{o}del modal logic and its paraconsistent relatives

We present the axiomatisation of the fuzzy bi-G\"{o}del modal logic (formulated in the language containing $\triangle$ and treating the coimplication as a defined connective) and establish its PSpace-completeness. We also consider its paraconsistent relatives defined on fuzzy frames with two valuations $e_1$ and $e_2$ standing for the support of truth and falsity, respectively, and equipped with \emph{two fuzzy relations} $R^+$ and $R^-$ used to determine supports of truth and falsity of modal formulas. We establish embeddings of these paraconsistent logics into the fuzzy bi-G\"{o}del modal logic and use them to prove their PSpace-completeness and obtain the characterisation of definable frames

A Four-Valued Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Epistemic logic is usually employed to model two aspects of a situation: the factual and the epistemic aspects. Truth, however, is not always attainable, and in many cases we are forced to reason only with whatever information is available to us. In this paper, we will explore a four-valued epistemic logic designed to deal with these situations, where agents have only knowledge about the available information (or evidence), which can be incomplete or conflicting, but not explicitly about facts. This layer of available information or evidence, which is the object of the agents' knowledge, can be seen as a database. By adopting this sceptical posture in our semantics, we prepare the ground for logics where the notion of knowledge-or more appropriately, belief-is entirely based on evidence. The technical results include a set of reduction axioms for public announcements, correspondence proofs, and a complete tableau system. In summary, our contributions are twofold: on the one hand we present an intuition and possible application for many-valued modal logics, and on the other hand we develop a logic that models the dynamics of evidence in a simple and intuitively clear fashion

Bilattice logic of epistemic actions and knowledge

International audienceBaltag, Moss, and Solecki proposed an expansion of classical modal logic, called logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (EAK), in which one can reason about knowledge and change of knowledge. Kurz and Palmigiano showed how duality theory provides a flexible framework for modeling such epistemic changes, allowing one to develop dynamic epistemic logics on a weaker propositional basis than classical logic (for example an intuitionistic basis). In this paper we show how the techniques of Kurz and Palmigiano can be further extended to define and axiomatize a bilattice logic of epistemic actions and knowledge (BEAK). Our propositional basis is a modal expansion of the well-known four-valued logic of Belnap and Dunn, which is a system designed for handling inconsistent as well as potentially conflicting information. These features, we believe, make our framework particularly promising from a computer science perspective

Evidence-Based Beliefs in Many-Valued Modal Logics

Rational agents, humans or otherwise, build their beliefs from evidence – a process which we call consolidation. But how should this process be carried out? In this thesis, we study a multi-agent logic of evidence and the question how agents should form beliefs in this logic. The main contributions of this thesis are twofold. First, we present and study a many-valued modal logic, and show how it can be suitable for modelling multi-agent scenarios where each agent has access to some evidence, which in turn can be processed into beliefs. This is a technical and practical contribution to many-valued modal logics. Second, we open new paths for research in the field of evidence logics: we show a new approach based on many-valued logics, we highlight the concept of consolidations and the importance of looking at their dynamic nature, and build a methodology based on rationality postulates to evaluate them

Kripke semantics for modal bilattice logic

Abstract—We employ the well-developed and powerful techniques of algebraic semantics and Priestley duality to set up a Kripke semantics for a modal expansion of Arieli and Avron’s bilattice logic, itself based on Belnap’s four-valued logic. We obtain soundness and completeness of a Hilbert-style derivation system for this logic with respect to four-valued Kripke frames, the standard notion of model in this setting. The proof is via intermediary relational structures which are analysed through a topological reading of one of the axioms of the logic. Both local and global consequence on the models are covered. I