The Destruction of Convoy PQ17: 27 June–10 July 1942

The most critical problem for the Western Allies in the northern European theater in 1941–42 was the urgent need to secure the war matériel being sent to the Soviet Union. Initially, the Germans did not react strongly against the Allied convoys sailing to northern Russia. However, that began to change quickly after February 1942, when the Germans redeployed almost all their heavy surface forces and a large number of U-boats from home waters to northern Norway

HM 27: Major Naval Operations in European Waters, 1939–1945

This work is the second and last sequel to Major Naval Operations, published by the Naval War College Press in 2008 as Newport Paper 32. The first sequel, Major Fleet-versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945, was published (as Historical Monograph 22) by the Naval War College Press / Government Printing Office in 2014; a second edition came out in 2016. The focus of that volume was on the description and analysis of three major fleet-versus-fleet operations. In contrast, this work, Major Naval Operations in European Waters, 1939–1945 (twenty-seventh in the Naval War College Press’s Historical Monograph series), looks at three different types of major naval/joint operations: an attack on enemy maritime trade, the defense and protection of friendly maritime trade, and a major amphibious/anti-amphibious operation. The principal purpose is to impress on commanders and their staffs the critical importance of studying the theory and practice of major naval/joint operations. Another purpose is to present a method for analyzing a historical case study from an operational instead of a tactical perspective, and then drawing appropriate conclusions and identifying operational lessons.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-historical-monographs/1026/thumbnail.jp

Wolves Without Teeth: The German Torpedo Crisis in World War Two

The Torpedo Crisis, or Torpedokrise as referred to by the Germans, is the name given to the period of the first few years during the Second World War during which time the German U-boat arm experienced catastrophic technical malfunctions with their torpedoes. These malfunctions robbed the Germans of tremendous success during the most critical period of the Second World War - the opening years during which Allied anti-submarine measures were at their poorest and German prospects for success concomitantly at their greatest. By the time the Germans finally succeeded in removing all of these problems and realized the true potential of the torpedo envisioned during the prewar years, Allied antisubmarine warfare tactics and especially technology had advanced to such a degree that it could not be overcome despite the best efforts of the U-bootwaffe. Seen through this light, the Torpedo Crisis assumes great importance as being a significant obstacle that slowed the German march to potential victory and thus perhaps buying the Allied additional time to perfect their methods of combating the U-boat menace. Using the war diaries of U-boat commander-in-chief Karl Donitz and different U-boat commanders, as well as select microfilm records of the German Naval High Command and various secondary sources, I attempt in this study to reconstruct the story of the torpedo crisis and the events that caused it, in the hope of raising the reader\u27s awareness of this crucial yet little known chapter of the Battle of the Atlantic

Considered policy or haphazard evolution? No. 617 Squadron RAF 1943 - 45

Following their breaching of German dams in May 1943, No. 617 Squadron, Royal Air Force, was maintained as a specialist precision bombing unit. For the remainder of the Second World War the Squadron carried out precision attacks using new and unconventional weapons, culminating with Barnes Wallis’s deep penetration bombs, TALLBOY and GRAND SLAM. This thesis will show that the numerous accounts of the Squadron’s history have failed to take account of many factors that determined its role. By concentrating on the operational record and weapons, both popular historians and scholars have given a distorted and interpretatively incomplete description of the Squadron’s development. This in turn has led to an incomplete perception of the Squadron’s Development and a misconception of its full contribution to the bomber offensive. This thesis identifies policy and decision making bodies and examines their role in selecting weapons and targets for the Squadron. It explores the issues which determined the role played by the Squadron: changes in Air Staff policy for Bomber Command, choice of targets, the development and production of weapons, and tactical requirements. Comparison is made between the planners’ original intentions and the final operational record. Many of the Squadron’s operations emerged from an inability to follow through from initial planning. Such failure resulted from factors that included unrealistic expectations of weapon performance, delays in the development of new weapons, and political intervention. Alternative targets were selected not only to take advantage of the Squadron’s existing capabilities but also to address specific issues that were often imposed on the planners by outside agencies which would have otherwise diverted Bomber Command from the main offensive. In other instances the Squadron was used to supplement existing operations carried out by main force. The gestation time for new weapons was such that when a weapon emerged its originally intended targets were no often longer relevant. Accordingly, new targets had to be found. The Squadron’s role in the development and assessment of weapons, equipment and new techniques for the Command is revealed to be greater than previously recognised. This new approach to the Squadron’s wartime role examines the policy and planning backstory to the Squadron’s operations. It reveals a hitherto unrecognised complexity in the evolution of the Squadron’s role, and demonstrates how haphazard delays and setbacks were transformed into new policy to meet ever changing requirements

The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 23.1 (2019)

Ukraine | Interviews with HMA Directors | Southeast Europe | Lessons From the Past: Holland | Field Notes | Research and Developmen

Ordinary Sailors: The French Navy, Vichy and the Second World War

After the debacle of the Fall of France in 1940, the one organization that managed to maintain its discipline and functionality virtually intact was the French Navy. This is the story of how subsequently that navy was able to exert a disproportionate influence on the Vichy regime of Marshal Petain. Such influence achieved its apogee between February 1941 and April 1942 when the navy\u27s Commander-in-Chief Admiral Darlan served simultaneously in several of the regime\u27s highest offices. During this period France continued to flirt with the possibility of actively engaging Great Britain in war on the side of Nazi Germany. It was also the period when Vichy introduced some of its most repressive measures against its own citizens and entered upon policies that led ultimately to active collaboration in the deportation of Jews to Auschwitz

The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 23.1 (2019)

Ukraine | Interviews with HMA Directors | Southeast Europe | Lessons From the Past: Holland | Field Notes | Research and Developmen