Knowledge, belief, normality, and introspection

We study two logics of knowledge and belief stemming from the work of Stalnaker (2006), omitting positive introspection for knowledge. The two systems are equivalent with positive introspection, but not without. We show that while the logic of beliefs remains unaffected by omitting introspection for knowledge in one system, it brings significant changes to the other. The resulting logic of belief is non-normal, and its complete axiomatization uses an infinite hierarchy of coherence constraints. We conclude by returning to the philosophical interpretation underlying both models of belief, showing that neither is strong enough to support a probabilistic interpretation, nor an interpretation in terms of certainty or the "mental component" of knowledge

Joint attention and perceptual experience

Joint attention customarily refers to the coordinated focus of attention between two or more individuals on a common object or event, where it is mutually “open” to all attenders that they are so engaged. We identify two broad approaches to analyse joint attention, one in terms of cognitive notions like common knowledge and common awareness, and one according to which joint attention is fundamentally a primitive phenomenon of sensory experience. John Campbell’s relational theory is a prominent representative of the latter approach, and the main focus of this paper. We argue that Campbell’s theory is problematic for a variety of reasons, through which runs a common thread: most of the problems that the theory is faced with arise from the relational view of perception that he endorses, and, more generally, they suggest that perceptual experience is not sufficient for an analysis of joint attention

Virtue Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism Justification

This research work titled, “Virtue epistemology: Internalism and Externalism Justification” attempts to give a succinct analysis of the justification of our knowledge. It rigorously scrutinizes the sources of our knowledge claim. Whether the justificatory criteria to authenticate our knowledge claim are external or internal. It is discovered that the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate lies near the centre of contemporary discussion about epistemology. The basic idea of internalism is that justification is solely determined by factors that are internal to a person. Externalists deny this, asserting that justification depends on additional factors that are external to a person. A significant aspect of the I-E debate involves setting out exactly what counts as internal to a person. One of the arguments for externalism is that if a process counts as cognitive when it is performed in the head, it should also count as cognitive when it is performed in the world. We sometimes perform actions in our heads that we usually perform in the world, so that the world leaks into the mind. Internalism has epistemological implications: if a process gives us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the world, it will also give us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the head. I explore the relation between internalism and externalism and contend that both are crucial and needed for the purpose of justification. The work employed analytical, expository and critical methods

Some Remarks on the Model Theory of Epistemic Plausibility Models

Classical logics of knowledge and belief are usually interpreted on Kripke models, for which a mathematically well-developed model theory is available. However, such models are inadequate to capture dynamic phenomena. Therefore, epistemic plausibility models have been introduced. Because these are much richer structures than Kripke models, they do not straightforwardly inherit the model-theoretical results of modal logic. Therefore, while epistemic plausibility structures are well-suited for modeling purposes, an extensive investigation of their model theory has been lacking so far. The aim of the present paper is to fill exactly this gap, by initiating a systematic exploration of the model theory of epistemic plausibility models. Like in 'ordinary' modal logic, the focus will be on the notion of bisimulation. We define various notions of bisimulations (parametrized by a language L) and show that L-bisimilarity implies L-equivalence. We prove a Hennesy-Milner type result, and also two undefinability results. However, our main point is a negative one, viz. that bisimulations cannot straightforwardly be generalized to epistemic plausibility models if conditional belief is taken into account. We present two ways of coping with this issue: (i) adding a modality to the language, and (ii) putting extra constraints on the models. Finally, we make some remarks about the interaction between bisimulation and dynamic model changes.Comment: 19 pages, 3 figure

Belief change for introspective agents

We discuss various possibilities for developing a dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) for introspective agents: agents who have the ability to form higher-order beliefs. Such agents can reflect upon and change their minds about their own beliefs. The project of constructing such a logic, full DDL or DDL unlimited, is ridden with difficulties due to the fact that the agent's own doxastic state now becomes a part of the reality he is trying to explore. When an introspective agent learns more about the world (and himself), the reality he holds beliefs about undergoes a change in its doxastic part, which means that his introspective beliefs have to be adjusted accordingly

Pointwise intersection in neighbourhood modal logic

We study the logic of neighbourhood models with pointwise intersection, as a means to characterize multi-modal logics. Pointwise intersection takes us from a set of neighbourhood sets $\mathcal{N}_i$ (one for each member $i$ of a set $G$, used to interpret the modality $\square_i$) to a new neighbourhood set $\mathcal{N}_G$, which in turn allows us to interpret the operator $\square_G$. Here, $X$ is in the neighbourhood for $G$ if and only if $X$ equals the intersection of some $\mathcal{Y} = \{Y_i \mid i\in G\}$. We show that the notion of pointwise intersection has various applications in epistemic and doxastic logic, deontic logic, coalition logic, and evidence logic. We then establish sound and strongly complete axiomatizations for the weakest logic characterized by pointwise intersection and for a number of variants, using a new and generally applicable technique for canonical model construction.Comment: Submitted to Advances in Modal Logic 201

Condição crônica e normalidade: rumo ao movimento que amplia a potência de agir e ser feliz

Esse artigo é um estudo teórico-epistemológico do processo saúde-doença cuja discussão central é a fronteira entre a saúde-doença e entre o normal-anormal da pessoa em condição crônica. Destaca a importância da dimensão subjetiva sem negar a dimensão objetiva desse processo. Mostra que, ao considerar o aspecto objetivo do processo saúde-doença, a definição de normalidade baseia-se em indicadores biológicos calcados em parâmetros estatísticos, que são aplicados como referência para todos os indivíduos. Ao considerar o aspecto subjetivo do processo saúde-doença, surgem diferentes normalidades, pois a pessoa com condição crônica lida de formas diferentes com as exigências cotidianas, visto que seu modo de andar a vida oscila entre o movimento de expansão e o movimento de introspecção. Assim, ter uma condição crônica e ser capaz, ativo e potente na vida significa estar desperto, aberto e sempre em movimento, criando novas normas para ser feliz.Este artículo es un estudio teórico-epistemológico del proceso de salud-enfermedad, cuya discusión central es la frontera entre la salud-enfermedad y la normalidad de la persona en condición crónica. Destaca la importancia de la dimensión subjetiva sin negar la dimensión objetiva de este proceso. Muestra que, al considerar el aspecto objetivo del proceso salud-enfermedad, la definición de la normalidad se basa en indicadores biológicos calcados en parámetros estadísticos, que se aplican como referencia a todos los individuos. Cuando se considera el aspecto subjetivo del proceso salud-enfermedad, aparecen diversos normalidades, pues la persona con condición crónica lidia con los requisitos diarios de diversas formas, puesto que su manera de llevar la vida oscila entre los movimientos de expansión e introspección. Así, tener una condición crónica y ser capaz, activa y potente en la vida significa estar despierto, abierto y siempre en movimiento, creando siempre nuevas normas para ser feliz.This article is an epistemological-theoretical study of the health-disease process, whose central discussion is the frontier between health-disease and between the normal-abnormal of the person in chronic condition. It emphasizes the importance of the subjective dimension, without denying the objective dimension of this process. It shows that, when considering the objective aspect of the health-disease process, the definition of normality is based on the biological indicators grounded on statistic parameters, which are applied as a reference for all individuals. When considering the subjective aspect of the health-disease process, different normalities appear, as people with chronic conditions deal with daily demands in different ways, since the way they lead their life oscillates between expansion and introspection. Thus, having a chronic condition and being able, active and powerful in life means to be awake, open and always moving, creating new ways of being happy

Knowledge and beliefs in economics: the case of the Austrian tradition

The contribution focuses on the problem of the influence of individual knowledge and beliefs on the working of economic activity, within the Austrian tradition of economic thought. More specifically, the contributions of von Mises, Hayek and Schumpeter are investigated. These contributions show a large variety of answers concerning the relation between individual and social beliefs. This variety is not exhaustive but it substantially contributes to a better understanding of contemporary theoretical debates.Individual/social beliefs, shared Knowledge, subjectivism, social rules