3,901 research outputs found
Market Design for Generation Adequacy: Healing Causes rather than Symptoms
Keywords JEL Classification This paper argues that electricity market reform â particularly the need for complementary mechanisms to remunerate capacity â need to be analysed in the light of the local regulatory and institutional environment. If there is a lack of investment, the priority should be to identify the roots of the problem. The lack of demand side response, short-term reliability management procedures and uncompetitive ancillary services procurement often undermine market reflective scarcity pricing and distort long-term investment incentives. The introduction of a capacity mechanism should come as an optional supplement to wholesale and ancillary markets improvements. Priority reforms should focus on encouraging demand side responsiveness and reducing scarcity price distortions introduced by balancing and congestion management through better dialog between network engineers and market operators. electricity market, generation adequacy, market design, capacity mechanis
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Generation Adequacy and Investment Incentives in Britain: from the Pool to NETA
Three years after the controversial change of the British market design from compulsory Pool with capacity payments to decentralised energy-only New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) market framework, we compare the two designs in terms of investment incentives. We review the biases of the Pool capacity payments design, the drought of investment following the introduction of NETA, and the reaction of the market during the first âstress-testâ of NETA during the winter 2003. In an energy-only market such as NETA, it is essential that price signals are right and the system operator has a crucial role in contracting ahead for reserve. We recommend that NETA adopt a single marginal imbalance price as dual imbalance pricing distorts price signals in times of scarcity. The lack of long-term contracting that causes hedging and financing difficulties for power projects can becompensated by vertical and horizontal reintegration at a cost of increased market power
Choosing a transport contract over multiple periods
We offer a shipper and a carrier the choice among three contracts in which to frame their relationship. Both can also take recourse in the transport spot market. Demand and price on the spot market are dependent exogenous stochastic processes. We model the outcome of this endogenous choice of contract. The results, given in closed form, are different from those presented in the literature. Using numeric instances, we show how a choice is made
and which contract would be preferred. Comparison on the variance of the economic returns are offered. The conclusions are applicable when the carrier is not capacity constrained.
Cartel detection in procurement markets
Cartel detection is usually viewed as a key task of either competition authorities or compliance officials in firms with an elevated risk of cartelization. We argue that customers of hard core cartels can have both incentives and possibilities to detect such agreements on their own initiative through the use of market-specific data sets. We apply a unique data set of about 340,000 market transactions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers and show that a price screen would have allowed particularly larger customers to detect the upstream cement cartel before the competition authority. The results not only suggest that monitoring procurement markets through screening tools has the potential of substantial cost reductions - thereby improving the competitive position of the respective user firms - but also allow the conclusion that competition authorities should view customers of potentially cartelized industries as important allies in their endeavour to fight hard core cartels. --business economics,procurement,antitrust policy,cartels,detection,screening
Procurement auctions with avoidable fixed costs: an experimental approach
Bidders in procurement auctions often face avoidable fixed costs. This can make bidding decisions complex and risky, and market outcomes volatile. If bidders deviate from risk neutral best responses, either due to faulty optimization or risk attitudes, then equilibrium predictions can perform poorly. In this paper, we confront laboratory bidders with three auction formats that make bidding difficult and risky in different ways. We find that measures of `difficulty' provide a consistent explanation of deviations from best response bidding across the three formats. In contrast, risk and loss preferences cannot explain behavior across all three formats.Auctions; Experimental; Procurement; Synergies; Asymmetric Bidders; Learning; Optimization errors
Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the biddersâ final utility possibly depends on the winnerâs identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartelsâ structures (not) observed in practice.auctions, Bayesian game, collusion, core, partition function game
An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information
available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take.
Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have
been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in
structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable
testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in
computer-based control systems.
Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order
to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods,
mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However,
due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically
simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results
derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result,
researchers are turning to empirical approaches.
This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to
designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on
empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field
Peer-to-peer energy trading between wind power producer and demand response aggregators for scheduling joint energy and reserve
In this article, a stochastic decision-making framework is presented in which a wind power producer (WPP) provides some required reserve capacity from demand response aggregators (DRAs) in a peer-to-peer (P2P) structure. In this structure, each DRA is able to choose the most competitive WPP, and purchase energy and sell reserve capacity to that WPP under a bilateral contract-based P2P electricity trading mechanism. Based on this structure, the WPP can determine the optimal buying reserve from DRAs to offset part of wind power deviation. The proposed framework is formulated as a bilevel stochastic model in which the upper level maximizes the WPP's profit based on the optimal bidding in the day-ahead and balancing markets, whereas the lower level minimizes DRAs' costs. In order to incorporate the risk associated with the WPP's decisions and to assess the effect of scheduling reserves on the profit variability, conditional value at risk is employed.©2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.fi=vertaisarvioitu|en=peerReviewed
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