Isoelastic Agents and Wealth Updates in Machine Learning Markets

Recently, prediction markets have shown considerable promise for developing flexible mechanisms for machine learning. In this paper, agents with isoelastic utilities are considered. It is shown that the costs associated with homogeneous markets of agents with isoelastic utilities produce equilibrium prices corresponding to alpha-mixtures, with a particular form of mixing component relating to each agent's wealth. We also demonstrate that wealth accumulation for logarithmic and other isoelastic agents (through payoffs on prediction of training targets) can implement both Bayesian model updates and mixture weight updates by imposing different market payoff structures. An iterative algorithm is given for market equilibrium computation. We demonstrate that inhomogeneous markets of agents with isoelastic utilities outperform state of the art aggregate classifiers such as random forests, as well as single classifiers (neural networks, decision trees) on a number of machine learning benchmarks, and show that isoelastic combination methods are generally better than their logarithmic counterparts.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the 29th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2012

Integrating local information for inference and optimization in machine learning

In practice, machine learners often care about two key issues: one is how to obtain a more accurate answer with limited data, and the other is how to handle large-scale data (often referred to as “Big Data” in industry) for efficient inference and optimization. One solution to the first issue might be aggregating learned predictions from diverse local models. For the second issue, integrating the information from subsets of the large-scale data is a proven way of achieving computation reduction. In this thesis, we have developed some novel frameworks and schemes to handle several scenarios in each of the two salient issues. For aggregating diverse models – in particular, aggregating probabilistic predictions from different models – we introduce a spectrum of compositional methods, Rényi divergence aggregators, which are maximum entropy distributions subject to biases from individual models, with the Rényi divergence parameter dependent on the bias. Experiments are implemented on various simulated and real-world datasets to verify the findings. We also show the theoretical connections between Rényi divergence aggregators and machine learning markets with isoelastic utilities. The second issue involves inference and optimization with large-scale data. We consider two important scenarios: one is optimizing large-scale Convex-Concave Saddle Point problem with a Separable structure, referred as Sep-CCSP; and the other is large-scale Bayesian posterior sampling. Two different settings of Sep-CCSP problem are considered, Sep-CCSP with strongly convex functions and non-strongly convex functions. We develop efficient stochastic coordinate descent methods for both of the two cases, which allow fast parallel processing for large-scale data. Both theoretically and empirically, it is demonstrated that the developed methods perform comparably, or more often, better than state-of-the-art methods. To handle the scalability issue in Bayesian posterior sampling, the stochastic approximation technique is employed, i.e., only touching a small mini batch of data items to approximate the full likelihood or its gradient. In order to deal with subsampling error introduced by stochastic approximation, we propose a covariance-controlled adaptive Langevin thermostat that can effectively dissipate parameter-dependent noise while maintaining a desired target distribution. This method achieves a substantial speedup over popular alternative schemes for large-scale machine learning applications

Smooth markets: A basic mechanism for organizing gradient-based learners

With the success of modern machine learning, it is becoming increasingly important to understand and control how learning algorithms interact. Unfortunately, negative results from game theory show there is little hope of understanding or controlling general n-player games. We therefore introduce smooth markets (SM-games), a class of n-player games with pairwise zero sum interactions. SM-games codify a common design pattern in machine learning that includes (some) GANs, adversarial training, and other recent algorithms. We show that SM-games are amenable to analysis and optimization using first-order methods.Comment: 18 pages, 3 figure

Convergence Analysis of Prediction Markets via Randomized Subspace Descent

Abstract Prediction markets are economic mechanisms for aggregating information about future events through sequential interactions with traders. The pricing mechanisms in these markets are known to be related to optimization algorithms in machine learning and through these connections we have some understanding of how equilibrium market prices relate to the beliefs of the traders in a market. However, little is known about rates and guarantees for the convergence of these sequential mechanisms, and two recent papers cite this as an important open question. In this paper we show how some previously studied prediction market trading models can be understood as a natural generalization of randomized coordinate descent which we call randomized subspace descent (RSD). We establish convergence rates for RSD and leverage them to prove rates for the two prediction market models above, answering the open questions. Our results extend beyond standard centralized markets to arbitrary trade networks

ABIDES-Economist: Agent-Based Simulation of Economic Systems with Learning Agents

We introduce a multi-agent simulator for economic systems comprised of heterogeneous Households, heterogeneous Firms, Central Bank and Government agents, that could be subjected to exogenous, stochastic shocks. The interaction between agents defines the production and consumption of goods in the economy alongside the flow of money. Each agent can be designed to act according to fixed, rule-based strategies or learn their strategies using interactions with others in the simulator. We ground our simulator by choosing agent heterogeneity parameters based on economic literature, while designing their action spaces in accordance with real data in the United States. Our simulator facilitates the use of reinforcement learning strategies for the agents via an OpenAI Gym style environment definition for the economic system. We demonstrate the utility of our simulator by simulating and analyzing two hypothetical (yet interesting) economic scenarios. The first scenario investigates the impact of heterogeneous household skills on their learned preferences to work at different firms. The second scenario examines the impact of a positive production shock to one of two firms on its pricing strategy in comparison to the second firm. We aspire that our platform sets a stage for subsequent research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics

Multi-period Trading Prediction Markets with Connections to Machine Learning

We present a new model for prediction markets, in which we use risk measures to model agents and introduce a market maker to describe the trading process. This specific choice on modelling tools brings us mathematical convenience. The analysis shows that the whole market effectively approaches a global objective, despite that the market is designed such that each agent only cares about its own goal. Additionally, the market dynamics provides a sensible algorithm for optimising the global objective. An intimate connection between machine learning and our markets is thus established, such that we could 1) analyse a market by applying machine learning methods to the global objective, and 2) solve machine learning problems by setting up and running certain markets

Prediction Markets for Machine Learning: Equilibrium Behaviour through Sequential Markets

Prediction markets which trade on contracts representing unknown future outcomes are designed specifically to aggregate expert predictions via the market price. While there are some existing machine learning interpretations for the market price and connections to Bayesian updating under the equilibrium analysis of such markets, there is less of an understanding of what the instantaneous price in sequentially traded markets means. In this thesis I show that the prices generated in sequentially traded prediction markets are stochastic approximations to the price given by an equilibrium analysis. This is done by showing that the equilibrium price is a solution to a stochastic optimisation problem which is solved by stochastic mirror descent (SMD) by a class of sequential pricing mechanisms. This connection leads to proposing a scheme called “mini-trading” which introduces a parameter related to the learning rate in SMD. I prove several properties of this scheme and show that it can improve the stability of prices in sequentially traded prediction markets. Also I analyse two popular trading models (namely the Maximum Expected Utility model and the Risk-measure model) in respect to an assumption on the class of traders I required to interpret sequential markets as SMD. I derive a sufficient condition for when the Maximum Expected Utility traders satisfy this assumption, but show that risk-measure based traders naturally satisfy this assumption for the type of markets I consider. Then I show that the “regret” of mini-trading markets (with respect to equilibrium markets) depend on the mini-trade parameter. Finally I attempt to compare the wealth updates of traders in sequential markets to the wealth updates in equilibrium markets, since this would help to extend the interpretation of equilibrium markets as performing Bayesian updates to sequential markets. For this I present preliminary results

On the Aggregation of Subjective Inputs from Multiple Sources

When we have a population of individuals or artificially intelligent agents possessing diverse subjective inputs (e.g. predictions, opinions, etc.) about a common topic, how should we collect and combine them into a single judgment or estimate? This has long been a fundamental question across disciplines that concern themselves with forecasting and decision-making, and has attracted the attention of computer scientists particularly on account of the proliferation of online platforms for electronic commerce and the harnessing of collective intelligence. In this dissertation, I study this problem through the lens of computational social science in three main parts: (1) Incentives in information aggregation: In this segment, I analyze mechanisms for the elicitation and combination of private information from strategic participants, particularly crowdsourced forecasting tools called prediction markets. I show that (a) when a prediction market implemented with a widely used family of algorithms called market scoring rules (MSRs) interacts with myopic risk-averse traders, the price process behaves like an opinion pool, a classical family of belief combination rules, and (b) in an MSR-based game-theoretic model of prediction markets where participants can influence the predicted outcome but some of them have a non-zero probability of being non-strategic, the equilibrium is one of two types, depending on this probability -- either collusive and uninformative or partially revealing; (2) Aggregation with non-strategic agents: In this part, I am agnostic to incentive issues, and focus on algorithms that uncover the ground truth from a sequence of noisy versions. In particular, I present the design and analysis of an approximately Bayesian algorithm for learning a real-valued target given access only to censored Gaussian signals, that performs asymptotically almost as well as if we had uncensored signals; (3) Market making in practice: This component, although tied to the two previous themes, deals more directly with practical aspects of aggregation mechanisms. Here, I develop an adaptation of an MSR to a nancial market setting called a continuous double auction, and document its experimental evaluation in a simulated market ecosystem