Drift and evolutionary forces: scrutinizing the Newtonian analogy

This article analyzes the view of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces. The analogy with Newtonian mechanics has been challenged due to the alleged mismatch between drift and the other evolutionary forces. Since genetic drift has no direction several authors tried to protect its status as a force: denying its lack of directionality, extending the notion of force and looking for a force in physics which also lacks of direction. I analyse these approaches, and although this strategy finally succeeds, this discussion overlooks the crucial point on the debate between causalists and statisticalists: the causal status of evolutionary theory

Drift and evolutionary forces

This arride analyzes the view of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces. The analogy with Newtonian mechanics has been challenged due to the alleged mismatch between drift and the other evolutionary forces. Since genetic drifr has no direction severa! authors tried to protect its status as a force: denying its lack of directionality, extending the notion of force and looking for a force in physics which also lacks of direction. I analyse these approaches, and although this strategy finally succeeds, this discussion overlooks the crucial point on the debate between causalists and statisticalists: the causal status of evolutionary theoty.; El presente artículo analiza la visión de la teoría evolutiva como una teoría de fuerzas. La analogía con la mecánica newtoniana se ha puesto en duda debido a las diferencias entre la deriva y el resto de fuerzas evolutivas. En tanto que la deriva genética no tiene dirección, varios autores han tratado de proteger su estatus de fuerza: negando su falta de direccionalidad, extendiendo la noción de fuerza y buscando una fuerza que también carezca de dirección en física. Analizo estas aproximaciones y aunque esta estrategia finalmente tiene éxito, argumento que esta discusión pasa por alto el punto crucial en el debate entre causalistas y estadísticos: el estatus causal de la teoría evolutiva

Drift as a Force of Evolution: A Manipulationist Account

Can evolutionary theory be properly characterised as a “theory of forces”, like Newtonian mechanics? One common criticism to this claim concerns the possibility to conceive genetic drift as a causal process endowed by a specific magnitude and direction. In this article, we aim to offer an original response to this criticism by pointing out a connection between the notion of force and the notion of explanatory depth, as depicted in Hitchcock and Woodward’s manipulationist account of causal explanation. In a nutshell, our argument is that, since force-explanations can be consistently reframed as deep explanations and vice versa, and the notion of drift can be characterised in manipulationist terms as constitutively intervening in evolutionary deep explanations, then drift-explanations can be consistently reframed as force-explanations, and drift can be properly considered as a force of evolution. Insofar as similar considerations may be extended also to other evolutionary factors – chiefly selection –, our analysis offers an important support to the claim that evolutionary theory is a theory of forces.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Drift and Evolutionary Forces

This article analyzes the view of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces. The analogy with Newtonian mechanics has been challenged due to the mismatch between drift and the other evolutionary forces. Genetic drift and its lack of direction has done that several authors tried to minimize or to protect its status as a force. I argue that the attempts to maintain drift as a force, in a strong manner, are not fully successful. I also show how historical and theoretical reasons explain why the Newtonian analogy arose, insofar as it is helpful in revealing the causal structure of evolutionary theory

Locating uncertainty in stochastic evolutionary models: divergence time estimation

Philosophers of biology have worked extensively on how we ought best to interpret the probabilities which arise throughout evolutionary theory. In spite of this substantial work, however, much of the debate has remained persistently intractable. I offer the example of Bayesian models of divergence time estimation (the determination of when two evolutionary lineages split) as a case study in how we might bring further resources from the biological literature to bear on these debates. These models offer us an example in which a number of different sources of uncertainty are combined to produce an estimate for a complex, unobservable quantity. These models have been carefully analyzed in recent biological work, which has determined the relationship between these sources of uncertainty (their relative importance and their disappearance in the limit of increasing data), both quantitatively and qualitatively. I suggest here that this case shows us the limitations of univocal analyses of probability in evolution, as well as the simple dichotomy between “subjective” and “objective” probabilities, and I conclude by gesturing toward ways in which we might introduce more sophisticated interpretive taxonomies of probability (modeled on some recent work in the philosophy of physics) as a path toward advancing debates on probability in the life sciences

Efforts and their Feelings

Effort and the feeling of effort play important roles in many theoretical discussions, from perception to self-control and free will, from the nature of ownership to the nature of desert and achievement. A crucial, overlooked distinction within the philosophical and scientific literatures is the distinction between theories that seek to explain effort and theories that seek to explain the feeling of effort. Lacking a clear distinction between these two phenomena makes the literature hard to navigate. To advance in the unification and development of this area, this article provides an overview of the main theories of the nature of effort and the nature of the feeling of effort, and then discusses how efforts and their feelings are related. Two key takeaways emerge. First, there is widespread agreement that efforts are goal-directed actions. Second, one of the main philosophical issues to be decided is whether feelings of effort should be defined by reference to efforts (effort-first approach), or whether efforts are defined by reference to the feeling of effort (feeling-first approach)

The force interpretation of evolutionary theory: scope and limits

La teoría evolutiva suele entenderse como una teoría causal donde las causas principales del cambio evolutivo son identificadas con la selección natural, la deriva genética, la mutación y la migración. Siguiendo este razonamiento, muchos biólogos y filósofos de la biología han estructurado la teoría evolutiva de forma análoga a la mecánica newtoniana, entendiendo la teoría evolutiva como una teoría de fuerzas. El punto clave en el que se sustenta la analogía, es que la estructura de la mecánica newtoniana permite identificar los elementos causales del sistema de interés. De esta manera, la teoría evolutiva encuentra una útil imagen explicativa del fenómeno evolutivo, estructurándose como una ‘teoría quasi-newtoniana’ (Maudlin 2004). Esta forma de estructurar o conceptualizar una teoría de forma similar a la newtoniana ha sido utilizada en diferentes áreas: en la composición de colores, de deseos, de servicios, en la composición de “fuerzas sociales”, de deberes, en cuestiones éticas, y en la composición de poderes causales en general (Massin 2016). Esta analogía, sin embargo, ha sido desafiada en la última década, mostrando no sólo las limitaciones de la misma, sino postulando una visión radicalmente nueva según la cual las entendidas como fuerzas o causas evolutivas no serían más que pseudoprocesos. La acción causal se encontraría en el nivel de los individuos siendo la selección, la deriva, etc., resúmenes estadísticos de dichos hechos. Lo que nos proponemos en este trabajo es analizar esta polémica, mostrar las bondades pero también las limitaciones de la analogía de fuerzas y, sobre todo, vislumbrar cuál es la estructura adecuada de la teoría evolutiva, prestando especial atención a la deriva genética por ser el factor causal que peor encaja en el marco de las fuerzas.Since Darwin’s times, evolutionary theory has been conceptualized as a causal theory. In order to emphasize this causal view, textbooks and most of the evolutionary literature talk about evolutionary forces acting on a population. Elliott Sober, in his influential book The Nature of Selection (1984), argues that evolutionary theory is a theory of forces because, in the same way that different forces of Newtonian mechanics cause changes in the movement of bodies, evolutionary forces cause changes in gene and/or genotype frequencies. As a result, selection, drift, mutation and migration would be the main forces or causes of evolution. Nevertheless, the appropriateness of the causal view, and particularly the Newtonian analogy, has been challenged in the last decade. Several authors (Denis Walsh, Mohan Matthen, André Ariew…) have argued for a new view, the statistical view, where the evolutionary process and its parts (selection, drift, etc.) are mere statistical outcomes, inseparable from each other. The so called evolutionary forces should be conceptualized as statistical population-level tendencies, abandoning any causal role for them. I have developed a third way to defend the causal view. Authors committed to the Newtonian analogy capture the common theoretical structure between evolutionary theory and Newtonian mechanics. On the other hand, causalists not committed to the Newtonian analogy share statisticalists’ concern about some important problems in the force interpretation (the most important being the mismatch in the analogy produced by the lack of directionality of genetic drift). My approach postulates a broader causal framework (a difference-maker account of causation) unifying different causalists approaches, and avoiding problems like searching a directionality for genetic drift. In addition, clarifies the features that any Zero-Cause Law must accomplish. Finally, my approach explains the reason why the force metaphor was formulated in the first place and why it still continues in evolutionary literature. The Newtonian analogy is illuminating insofar as it is helpful in revealing the causal structure of evolutionary theory. In other words, the theory is constructed from a Zero-Cause Law that stipulates a default behaviour and arises by introducing factors which alters that behaviour. On the other hand, I have developed a new analysis of the Price equation, showing its virtues as a key equation in evolutionary theory, and overcoming recent critiques about its usefulness