Neural Underpinnings of Prosody in Autism

This study examines the processing of prosodic cues to linguistic structure and to affect, drawing on fMRI and behavioral data from 16 high-functioning adolescents with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and 11 typically developing controls. Stimuli were carefully matched on pitch, intensity, and duration, while varying systematically in conditions of affective prosody (angry versus neutral speech) and grammatical prosody (questions versus statement). To avoid conscious attention to prosody, which normalizes responses in young people with ASD, the implicit comprehension task directed attention to semantic aspects of the stimuli. Results showed that when perceiving prosodic cues, both affective and grammatical, activation of neural regions was more generalized in ASD than in typical development, and areas recruited reflect heightened reliance on cognitive control, reading of intentions, attentional management, and visualization. This broader recruitment of executive and “mind-reading” brain areas for a relative simple language-processing task may be interpreted to suggest that speakers with high-functioning autism (HFA) have developed less automaticity in language processing and may also suggest that “mind-reading” or theory of mind deficits are intricately bound up in language processing. Data provide support for both a right-lateralized as well as a bilateral model of prosodic processing in typical individuals, depending upon the function of the prosodic information

Deconstructing Events: The Neural Bases for Space, Time, and Causality

Space, time, and causality provide a natural structure for organizing our experience. These abstract categories allow us to think relationally in the most basic sense; understanding simple events requires one to represent the spatial relations among objects, the relative durations of actions or movements, and the links between causes and effects. The present fMRI study investigates the extent to which the brain distinguishes between these fundamental conceptual domains. Participants performed a 1-back task with three conditions of interest (space, time, and causality). Each condition required comparing relations between events in a simple verbal narrative. Depending on the condition, participants were instructed to either attend to the spatial, temporal, or causal characteristics of events, but between participants each particular event relation appeared in all three conditions. Contrasts compared neural activity during each condition against the remaining two and revealed how thinking about events is deconstructed neurally. Space trials recruited neural areas traditionally associated with visuospatial processing, primarily bilateral frontal and occipitoparietal networks. Causality trials activated areas previously found to underlie causal thinking and thematic role assignment, such as left medial frontal and left middle temporal gyri, respectively. Causality trials also produced activations in SMA, caudate, and cerebellum; cortical and subcortical regions associated with the perception of time at different timescales. The time contrast, however, produced no significant effects. This pattern, indicating negative results for time trials but positive effects for causality trials in areas important for time perception, motivated additional overlap analyses to further probe relations between domains. The results of these analyses suggest a closer correspondence between time and causality than between time and space