Optimization of BGP Convergence and Prefix Security in IP/MPLS Networks

Multi-Protocol Label Switching-based networks are the backbone of the operation of the Internet, that communicates through the use of the Border Gateway Protocol which connects distinct networks, referred to as Autonomous Systems, together. As the technology matures, so does the challenges caused by the extreme growth rate of the Internet. The amount of BGP prefixes required to facilitate such an increase in connectivity introduces multiple new critical issues, such as with the scalability and the security of the aforementioned Border Gateway Protocol. Illustration of an implementation of an IP/MPLS core transmission network is formed through the introduction of the four main pillars of an Autonomous System: Multi-Protocol Label Switching, Border Gateway Protocol, Open Shortest Path First and the Resource Reservation Protocol. The symbiosis of these technologies is used to introduce the practicalities of operating an IP/MPLS-based ISP network with traffic engineering and fault-resilience at heart. The first research objective of this thesis is to determine whether the deployment of a new BGP feature, which is referred to as BGP Prefix Independent Convergence (PIC), within AS16086 would be a worthwhile endeavour. This BGP extension aims to reduce the convergence delay of BGP Prefixes inside of an IP/MPLS Core Transmission Network, thus improving the networks resilience against faults. Simultaneously, the second research objective was to research the available mechanisms considering the protection of BGP Prefixes, such as with the implementation of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure and the Artemis BGP Monitor for proactive and reactive security of BGP prefixes within AS16086. The future prospective deployment of BGPsec is discussed to form an outlook to the future of IP/MPLS network design. As the trust-based nature of BGP as a protocol has become a distinct vulnerability, thus necessitating the use of various technologies to secure the communications between the Autonomous Systems that form the network to end all networks, the Internet

Bootstrapping Real-world Deployment of Future Internet Architectures

The past decade has seen many proposals for future Internet architectures. Most of these proposals require substantial changes to the current networking infrastructure and end-user devices, resulting in a failure to move from theory to real-world deployment. This paper describes one possible strategy for bootstrapping the initial deployment of future Internet architectures by focusing on providing high availability as an incentive for early adopters. Through large-scale simulation and real-world implementation, we show that with only a small number of adopting ISPs, customers can obtain high availability guarantees. We discuss design, implementation, and evaluation of an availability device that allows customers to bridge into the future Internet architecture without modifications to their existing infrastructure

Multi-path BGP: motivations and solutions

Although there are many reasons towards the adoption of a multi-path routing paradigm in the Internet, nowadays the required multi-path support is far from universal. It is mostly limited to some domains that rely on IGP features to improve load distribution in their internal infrastructure or some multi-homed parties that base their load balance on traffic engineering. This chapter explains the motivations for a multi-path routing Internet scheme, commenting the existing alternatives and detailing two new proposals. Part of this work has been done within the framework of the Trilogy research and development project, whose main objectives are also commented in the chapter.Part of this work has been done within the framework of the Trilogy research and development project. The different research partners of this project are: British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, NEC Europe, Nokia, Roke Manor Research Limited, Athens University of Economics and Business, University Carlos III of Madrid, University College London, Universit Catholique de Louvain and Stanford University.European Community's Seventh Framework ProgramEn prens

ROVER: a DNS-based method to detect and prevent IP hijacks

2013 Fall.Includes bibliographical references.The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is critical to the global internet infrastructure. Unfortunately BGP routing was designed with limited regard for security. As a result, IP route hijacking has been observed for more than 16 years. Well known incidents include a 2008 hijack of YouTube, loss of connectivity for Australia in February 2012, and an event that partially crippled Google in November 2012. Concern has been escalating as critical national infrastructure is reliant on a secure foundation for the Internet. Disruptions to military, banking, utilities, industry, and commerce can be catastrophic. In this dissertation we propose ROVER (Route Origin VERification System), a novel and practical solution for detecting and preventing origin and sub-prefix hijacks. ROVER exploits the reverse DNS for storing route origin data and provides a fail-safe, best effort approach to authentication. This approach can be used with a variety of operational models including fully dynamic in-line BGP filtering, periodically updated authenticated route filters, and real-time notifications for network operators. Our thesis is that ROVER systems can be deployed by a small number of institutions in an incremental fashion and still effectively thwart origin and sub-prefix IP hijacking despite non-participation by the majority of Autonomous System owners. We then present research results supporting this statement. We evaluate the effectiveness of ROVER using simulations on an Internet scale topology as well as with tests on real operational systems. Analyses include a study of IP hijack propagation patterns, effectiveness of various deployment models, critical mass requirements, and an examination of ROVER resilience and scalability

Exploiting the power of multiplicity: a holistic survey of network-layer multipath

The Internet is inherently a multipath network: For an underlying network with only a single path, connecting various nodes would have been debilitatingly fragile. Unfortunately, traditional Internet technologies have been designed around the restrictive assumption of a single working path between a source and a destination. The lack of native multipath support constrains network performance even as the underlying network is richly connected and has redundant multiple paths. Computer networks can exploit the power of multiplicity, through which a diverse collection of paths is resource pooled as a single resource, to unlock the inherent redundancy of the Internet. This opens up a new vista of opportunities, promising increased throughput (through concurrent usage of multiple paths) and increased reliability and fault tolerance (through the use of multiple paths in backup/redundant arrangements). There are many emerging trends in networking that signify that the Internet's future will be multipath, including the use of multipath technology in data center computing; the ready availability of multiple heterogeneous radio interfaces in wireless (such as Wi-Fi and cellular) in wireless devices; ubiquity of mobile devices that are multihomed with heterogeneous access networks; and the development and standardization of multipath transport protocols such as multipath TCP. The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive survey of the literature on network-layer multipath solutions. We will present a detailed investigation of two important design issues, namely, the control plane problem of how to compute and select the routes and the data plane problem of how to split the flow on the computed paths. The main contribution of this paper is a systematic articulation of the main design issues in network-layer multipath routing along with a broad-ranging survey of the vast literature on network-layer multipathing. We also highlight open issues and identify directions for future work

A Highly-Available Multiple Region Multi-access Edge Computing Platform with Traffic Failover

One of the main challenges in the Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) is steering traffic from clients to the nearest MEC instances. If the nearest MEC fails, a failover mechanism should provide mitigation by steering the traffic to the next nearest MEC. There are two conventional approaches to solve this problem, i.e., GeoDNS and Internet Protocol (IP) anycast. GeoDNS is not failover friendly because of the Domain Name System (DNS) cache lifetime. Moreover, the use of a recursive resolver may inaccurately translate the IP address to its geolocation. Thus, this thesis studies and proposes a highly available MEC platform leveraging IP anycast. We built a proof-of-concept using Kubernetes, MetalLB, and a custom health-checker running on the GNS3 network emulator. We measured latency, failure percentage, and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) to observe the system's behavior. The performance evaluation of the proposed solution shows an average recovery time better than one second. The number of failed requests and latency overhead grows linearly as the failover time and latency between two MECs increases. This thesis demonstrates the effectiveness of IP anycast for MEC applications to steer the traffic to the nearest MEC instance and to enhance resiliency with minor overhead

Interdomain Route Leak Mitigation: A Pragmatic Approach

The Internet has grown to support many vital functions, but it is not administered by any central authority. Rather, the many smaller networks that make up the Internet - called Autonomous Systems (ASes) - independently manage their own distinct host address space and routing policy. Routers at the borders between ASes exchange information about how to reach remote IP prefixes with neighboring networks over the control plane with the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). This inter-AS communication connects hosts across AS boundaries to build the illusion of one large, unified global network - the Internet. Unfortunately, BGP is a dated protocol that allows ASes to inject virtually any routing information into the control plane. The Internet’s decentralized administrative structure means that ASes lack visibility of the relationships and policies of other networks, and have little means of vetting the information they receive. Routes are global, connecting hosts around the world, but AS operators can only see routes exchanged between their own network and directly connected neighbor networks. This mismatch between global route scope and local network operator visibility gives rise to adverse routing events like route leaks, which occur when an AS advertises a route that should have been kept within its own network by mistake. In this work, we explore our thesis: that malicious and unintentional route leaks threaten Internet availability, but pragmatic solutions can mitigate their impact. Leaks effectively reroute traffic meant for the leak destination along the leak path. This diversion of flows onto unexpected paths can cause broad disruption for hosts attempting to reach the leak destination, as well as obstruct the normal traffic on the leak path. These events are usually due to misconfiguration and not malicious activity, but we show in our initial work that vrouting-capable adversaries can weaponize route leaks and fraudulent path advertisements to enhance data plane attacks on Internet infrastructure and services. Existing solutions like Internet Routing Registry (IRR) filtering have not succeeded in solving the route leak problem, as globally disruptive route leaks still periodically interrupt the normal functioning of the Internet. We examine one relatively new solution - Peerlocking or defensive AS PATH filtering - where ASes exchange toplogical information to secure their networks. Our measurements reveal that Peerlock is already deployed in defense of the largest ASes, but has found little purchase elsewhere. We conclude by introducing a novel leak defense system, Corelock, designed to provide Peerlock-like protection without the scalability concerns that have limited Peerlock’s scope. Corelock builds meaningful route leak filters from globally distributed route collectors and can be deployed without cooperation from other network