The Nile Question: The Accords on the Water of the Nile and Their Implications on

Some authorities identify the Nile basin as one of the hotspots in an area where violent conflict could break out over the shared water resource because of the various hydropolitical intricacies it involves. Mounting demands for more water, an alarming population growth rate, the absence of comprehensive legal and institutional frameworks, and relations among the riparian states that are marred with suspicion and misunderstanding, are among the major factors creating the potential for an extreme conflict in the basin. To date, the Basin states have not been able to cooperate in order to devise a solution to the issue of the Nile – the utilisation and management of Nile water for the benefit of all riparian states. One of the impediments to such a solution, is the absence of a basinwide agreement. Although there have been various agreements over the Nile River, none of these has involved more than three states. The accords constitute one of the hurdles in the path towards cooperation. This article reviews the main agreements which have decided control over the Nile, their traits, and the implications for cooperative schemes in the basin. It also examines the current promising initiative, the Nile Basin Initiative, as a possible way forward to reach comprehensive cooperation. The article does not examine all the problems enveloping the Nile basin. It limits itself to the legal aspects of the questions of the Nile and proposes appropriate approaches to accords on the water of the Nile. Further, it concentrates on three countries, Egypt, the Sudan and Ethiopia, which are considered to be central actors in the Nile issues and deals with the accords involving them, or concluded on their behalf, during the colonial period

A synergy of costly punishment and commitment in cooperation dilemmas

To ensure cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, individuals may require prior commitments from others, subject to compensations when agreements to cooperate are violated. Alternatively, individuals may prefer to behave reactively, without arranging prior commitments, by simply punishing those who misbehave. These two mechanisms have been shown to promote the emergence of cooperation, yet are complementary in the way they aim to promote cooperation. Although both mechanisms have their specific limitations, either one of them can overcome the problems of the other. On one hand, costly punishment requires an excessive effect-to-cost ratio to be successful, and this ratio can be significantly reduced by arranging a prior commitment with a more limited compensation. On the other hand, commitment-proposing strategies can be suppressed by free-riding strategies that commit only when someone else is paying the cost to arrange the deal, whom in turn can be dealt with more effectively by reactive punishers. Using methods from Evolutionary Game Theory, we present here an analytical model showing that there is a wide range of settings for which the combined strategy outperforms either strategy by itself, leading to significantly higher levels of cooperation. Interestingly, the improvement is most significant when the cost of arranging commitments is sufficiently high and the penalty reaches a certain threshold, thereby overcoming the weaknesses of both mechanisms.SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

The Role of Intent in the Rise of Individual Accountability in AML-BSA Enforcement Actions

The statutory framework which prohibits individuals at financial institutions from engaging in money laundering attributes criminal or civil liability on the basis of an individual’s culpability with respect to the prohibited conduct. A recent Department of Justice policy shift has begun to place a greater focus on the prosecution of individuals within corporations. This shift has led to increased prosecutions of compliance personnel and bank officials in recent years. Through analysis of recent cases, this Note seeks to explore how the requirement of intentional and/or willful conduct defines the potential for criminal and/or civil exposure for compliance personnel and bank officials under the AML-BSA statutory framework. This shift in enforcement has been criticized as unfair and overly harsh; however, through analysis of recent AML-BSA enforcement actions, this Note demonstrates that the statutory and prosecutorial focus on culpable conduct undermines that criticism. Further, this Note demonstrates that the recent shift towards individual accountability in AML-BSA enforcement can help serve to deter violations of the BSA, and money laundering activity generally, moving forward

Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation dilemmas

Commitments have been shown to promote cooperation if, on the one hand, they can be sufficiently enforced, and on the other hand, the cost of arranging them is justified with respect to the benefits of cooperation. When either of these constraints is not met it leads to the prevalence of commitment free-riders, such as those who commit only when someone else pays to arrange the commitments. Here, we show how intention recognition may circumvent such weakness of costly commitments. We describe an evolutionary model, in the context of the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma, showing that if players first predict the intentions of their co-player and propose a commitment only when they are not confident enough about their prediction, the chances of reaching mutual cooperation are largely enhanced. We find that an advantageous synergy between intention recognition and costly commitments depends strongly on the confidence and accuracy of intention recognition. In general, we observe an intermediate level of confidence threshold leading to the highest evolutionary advantage, showing that neither unconditional use of commitment nor intention recognition can perform optimally. Rather, our results show that arranging commitments is not always desirable, but that they may be also unavoidable depending on the strength of the dilemma.SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Heads, I Win. Tails, You Lose

To develop and deliver desirable and viable products, services, processes, and policy, government organizations rely on teamwork. Yet, most forms of organization cannot help but engender conflict in such areas as strategy, organization, people, business processes, and rewards and recognition. Organizational conflict, fuelled daily by such perennials as corporate silos, must be accepted then actively managed. Yet, most individuals and organizations are disappointingly poor at resolving problems, preferring instead to avoid or satisfice—the strategy for decision making whereby alternatives are considered until an acceptable option is found, not necessarily the optimal one. Promoting effective cross-functional collaboration demands that an enabling environment be built for that very purpose

When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation

Agreements and commitments have provided a novel mechanism to promote cooperation in social dilemmas in both one-shot and repeated games. Individuals requesting others to commit to cooperate (proposers) incur a cost, while their co-players are not necessarily required to pay any, allowing them to free-ride on the proposal investment cost (acceptors). Although there is a clear complementarity in these behaviours, no dynamic evidence is currently available that proves that they coexist in different forms of commitment creation. Using a stochastic evolutionary model allowing for mixed population states, we identify non-trivial roles of acceptors as well as the importance of intention recognition in commitments. In the one-shot prisoner's dilemma, alliances between proposers and acceptors are necessary to isolate defectors when proposers do not know the acceptance intentions of the others. However, when the intentions are clear beforehand, the proposers can emerge by themselves. In repeated games with noise, the incapacity of proposers and acceptors to set up alliances makes the emergence of the first harder whenever the latter are present. As a result, acceptors will exploit proposers and take over the population when an apology-forgiveness mechanism with too low apology cost is introduced, and hence reduce the overall cooperation level.SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Guilt for Non-Humans

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