Equilibrium Computation in Atomic Splittable Routing Games

We present polynomial-time algorithms as well as hardness results for equilibrium computation in atomic splittable routing games, for the case of general convex cost functions. These games model traffic in freight transportation, market oligopolies, data networks, and various other applications. An atomic splittable routing game is played on a network where the edges have traffic-dependent cost functions, and player strategies correspond to flows in the network. A player can thus split its traffic arbitrarily among different paths. While many properties of equilibria in these games have been studied, efficient algorithms for equilibrium computation are known for only two cases: if cost functions are affine, or if players are symmetric. Neither of these conditions is met in most practical applications. We present two algorithms for routing games with general convex cost functions on parallel links. The first algorithm is exponential in the number of players, while the second is exponential in the number of edges; thus if either of these is small, we get a polynomial-time algorithm. These are the first algorithms for these games with convex cost functions. Lastly, we show that in general networks, given input C, it is NP-hard to decide if there exists an equilibrium where every player has cost at most C

Towards a Unified Theory of Sparsification for Matching Problems

In this paper, we present a construction of a "matching sparsifier", that is, a sparse subgraph of the given graph that preserves large matchings approximately and is robust to modifications of the graph. We use this matching sparsifier to obtain several new algorithmic results for the maximum matching problem: - An almost (3/2)-approximation one-way communication protocol for the maximum matching problem, significantly simplifying the (3/2)-approximation protocol of Goel, Kapralov, and Khanna (SODA 2012) and extending it from bipartite graphs to general graphs. - An almost (3/2)-approximation algorithm for the stochastic matching problem, improving upon and significantly simplifying the previous 1.999-approximation algorithm of Assadi, Khanna, and Li (EC 2017). - An almost (3/2)-approximation algorithm for the fault-tolerant matching problem, which, to our knowledge, is the first non-trivial algorithm for this problem. Our matching sparsifier is obtained by proving new properties of the edge-degree constrained subgraph (EDCS) of Bernstein and Stein (ICALP 2015; SODA 2016) - designed in the context of maintaining matchings in dynamic graphs - that identifies EDCS as an excellent choice for a matching sparsifier. This leads to surprisingly simple and non-technical proofs of the above results in a unified way. Along the way, we also provide a much simpler proof of the fact that an EDCS is guaranteed to contain a large matching, which may be of independent interest

Mixed-integer convex representability

Motivated by recent advances in solution methods for mixed-integer convex optimization (MICP), we study the fundamental and open question of which sets can be represented exactly as feasible regions of MICP problems. We establish several results in this direction, including the first complete characterization for the mixed-binary case and a simple necessary condition for the general case. We use the latter to derive the first non-representability results for various non-convex sets such as the set of rank-1 matrices and the set of prime numbers. Finally, in correspondence with the seminal work on mixed-integer linear representability by Jeroslow and Lowe, we study the representability question under rationality assumptions. Under these rationality assumptions, we establish that representable sets obey strong regularity properties such as periodicity, and we provide a complete characterization of representable subsets of the natural numbers and of representable compact sets. Interestingly, in the case of subsets of natural numbers, our results provide a clear separation between the mathematical modeling power of mixed-integer linear and mixed-integer convex optimization. In the case of compact sets, our results imply that using unbounded integer variables is necessary only for modeling unbounded sets

Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first truthful, budget-feasible and $O(1)$-approximate mechanisms that run in polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions. Prior to our work, the only $O(1)$-approximation mechanism known for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries. At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem where---crucially---the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online setting as well. To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the case where additional feasibility constraints are present. We obtain $O(p)$-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a $p$-system. With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guarantees in polynomial time, our results are asymptotically best possible.Comment: Accepted to EC 201

Budget-feasible mechanism design for non-monotone submodular objectives: Offline and online

The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first truthful, budget-feasible and O(1)-approximation mechanisms that run in polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions. Since the introduction of the problem by Singer [40], obtaining efficient mechanisms for objectives that go beyond the class of monotone submodular functions has been elusive. Prior to our work, the only O(1)-approximation mechanism known for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries. At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem where-crucially-the agents are not ordered according to their marginal value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online setting as well. To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the case where additional feasibility constraints are present, e.g., at most k agents can be selected. We obtain O(p)-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a p-system. With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guaran