Metacognition in the Prisoner's Dilemma

In this paper, we show ACT-R agents capable of metacognitive reasoning about opponents in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Two types of metacognitive agent were developed and compared to a non-metacognitive agent and two fixed-strategy agents. The first type of metacognitive agent (opponent-perspective) takes the perspective of the opponent to anticipate the opponent’s future actions and respond accordingly. The other metacognitive agent (modeler) predicts the opponent’s next move based on the previous moves of the agent and the opponent. The modeler agent achieves better individual outcomes than a non-metacognitive agent and is more successful at encouraging cooperation. The opponent perspective agent, by contrast, fails to achieve these outcomes because it lacks important information about the opponent. These simple agents provide insights regarding modeling of metacognition in more complex tasks

Metacognition in the Prisoner's Dilemma

In this paper, we show ACT-R agents capable of metacognitive reasoning about opponents in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Two types of metacognitive agent were developed and compared to a non-metacognitive agent and two fixed-strategy agents. The first type of metacognitive agent (opponent-perspective) takes the perspective of the opponent to anticipate the opponent’s future actions and respond accordingly. The other metacognitive agent (modeler) predicts the opponent’s next move based on the previous moves of the agent and the opponent. The modeler agent achieves better individual outcomes than a non-metacognitive agent and is more successful at encouraging cooperation. The opponent perspective agent, by contrast, fails to achieve these outcomes because it lacks important information about the opponent. These simple agents provide insights regarding modeling of metacognition in more complex tasks

From primed construct to motivated behavior: validation processes in goal pursuit

When posting or re-using the article, you should provide a link/URL from the article posted to the SAGE Journals Online site where the article is published: http://online.sagepub.com and please make the following acknowledgment: "The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in , Vol/Issue, Month/Year by SAGE Publications Ltd, All rights reserved. © [The Author(s)]"Past research has found that primes can automatically initiate unconscious goal striving. Recent models of priming have suggested that this effect can be moderated by validation processes. According to a goal-validation perspective, primes should cause changes in one’s motivational state to the extent people have confidence in the prime-related mental content. Across three experiments, we provided the first direct empirical evidence for this goal-validation account. Using a variety of goal priming manipulations (cooperation vs. competition, achievement, and self-improvement vs. saving money) and validity inductions (power, ease, and writing about confidence), we demonstrated that the impact of goal primes on behavior occurs to a greater extent when conditions foster confidence (vs. doubt) in mental contents. Indeed, when conditions foster doubt, goal priming effects are eliminated or counter to the implications of the prime. The implications of these findings for research on goal priming and validation processes are discussed.The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported in part by NSF Grant BCS-0847834 (to R.E.P.) and by Spanish grant PSI2011-26212 (to P.B.)

A Lineage Explanation of Human Normative Guidance: The Coadaptive Model of Instrumental Rationality and Shared Intentionality

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology. This approach builds upon theories of goal-directed behavioral control in the reinforcement learning and control literature, arguing that this form of control defines an important class of intentional normative mental states that are instrumental in nature. I defend the view that great ape capacities for instrumental reasoning and our capacity (or family of capacities) for shared intentionality coadapted to each other and argue that the evolution of this capacity has allowed the representation of social norms and the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance

Schizotypy and mentalizing: An fMRI study

Introduction: Schizotypy is a personality trait characterized by subclinical schizophrenia symptoms. Individuals with schizophrenia typically display behavioral mentalizing deficits and altered neural correlates during mentalizing. While schizotypy has been inconsistently related to behavioral mentalizing skills, its neural correlates of mentalizing are understudied so far. With this study we tested the association between schizotypy traits in healthy subjects and mentalizing-related neural correlates to provide new insights into neural processes associated with subclinical schizophrenia traits.Methods: Brain activation was measured using fMRI during an interactive mentalizing paradigm (Prisoner's Dilemma Game) in 164 healthy subjects. The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ-B) was administered to assess the three dimensions of schizotypy, i.e., cognitive-perceptual, interpersonal and disorganized.Results: We found that interpersonal schizotypy was significantly negatively correlated with brain activation in bilateral precunei and right caudate nucleus (among others) during mentalizing. By contrast, disorganized schizotypy was significantly positively correlated with mentalizing-associated neural activation in right precuneus, left middle cingulate cortex and right cerebellar hemisphere. No significant associations for cognitive-perceptual schizotypy and the SPQ-B total score were found.Discussion: Our study showed that interpersonal and disorganized schizotypy are associated with neural correlates of mentalizing in brain regions that are involved in self-processing and mentalizing. These brain regions have also been linked to mentalizing in schizophrenia.</p

A Quantum Approach to Human Decision Making

This thesis examines various aspects of decision making, with a focus on probabilistic tools to cognitive modeling. One such tool is the so-called Classical Probability Theory (CPT, or Bayesian Theory; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001; Chater et al., 2006), which has been the dominant approach in understanding different aspects of human behavior. The broad argument is that cognitive processing must reflect some kind of optimal adaptation to environmental statistical structure and, therefore, human cognition must be consistent with the principles of CPT (Oaksford & Chater, 2009). CPT indeed appears to provide accurate descriptions of behavior in many cases, particularly decision making (Siegel et al., 2018), which is the focus of this work

Chimpanzees Rarely Settle on Consistent Patterns of Play in the Hawk Dove, Assurance, and Prisoner's Dilemma Games, in a Token Exchange Task

Games derived from experimental economics can be used to directly compare decision-making behavior across primate species, including humans. For example, the use of coordination games, such as the Assurance game, has shown that a variety of primate species can coordinate; however, the mechanism by which they do so appears to differ across species. Recently, these games have been extended to explore anti-coordination and cooperation in monkeys, with evidence that they play the Nash equilibria in sequential games in these other contexts. In the current paper, we use the same methods to explore chimpanzees’ behavior in the Assurance Game; an anti-coordination game, the Hawk Dove game; and a cooperation game with a temptation to defect, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We predicted that they would consistently play the Nash equilibria, as do the monkeys, and that, as in previous work, the subjects’ level of experience with cognitive experiments would impact performance. Surprisingly, few of our pairs consistently played the same outcome (i.e., no statistically significant preferences), although those who did showed evidence consistent with Nash equilibria play, the same pattern seen more consistently in the monkeys. We consider reasons for their inconsistent performance; for instance, perhaps it was due to lack of interest in a task that rewarded them almost every trial no matter what option they chose, although this does not explain why they were inconsistent when the monkeys were not. A second goal of our study was to ascertain the effects of exogenous oxytocin in their decision making in one population. In line with recent work showing complex effects of oxytocin on social behavior, we found no effect on subjects’ outcomes. We consider possible explanations for this as well