Information-Theoretic Secure Outsourced Computation in Distributed Systems

Secure multi-party computation (secure MPC) has been established as the de facto paradigm for protecting privacy in distributed computation. One of the earliest secure MPC primitives is the Shamir\u27s secret sharing (SSS) scheme. SSS has many advantages over other popular secure MPC primitives like garbled circuits (GC) -- it provides information-theoretic security guarantee, requires no complex long-integer operations, and often leads to more efficient protocols. Nonetheless, SSS receives less attention in the signal processing community because SSS requires a larger number of honest participants, making it prone to collusion attacks. In this dissertation, I propose an agent-based computing framework using SSS to protect privacy in distributed signal processing. There are three main contributions to this dissertation. First, the proposed computing framework is shown to be significantly more efficient than GC. Second, a novel game-theoretical framework is proposed to analyze different types of collusion attacks. Third, using the proposed game-theoretical framework, specific mechanism designs are developed to deter collusion attacks in a fully distributed manner. Specifically, for a collusion attack with known detectors, I analyze it as games between secret owners and show that the attack can be effectively deterred by an explicit retaliation mechanism. For a general attack without detectors, I expand the scope of the game to include the computing agents and provide deterrence through deceptive collusion requests. The correctness and privacy of the protocols are proved under a covert adversarial model. Our experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of SSS-based protocols and the validity of our mechanism design

Betrayal, Distrust, and Rationality: Smart Counter-Collusion Contracts for Verifiable Cloud Computing

Cloud computing has become an irreversible trend. Together comes the pressing need for verifiability, to assure the client the correctness of computation outsourced to the cloud. Existing verifiable computation techniques all have a high overhead, thus if being deployed in the clouds, would render cloud computing more expensive than the on-premises counterpart. To achieve verifiability at a reasonable cost, we leverage game theory and propose a smart contract based solution. In a nutshell, a client lets two clouds compute the same task, and uses smart contracts to stimulate tension, betrayal and distrust between the clouds, so that rational clouds will not collude and cheat. In the absence of collusion, verification of correctness can be done easily by crosschecking the results from the two clouds. We provide a formal analysis of the games induced by the contracts, and prove that the contracts will be effective under certain reasonable assumptions. By resorting to game theory and smart contracts, we are able to avoid heavy cryptographic protocols. The client only needs to pay two clouds to compute in the clear, and a small transaction fee to use the smart contracts. We also conducted a feasibility study that involves implementing the contracts in Solidity and running them on the official Ethereum network.Comment: Published in ACM CCS 2017, this is the full version with all appendice

A Comprehensive Insight into Game Theory in relevance to Cyber Security

The progressively ubiquitous connectivity in the present information systems pose newer challenges tosecurity. The conventional security mechanisms have come a long way in securing the well-definedobjectives of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability. Nevertheless, with the growth in thesystem complexities and attack sophistication, providing security via traditional means can beunaffordable. A novel theoretical perspective and an innovative approach are thus required forunderstanding security from decision-making and strategic viewpoint. One of the analytical tools whichmay assist the researchers in designing security protocols for computer networks is game theory. Thegame-theoretic concept finds extensive applications in security at different levels, including thecyberspace and is generally categorized under security games. It can be utilized as a robust mathematicaltool for modelling and analyzing contemporary security issues. Game theory offers a natural frameworkfor capturing the defensive as well as adversarial interactions between the defenders and the attackers.Furthermore, defenders can attain a deep understanding of the potential attack threats and the strategiesof attackers by equilibrium evaluation of the security games. In this paper, the concept of game theoryhas been presented, followed by game-theoretic applications in cybersecurity including cryptography.Different types of games, particularly those focused on securing the cyberspace, have been analysed andvaried game-theoretic methodologies including mechanism design theories have been outlined foroffering a modern foundation of the science of cybersecurity

IKP: Turning a PKI Around with Blockchains

Man-in-the-middle attacks in TLS due to compromised CAs have been mitigated by log-based PKI enhancements such as Certificate Transparency. However, these log-based schemes do not offer sufficient incentives to logs and monitors, and do not offer any actions that domains can take in response to CA misbehavior. We propose IKP, a blockchain-based PKI enhancement that offers automatic responses to CA misbehavior and incentives for those who help detect misbehavior. IKP’s decentralized nature and smart contract system allows open participation, offers incentives for vigilance over CAs, and enables financial recourse against misbehavior. We demonstrate through a game theoretic model and through an Ethereum prototype implementation that the incentives and increased deterrence offered by IKP are technically and economically viable

Security Against Honorific Adversaries: Efficient MPC with Server-aided Public Verifiability

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows distrustful parties to jointly compute some functions while keeping their private secrets unrevealed. MPC adversaries are often categorized as semi-honest and malicious, depending on whether they follow the protocol specifications or not. Covert security was first introduced by Aumann and Lindell in 2007, which models a third type of active adversaries who cheat but can be caught with a probability. However, this probability is predefined externally, and the misbehavior detection must be made by other honest participants with cut-and-choose in current constructions. In this paper, we propose a new security notion called security against honorific adversaries, who may cheat during the protocol execution but are extremely unwilling to be punished. Intuitively, honorific adversaries can cheat successfully, but decisive evidence of misbehavior will be left to honest parties with a probability close to one. By introducing an independent but not trusted auditor to the MPC ideal functionality in the universal composability framework (UC), we avoid heavy cryptographic machinery in detection and complicated discussion about the probability of being caught. With this new notion, we construct new provably secure protocols without cut-and-choose for garbled circuits that are much more efficient than those in the covert and malicious model, with slightly more overhead than passively secure protocols

Privacy and Robustness in Federated Learning: Attacks and Defenses

As data are increasingly being stored in different silos and societies becoming more aware of data privacy issues, the traditional centralized training of artificial intelligence (AI) models is facing efficiency and privacy challenges. Recently, federated learning (FL) has emerged as an alternative solution and continue to thrive in this new reality. Existing FL protocol design has been shown to be vulnerable to adversaries within or outside of the system, compromising data privacy and system robustness. Besides training powerful global models, it is of paramount importance to design FL systems that have privacy guarantees and are resistant to different types of adversaries. In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive survey on this topic. Through a concise introduction to the concept of FL, and a unique taxonomy covering: 1) threat models; 2) poisoning attacks and defenses against robustness; 3) inference attacks and defenses against privacy, we provide an accessible review of this important topic. We highlight the intuitions, key techniques as well as fundamental assumptions adopted by various attacks and defenses. Finally, we discuss promising future research directions towards robust and privacy-preserving federated learning.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2003.02133; text overlap with arXiv:1911.11815 by other author

A Blockchain-based Decentralized Electronic Marketplace for Computing Resources

AbstractWe propose a framework for building a decentralized electronic marketplace for computing resources. The idea is that anyone with spare capacities can offer them on this marketplace, opening up the cloud computing market to smaller players, thus creating a more competitive environment compared to today's market consisting of a few large providers. Trust is a crucial component in making an anonymized decentralized marketplace a reality. We develop protocols that enable participants to interact with each other in a fair way and show how these protocols can be implemented using smart contracts and blockchains. We discuss and evaluate our framework not only from a technical point of view, but also look at the wider context in terms of fair interactions and legal implications