Lossy Channel Games under Incomplete Information

In this paper we investigate lossy channel games under incomplete information, where two players operate on a finite set of unbounded FIFO channels and one player, representing a system component under consideration operates under incomplete information, while the other player, representing the component's environment is allowed to lose messages from the channels. We argue that these games are a suitable model for synthesis of communication protocols where processes communicate over unreliable channels. We show that in the case of finite message alphabets, games with safety and reachability winning conditions are decidable and finite-state observation-based strategies for the component can be effectively computed. Undecidability for (weak) parity objectives follows from the undecidability of (weak) parity perfect information games where only one player can lose messages.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2013, arXiv:1303.007

On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information

We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games, by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler (1995). We determine the value and identify the optimal strategies for a range of parameters.Repeated game with incomplete information, Zero-sum games, Partially observable Markov decision processes

Discounting in Games across Time Scales

We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game. Two-level games model hierarchical and sequential decision making under uncertainty across different time scales. We show the existence of pure memoryless optimal strategies for both players and an ordered field property for such games. We show that if there is only one player (Markov decision processes), then the values can be computed in polynomial time. It follows that whether the value of a player is equal to a given rational constant in two-level discounted games can be decided in NP intersected coNP. We also give an alternate strategy improvement algorithm to compute the value

A new formulation of asset trading games in continuous time with essential forcing of variation exponent

We introduce a new formulation of asset trading games in continuous time in the framework of the game-theoretic probability established by Shafer and Vovk (Probability and Finance: It's Only a Game! (2001) Wiley). In our formulation, the market moves continuously, but an investor trades in discrete times, which can depend on the past path of the market. We prove that an investor can essentially force that the asset price path behaves with the variation exponent exactly equal to two. Our proof is based on embedding high-frequency discrete-time games into the continuous-time game and the use of the Bayesian strategy of Kumon, Takemura and Takeuchi (Stoch. Anal. Appl. 26 (2008) 1161--1180) for discrete-time coin-tossing games. We also show that the main growth part of the investor's capital processes is clearly described by the information quantities, which are derived from the Kullback--Leibler information with respect to the empirical fluctuation of the asset price.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.3150/08-BEJ188 the Bernoulli (http://isi.cbs.nl/bernoulli/) by the International Statistical Institute/Bernoulli Society (http://isi.cbs.nl/BS/bshome.htm

Payoff-Based Dynamics for Multiplayer Weakly Acyclic Games

We consider repeated multiplayer games in which players repeatedly and simultaneously choose strategies from a finite set of available strategies according to some strategy adjustment process. We focus on the specific class of weakly acyclic games, which is particularly relevant for multiagent cooperative control problems. A strategy adjustment process determines how players select their strategies at any stage as a function of the information gathered over previous stages. Of particular interest are “payoff-based” processes in which, at any stage, players know only their own actions and (noise corrupted) payoffs from previous stages. In particular, players do not know the actions taken by other players and do not know the structural form of payoff functions. We introduce three different payoff-based processes for increasingly general scenarios and prove that, after a sufficiently large number of stages, player actions constitute a Nash equilibrium at any stage with arbitrarily high probability. We also show how to modify player utility functions through tolls and incentives in so-called congestion games, a special class of weakly acyclic games, to guarantee that a centralized objective can be realized as a Nash equilibrium. We illustrate the methods with a simulation of distributed routing over a network

Stochastic Stackelberg equilibria with applications to time dependent newsvendor models

In this paper we prove a sufficient maximum principle for general stochastic differential Stackelberg games, and apply the theory to continuous time newsvendor problems. In the newsvendor problem a manufacturer sells goods to a retailer, and the objective of both parties is to maximize expected profits under a random demand rate. Our demand rate is an Ito-Levy process, and to increase realism information is delayed, e.g., due to production time. We provide complete existence and uniqueness proofs for a series of special cases, including geometric Brownian motion and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, both with time variable coefficients. Moreover, these results are operational because we are able to offer explicit solution formulas. An interesting finding is that more precise information may be a considerable disadvantage for the retailer.Stochastic differential games; newsvendor model; delayed information; Ito-Levy processes