On the Existence of Characterization Logics and Fundamental Properties of Argumentation Semantics

Given the large variety of existing logical formalisms it is of utmost importance to select the most adequate one for a specific purpose, e.g. for representing the knowledge relevant for a particular application or for using the formalism as a modeling tool for problem solving. Awareness of the nature of a logical formalism, in other words, of its fundamental intrinsic properties, is indispensable and provides the basis of an informed choice. One such intrinsic property of logic-based knowledge representation languages is the context-dependency of pieces of knowledge. In classical propositional logic, for example, there is no such context-dependence: whenever two sets of formulas are equivalent in the sense of having the same models (ordinary equivalence), then they are mutually replaceable in arbitrary contexts (strong equivalence). However, a large number of commonly used formalisms are not like classical logic which leads to a series of interesting developments. It turned out that sometimes, to characterize strong equivalence in formalism L, we can use ordinary equivalence in formalism L0: for example, strong equivalence in normal logic programs under stable models can be characterized by the standard semantics of the logic of here-and-there. Such results about the existence of characterizing logics has rightly been recognized as important for the study of concrete knowledge representation formalisms and raise a fundamental question: Does every formalism have one? In this thesis, we answer this question with a qualified “yes”. More precisely, we show that the important case of considering only finite knowledge bases guarantees the existence of a canonical characterizing formalism. Furthermore, we argue that those characterizing formalisms can be seen as classical, monotonic logics which are uniquely determined (up to isomorphism) regarding their model theory. The other main part of this thesis is devoted to argumentation semantics which play the flagship role in Dung’s abstract argumentation theory. Almost all of them are motivated by an easily understandable intuition of what should be acceptable in the light of conflicts. However, although these intuitions equip us with short and comprehensible formal definitions it turned out that their intrinsic properties such as existence and uniqueness, expressibility, replaceability and verifiability are not that easily accessible. We review the mentioned properties for almost all semantics available in the literature. In doing so we include two main axes: namely first, the distinction between extension-based and labelling-based versions and secondly, the distinction of different kind of argumentation frameworks such as finite or unrestricted ones

Understanding Inconsistency -- A Contribution to the Field of Non-monotonic Reasoning

Conflicting information in an agent's knowledge base may lead to a semantical defect, that is, a situation where it is impossible to draw any plausible conclusion. Finding out the reasons for the observed inconsistency and restoring consistency in a certain minimal way are frequently occurring issues in the research area of knowledge representation and reasoning. In a seminal paper Raymond Reiter proves a duality between maximal consistent subsets of a propositional knowledge base and minimal hitting sets of each minimal conflict -- the famous hitting set duality. We extend Reiter's result to arbitrary non-monotonic logics. To this end, we develop a refined notion of inconsistency, called strong inconsistency. We show that minimal strongly inconsistent subsets play a similar role as minimal inconsistent subsets in propositional logic. In particular, the duality between hitting sets of minimal inconsistent subsets and maximal consistent subsets generalizes to arbitrary logics if the stronger notion of inconsistency is used. We cover various notions of repairs and characterize them using analogous hitting set dualities. Our analysis also includes an investigation of structural properties of knowledge bases with respect to our notions. Minimal inconsistent subsets of knowledge bases in monotonic logics play an important role when investigating the reasons for conflicts and trying to handle them, but also for inconsistency measurement. Our notion of strong inconsistency thus allows us to extend existing results to non-monotonic logics. While measuring inconsistency in propositional logic has been investigated for some time now, taking the non-monotony into account poses new challenges. In order to tackle them, we focus on the structure of minimal strongly inconsistent subsets of a knowledge base. We propose measures based on this notion and investigate their behavior in a non-monotonic setting by revisiting existing rationality postulates, and analyzing the compliance of the proposed measures with these postulates. We provide a series of first results in the context of inconsistency in abstract argumentation theory regarding the two most important reasoning modes, namely credulous as well as skeptical acceptance. Our analysis includes the following problems regarding minimal repairs: existence, verification, computation of one and characterization of all solutions. The latter will be tackled with our previously obtained duality results. Finally, we investigate the complexity of various related reasoning problems and compare our results to existing ones for monotonic logics