Classical Horizontal Inequity and Reranking: an Integrated Approach

The last 20 years have seen a significant evolution in the literature on horizontal inequity (HI) and have generated two major and "rival" methodological strands, namely, classical HI and reranking. We propose in this paper a class of ethically flexible tools that integrate these two strands. This is achieved using a measure of inequality that merges the well-known Gini coefficient and Atkinson indices, and that allows a decomposition of the total redistributive effect of taxes and transfers in a vertical equity effect and a loss of redistribution due to either classical HI or reranking. An inequality-change approach and a money-metric cost-of-inequality approach are developed. The latter approach makes aggregate classical HI decomposable across groups. As in recent work, equals are identified through a nonparametric estimation of the joint density of gross and net incomes. An illustration using Canadian data from 1981 to 1994 shows a substantial, and increasing, robust erosion of redistribution attributable both to classical HI and to reranking, but does not reveal which of reranking or classical HI is more important since this requires a judgement that is fundamentally normative in nature.Horizontal inequity, reranking, tax equity, inequality, Canadian tax system.

Classical Horizontal Inequity and Reranking: an Integrated Approach

The last 20 years have seen a significant evolution in the literature on horizontal inequity (HI) and have led to two major and "rival" methodological strands, namely, classical HI and reranking. We propose in this paper a class of ethically flexible tools that integrate these two strands. This is achieved using a measure of inequality that merges the well-known Gini coefficient and Atkinson index, and that allows a decomposition of the total redistributive effect of taxes and transfers into a vertical equity effect, a loss of redistribution due to classical HI, and a loss of redistribution due to reranking. An inequality-change approach and a money-metric cost-of-inequality approach are developed. The latter approach makes aggregate classical HI decomposable across socio-economic groups and percentiles. As in recent work, equals are identified through a nonparametric estimation of the joint density of gross and net incomes. An illustration using Canadian data from 1981 to 1994 shows a substantial, and increasing, robust erosion of redistribution attributable both to classical HI and to reranking, but does not reveal whether reranking is more or less important than classical HI, since this requires a judgement that is fundamentally normative.Horizontal inequity, Reranking, Tax equity, Inequality, Canadian tax and transfer system

Indirect tax reform and the role of exemptions

This paper examines the question of whether indirect tax rates should be uniform, using four different modelling strategies. First, marginal tax reform is examined. This is concerned with the optimal direction of small changes in effective indirect tax rates and requires considerably less information than the calculation of optimal rates. Second, the welfare effects of a partial shift from the current indirect tax system in Australia towards a goods and services tax (GST) are considered, with particular emphasis on differences between household types and the role of exemptions. Third, in view of the stress on a distributional role for exemptions of certain goods from a GST, the potential limits to such redistribution are considered. The fourth approach examines the extent of horizontal inequity and reranking that can arise when there are non-uniform tax rates. These inequities arise essentially because of preference heterogeneity.

The Distributional Impact of Healthcare Financing in Nigeria: A Case Study of Enugu State

The deregulation of healthcare financing and supply in Nigeria has shifted the healthcare system towards competitive market ideals. Households' decision to utilize healthcare is identical with healthcare financing. This financing arrangement has potentials for income redistribution in a society with already high levels of inequality in resource redistribution. This study attempts to examine the extent to which this system of healthcare financing leads to catastrophic expenditures, defined as a threshold percentage of a household's income, and the extend of impoverishment arising from healthcare spending. It also uses the Aronson, Johnson, and Lambert (1994) decomposition framework to analyze redistributive effects in terms of vertical and horizontal inequities, as well as re-ranking effect. The study finds that healthcare spending engenders high incidence of catastrophic spending and impoverishment in the population. It also finds that healthcare spending is pro-rich in its redistributive effect, with significant vertical and horizontal inequities as well as reranking inherent in the system. The paper suggests policy reforms that separate healthcare utilization from healthcare financing if the poor are to have access to healthcare services.Redistributive effects, Healthcare financing, Catastrophic financing, Impoverishing effects, Equity, Nigeria

Measuring distributional effects of fiscal reforms

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of how to analyse the distributional effects of fiscal reforms. Thereby, distributional e¤ects shall be differentiated by four subconcepts, i.e. 1.) the traditional concept of inequality, 2.) the rather novel concept of polarisation, 3.) the concept of progression in taxation, and 4.) the concepts of income poverty and richness. The concept of inequality and the concept of income poverty are the by far most widely applied concepts in empirical analyses, probably since they appear to be the most transparent ones in their structure as well as the most controversial ones in political affairs. However, the concepts of richness, polarisation and progression in taxation shall additionally be subject of this analysis, since they appear to be useful devices on the course of analysing cause and effect of the other two concepts. --Inequality,polarisation,progression,poverty,richness

A Normative Approach to Measuring Classical Horizontal Inequity

This paper makes a new attack on the old problem of measuring horizontal inequity (HI). A local measure of HI is proposed, and aggregated into a global index. Whilst other approaches have captured the welfare gain which would come from eliminating HI revenue-neutrally, our global index provides a measure of the revenue gain per capita which would come from eliminating HI welfare-neutrally. When expressed as a fraction of mean post-tax income, the measure can be viewed as a negative component in the Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) index of tax progressivity, quantifying the loss of vertical performance arising from differences in the tax treatment of equals. Being money-metric, the measure can also be easily and intuitively interpreted. We propose non- parametric estimation procedures to obviate the important þidentification of equalsþ problem. To our knowledge, this provides the first consistent statistical solution to measuring classical horizontal inequity. The method is applied to the Canadian distributions of gross and net incomes in 1981 and 1990.

Classical horizontal inequity and reranking : an integrated approach

The last 20 years have seen a significant evolution in the literature on horizontal inequity (HI) and have generated two major and "rival" methodological strands, namely, classical HI and reranking. We propose in this paper a class of ethically flexible tools that integrate these two strands. This is achieved using a measure of inequality that merges the well-known Gini coefficient and Atkinson indices, and that allows a decomposition of the total redistributive effect of taxes and transfers in a vertical equity effect and a loss of redistribution due to either classical HI or reranking. An inequality-change approach and a money-metric cost-of-inequality approach are developed. The latter approach makes aggregate classical HI decomposable across groups. As in recent work, equals are identified through a nonparametric estimation of the joint density of gross and net incomes. An illustration using Canadian data from 1981 to 1994 shows a substantial, and increasing, robust erosion of redistribution attributable both to classical HI and to reranking, but does not reveal which of reranking or classical HI is more important since this requires a judgement that is fundamentally normative in nature

Taxation, Reranking and Equivalence Scales

This paper considers whether an equivalence scale implicit in transfer policy can be inferred from summary measures of reranking (whereby the rank order of pre-tax incomes is different from that of the post-tax distribution). It is conjectured that, if the government has a distributional objective and formulates tax policy with a view to equitable treatment of income units, then adopting the scale that is implicit in government transfer policy should identify only the reranking that has no equity foundation. This motivates the question: Is the incidence of reranking associated with a transfer system minimised by the equivalence scale that is implicit in the transfer system? The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the equivalence scale which minimises reranking, while not necessarily equal to the closest approximation to the one that is implicit in transfer policy, is nevertheless in its vicinity.Adult equivalence scales; reranking; horizontal equity