Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules

Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors individually decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors collectively agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards

Characterizing majority rule on various discrete models of consensus.

In any social structure, there is often a need to reach decisions, not only within a group but between groups as well, sometimes even urgently so. Each of the individuals constituting these groups has their own preference for the decision to be made. We will discuss the problem of aggregating individual preferences into a collective preference and under what conditions we are required to select a collective majority. In this dissertation we will look at three models of consensus and show the conditions vary based on the model

Group Influence On Individual Risk Taking 1

Does group interaction lead to greater conservatism or to greater risk taking in decisions than would obtain were the decisions arrived at individually.–or is there an averaging effect? This question was investigated with a procedure in which the protagonist in each of 12 everyday life situations must choose between two courses of action, one of which involves considerably more risk than the other but also is much more rewarding if successful. The S must decide on the lowest level of probability for the success of the risky alternative that he would deem sufficient to warrant its choice. A total of 218 liberal arts university students participated in the study. In the experimental condition, the S s first arrived at individual decisions concerning each of the 12 situations; then, they were brought together in discussion groups of six with the request that they reach a group consensus on each decision; and afterward, they were asked to make all their decisions privately once again. Some S s also made private decisions yet another time two to six weeks later. The group members' judgments of one another's relative degrees of influence and of popularity within the group also were obtained. There were 14 all‐male and 14 all‐female groups. In the control condition, S s made their decisions individually each of two times with one week intervening, under instructions the second time that encouraged them to change rather than simply to recall their earlier decisions. It was found that (1) group decisions exhibit greater risk taking than appears in pre‐discussion individual decisions; (2) post‐discussion private decisions exhibit the same increase in risk taking as occurs in the group decisions; (3) the increase in risk taking resulting from the discussion process is still maintained after a subsequent period of two to six weeks has elapsed; (4) no shift in risk taking level occurs over time in the absence of the discussion process; and (5) degree of risk taking in pre‐discussion individual decisions and degree of judged influence within the group are positively related. Two interpretations of these findings were suggested, either or both of which may apply: (1) the knowledge that one's decisions are being made jointly with others leads to a diffusion of personal responsiblity, the outcome of which is an increased willingness to take risks; (2) high risk takers are more likely to take the initiative in social situations, with the result that they become more influential in the group.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/108371/1/ets200112.pd

Overactive bladder: the importance of tailoring treatment to the individual patient

Harold P DrutzDepartment of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Mount Sinai Hospital, University of Toronto, Ontario, CanadaOn behalf of the Specialist Advisory Group on OAB (Lake Como, Italy, June 2009)Introduction: Overactive bladder (OAB) is a prevalent and persistent condition that is often under-diagnosed and under-treated, and which frequently requires tailored treatment for successful management.Methods: This consensus opinion-based review summarizes the discussions of a group of experts in the field of OAB that were assembled to evaluate the importance of correct diagnosis and appropriate pharmacotherapy in patients with OAB.Results: A thorough diagnostic process is crucial for allowing exclusion of underlying medical issues and differentiation from genitourinary conditions other than OAB. In addition, selecting the most appropriate pharmacotherapy needs to be carefully considered in the context of each patient with OAB. In general, patients with OAB tend to be older with various comorbidities and often receiving multiple concomitant medications. Treatment decisions should take into consideration the differing potential for antimuscarinic medications to alter cognitive and cardiovascular functions, both of which may be compromised in this patient population.Conclusion: Tailoring treatment to individual patients by comprehensive patient assessment may lead to more effective management of patients with OAB, especially those receiving polypharmacy for comorbidities.Keywords: overactive bladder, diagnosis, antimuscarinics, cognitive function, cardiovascular&nbsp

Better the Devil You Know: A New Theory of Negotiation in Collaborative Governance and Evidence from Endangered Species Management

While a growing literature in collaborative public management has made progress in our understanding of stakeholder collaboration, it has generally evaluated such efforts on criteria such as inclusiveness and the emergence of consensus. However, this theoretical framework, while not necessarily incorrect, has left us wanting for detailed explanations of individual and group decision-making processes, negotiation strategies, and the differential influence of competing interest groups within collaborative negotiations. How do individuals or groups involved in collaborative governance make decisions when their preferences and values are opposed? How do they reach a unified outcome that all can accept? Who compromises, on what, how much, and why? What role does the technical complexity of the problem play in this decision calculus? These are the key motivating questions behind this dissertation. I provide answers to these theoretical questions first by proposing a decision-making theory that draws from procrastination, obedience, and rational addiction theories in behavioral economics literature. I then show how this theory can be applied to explain why sometimes interest groups involved in long-term negotiations, such as those in collaborative governance arrangements, sometimes make decisions and agree to solutions that, on the surface, seem inconsistent with their preferences. I argue that one of the key elements driving this type of behavior is the technical complexity so frequently involved in these cases. The dissertation then examines this theory empirically through studies of two recent cases of collaborative governance drawn from Habitat Conservation Plans under the Endangered Species Act: the Florida Beaches Habitat Conservation Plan and the Charlotte County (Florida) Scrub-Jay Habitat Conservation Plan. The case selection is designed to give maximum variation in technical complexity between the two cases. I employ archival research and in-depth interviews with individuals involved in the negotiation processes over these two cases in order to understand the most important factors affecting individual and group decisions throughout the process. The results are consistent with the predictions drawn from the theory. In the higher complexity case, the interaction of technical and political complexity has resulted in perpetual delay and thus the least effective alternative for preserving the species. In the comparison case, however, negotiations resulted in the most robust conservation alternative that was practicable under the circumstances

Models of Consensus for Multiple Agent Systems

Models of consensus are used to manage multiple agent systems in order to choose between different recommendations provided by the system. It is assumed that there is a central agent that solicits recommendations or plans from other agents. That agent the n determines the consensus of the other agents, and chooses the resultant consensus recommendation or plan. Voting schemes such as this have been used in a variety of domains, including air traffic control. This paper uses an analytic model to study the use of consensus in multiple agent systems. The binomial model is used to study the probability that the consensus judgment is correct or incorrect. That basic model is extended to account for both different levels of agent competence and unequal prior odds. The analysis of that model is critical in the investigation of multiple agent systems, since the model leads us to conclude that in some cases consensus judgment is not appropriate. In addition, the results allow us to determine how many agents should be used to develop consensus decisions, which agents should be used to develop consensus decisions and under which conditions the consensus model should be used.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1994

Mathematical Structures in Group Decision-Making on Resource Allocation Distributions.

Optimal decisions on the distribution of finite resources are explicitly structured by mathematical models that specify relevant variables, constraints, and objectives. Here we report analysis and evidence that implicit mathematical structures are also involved in group decision-making on resource allocation distributions under conditions of uncertainty that disallow formal optimization. A group's array of initial distribution preferences automatically sets up a geometric decision space of alternative resource distributions. Weighted averaging mechanisms of interpersonal influence reduce the heterogeneity of the group's initial preferences on a suitable distribution. A model of opinion formation based on weighted averaging predicts a distribution that is a feasible point in the group's implicit initial decision space

The organization of collective group movements in wild Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus): social structure drives processes of group coordination in macaques

Social animals have to coordinate activities and collective movements to benefit from the advantages of group living. Animals in large groups maintain cohesion by self-organization processes whereas in smaller groups consensus decisions can be reached. Where consensus decisions are relevant leadership may emerge. Variation in the organization of collective movements has been linked to variation in female social tolerance among macaque species ranging from despotic to egalitarian. Here we investigated the processes underlying group movements in a wild macaque species characterized by a degree of social tolerance intermediate to previously studied congeneric species. We focused on processes before, during and after the departure of the first individual. To this end, we observed one group of wild Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus) in the Middle Atlas, Morocco using all-occurrence behaviour sampling of 199 collective movements. We found that initiators of a collective movement usually chose the direction in which more individuals displayed pre-departure behavior. Dominant individuals contributed to group movements more than subordinates, especially juveniles, measured as frequencies of successful initiations and pre-departure behaviour. Joining was determined by affiliative relationships and the number of individuals that already joined the movement (mimetism). Thus, in our study group partially shared consensus decisions mediated by selective mimetism seemed to be prevalent, overall supporting the suggestion that a species’ social style affects the organization of group movements. As only the most tolerant species show equally shared consensus decisions whereas in others the decision is partially shared with a bias to dominant individuals the type of consensus decisions seems to follow a stepwise relation. Joining order may also follow a stepwise, however opposite, relationship, because dominance only determined joining in highly despotic, but not in intermediate and tolerant species

User involvement in a Cochrane systematic review:using structured methods to enhance the clinical relevance, usefulness and usability of a systematic review update

Background: This paper describes the structured methods used to involve patients, carers and health professionals in an update of a Cochrane systematic review relating to physiotherapy after stroke and explores the perceived impact of involvement.Methods: We sought funding and ethical approval for our user involvement. We recruited a stakeholder group comprising stroke survivors, carers, physiotherapists and educators and held three pre-planned meetings during the course of updating a Cochrane systematic review. Within these meetings, we used formal group consensus methods, based on nominal group techniques, to reach consensus decisions on key issues relating to the structure and methods of the review.Results: The stakeholder group comprised 13 people, including stroke survivors, carers and physiotherapists with a range of different experience, and either 12 or 13 participated in each meeting. At meeting 1, there was consensus that methods of categorising interventions that were used in the original Cochrane review were no longer appropriate or clinically relevant (11/13 participants disagreed or strongly disagreed with previous categories) and that international trials (which had not fitted into the original method of categorisation) ought to be included within the review (12/12 participants agreed or strongly agreed these should be included). At meeting 2, the group members reached consensus over 27 clearly defined treatment components, which were to be used to categorise interventions within the review (12/12 agreed or strongly agreed), and at meeting 3, they agreed on the key messages emerging from the completed review. All participants strongly agreed that the views of the group impacted on the review update, that the review benefited from the involvement of the stakeholder group, and that they believed other Cochrane reviews would benefit from the involvement of similar stakeholder groups.Conclusions: We involved a stakeholder group in the update of a Cochrane systematic review, using clearly described structured methods to reach consensus decisions. The involvement of stakeholders impacted substantially on the review, with the inclusion of international studies, and changes to classification of treatments, comparisons and subgroup comparisons explored within the meta-analysis. We argue that the structured approach which we adopted has implications for other systematic reviews.</p

Bias in judgement: Comparing individuals and groups

The relative susceptibility of individuals and groups to systematic judgmental biases is considered. An overview of the relevant empirical literature reveals no clear or general pattern. However, a theoretical analysis employing J. H. Davis's (1973) social decision scheme (SDS) model reveals that the relative magnitude of individual and group bias depends upon several factors, including group size, initial individual judgment, the magnitude of bias among individuals, the type of bias, and most of all, the group-judgment process. It is concluded that there can be no simple answer to the question, "Which are more biased, individuals or groups?," but the SDS model offers a framework for specifying some of the conditions under which individuals are both more and less biased than groups