Sense and reference on the web

This thesis builds a foundation for the philosophy of theWeb by examining the crucial question: What does a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) mean? Does it have a sense, and can it refer to things? A philosophical and historical introduction to the Web explains the primary purpose of theWeb as a universal information space for naming and accessing information via URIs. A terminology, based on distinctions in philosophy, is employed to define precisely what is meant by information, language, representation, and reference. These terms are then employed to create a foundational ontology and principles ofWeb architecture. From this perspective, the SemanticWeb is then viewed as the application of the principles of Web architecture to knowledge representation. However, the classical philosophical problems of sense and reference that have been the source of debate within the philosophy of language return. Three main positions are inspected: the logicist position, as exemplified by the descriptivist theory of reference and the first-generation SemanticWeb, the direct reference position, as exemplified by Putnamand Kripke’s causal theory of reference and the second-generation Linked Data initiative, and a Wittgensteinian position that views the Semantic Web as yet another public language. After identifying the public language position as the most promising, a solution of using people’s everyday use of search engines as relevance feedback is proposed as a Wittgensteinian way to determine sense of URIs. This solution is then evaluated on a sample of the Semantic Web discovered by via using queries from a hypertext search engine query log. The results are evaluated and the technique of using relevance feedback from hypertext Web searches to determine relevant Semantic Web URIs in response to user queries is shown to considerably improve baseline performance. Future work for the Web that follows from our argument and experiments is detailed, and outlines of a future philosophy of the Web laid out

Topics in Programming Languages, a Philosophical Analysis through the case of Prolog

[EN]Programming languages seldom find proper anchorage in philosophy of logic, language and science. is more, philosophy of language seems to be restricted to natural languages and linguistics, and even philosophy of logic is rarely framed into programming languages topics. The logic programming paradigm and Prolog are, thus, the most adequate paradigm and programming language to work on this subject, combining natural language processing and linguistics, logic programming and constriction methodology on both algorithms and procedures, on an overall philosophizing declarative status. Not only this, but the dimension of the Fifth Generation Computer system related to strong Al wherein Prolog took a major role. and its historical frame in the very crucial dialectic between procedural and declarative paradigms, structuralist and empiricist biases, serves, in exemplar form, to treat straight ahead philosophy of logic, language and science in the contemporaneous age as well. In recounting Prolog's philosophical, mechanical and algorithmic harbingers, the opportunity is open to various routes. We herein shall exemplify some: - the mechanical-computational background explored by Pascal, Leibniz, Boole, Jacquard, Babbage, Konrad Zuse, until reaching to the ACE (Alan Turing) and EDVAC (von Neumann), offering the backbone in computer architecture, and the work of Turing, Church, Gödel, Kleene, von Neumann, Shannon, and others on computability, in parallel lines, throughly studied in detail, permit us to interpret ahead the evolving realm of programming languages. The proper line from lambda-calculus, to the Algol-family, the declarative and procedural split with the C language and Prolog, and the ensuing branching and programming languages explosion and further delimitation, are thereupon inspected as to relate them with the proper syntax, semantics and philosophical élan of logic programming and Prolog

Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics

This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's "criterial" identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the interaction between epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, epistemic set theory, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebraic automata to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. The hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{2} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, and \textbf{11}. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides four models of hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory

The epistemology of abstractionism

I examine the nature and the structure of basic logico-mathematical knowledge. What justifies the truth of the Dedekind-Peano axioms and the validity of Modus Ponens? And is the justification we possess reflectively available? To make progress with these questions, I ultimately embed Hale's and Wright's neo-Fregeanism in a general internalistic epistemological framework. In Part I, I provide an introduction to the problems in the philosophy of mathematics to motivate the investigations to follow. I present desiderata for a fully satisfactory epistemology of mathematics and discuss relevant positions. All these positions turn out to be unsatisfactory, which motivates the abstractionist approach. I argue that abstractionism is in need of further explication when it comes to its central epistemological workings. I fill this gap by embedding neo-Fregeanism in an internalistic epistemological framework. In Part 11, I motivate, outline, and discuss the consequences of the frame- work. I argue: (1) we need an internalistic notion of warrant in our epistemology and every good epistemology accounts for the possession of such warrant; (2) to avoid scepticism, we need to invoke a notion of non-evidential warrant (entitlement); (3) because entitlements cannot be upgraded, endorsing entitlements for mathematical axioms and validity claims would entail that such propositions cannot be claimed to be known. Because of (3), the framework appears to yield sceptical consequences. In Part 111, I discuss (i) whether we can accept these consequences and (ii) whether we have to accept these consequences. As to (i), I argue that there is a tenable solely entitlement- based philosophy of mathematics and logic. However, I also argue that we can over- come limitations by vindicating the neo-Fregean proposal that implicit definitions can underwrite basic logico-mathematical knowledge. One key manoeuvre here is to acknowledge that the semantic success of creative implicit definitions rests on substantial presuppositions - but to argue that relevant presuppositions are entitlements

Impredicativity and turn of the century foundations of mathematics : presupposition in Poincare and Russell

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1993.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 145-158).by Joseph Romeo William Michael PicardPh.D

Learning and recognition by a dynamical system with a plastic velocity field

Learning is a mechanism intrinsic to all sentient biological systems. Despite the diverse range of paradigms that exist, it appears that an artificial system has yet to be developed that can emulate learning with a comparable degree of accuracy or efficiency to the human brain. With the development of new approaches comes the opportunity to reduce this disparity in performance. A model presented by Janson and Marsden [arXiv:1107.0674 (2011)] (Memory foam model) redefines the critical features that an intelligent system should demonstrate. Rather than focussing on the topological constraints of the rigid neuron structure, the emphasis is placed on the on-line, unsupervised, classification, retention and recognition of stimuli. In contrast to traditional AI approaches, the system s memory is not plagued by spurious attractors or the curse of dimensionality. The ability to continuously learn, whilst simultaneously recognising aspects of a stimuli ensures that this model more closely embodies the operations occurring in the brain than many other AI approaches. Here we consider the pertinent deficiencies of classical artificial learning models before introducing and developing this memory foam self-shaping system. As this model is relatively new, its limitations are not yet apparent. These must be established by testing the model in various complex environments. Here we consider its ability to learn and recognize the RGB colours composing cartoons as observed via a web-camera. The self-shaping vector field of the system is shown to adjust its composition to reflect the distribution of three-dimensional inputs. The model builds a memory of its experiences and is shown to recognize unfamiliar colours by locating the most appropriate class with which to associate a stimuli. In addition, we discuss a method to map a three-dimensional RGB input onto a line spectrum of colours. The corresponding reduction of the models dimensions is shown to dramatically improve computational speed, however, the model is then restricted to a much smaller set of representable colours. This models prototype offers a gradient description of recognition, it is evident that a more complex, non-linear alternative may be used to better characterize the classes of the system. It is postulated that non-linear attractors may be utilized to convey the concept of hierarchy that relates the different classes of the system. We relate the dynamics of the van der Pol oscillator to this plastic self-shaping system, first demonstrating the recognition of stimuli with limit cycle trajectories. The location and frequency of each cycle is dependent on the topology of the systems energy potential. For a one-dimensional stimuli the dynamics are restricted to the cycle, the extension of the model to an N dimensional stimuli is approached via the coupling of N oscillators. Here we study systems of up to three mutually coupled oscillators and relate limit cycles, fixed points and quasi-periodic orbits to the recognition of stimuli