Evaluation of the Vulnerability of Speaker Verification to Synthetic Speech

In this paper, we evaluate the vulnerability of a speaker verification (SV) system to synthetic speech. Although this problem was first examined over a decade ago, dramatic improvements in both SV and speech synthesis have renewed interest in this problem. We use a HMM-based speech synthesizer, which creates synthetic speech for a targeted speaker through adaptation of a background model and a GMM-UBM-based SV system. Using 283 speakers from the Wall-Street Journal (WSJ) corpus, our SV system has a 0.4% EER. When the system is tested with synthetic speech generated from speaker models derived from the WSJ journal corpus, 90% of the matched claims are accepted. This result suggests a possible vulnerability in SV systems to synthetic speech. In order to detect synthetic speech prior to recognition, we investigate the use of an automatic speech recognizer (ASR), dynamic-timewarping (DTW) distance of mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC), and previously-proposed average inter-frame difference of log-likelihood (IFDLL). Overall, while SV systems have impressive accuracy, even with the proposed detector, high-quality synthetic speech can lead to an unacceptably high acceptance rate of synthetic speakers

Synthetic speech detection using phase information

Taking advantage of the fact that most of the speech processing techniques neglect the phase information, we seek to detect phase perturbations in order to prevent synthetic impostors attacking Speaker Verification systems. Two Synthetic Speech Detection (SSD) systems that use spectral phase related information are reviewed and evaluated in this work: one based on the Modified Group Delay (MGD), and the other based on the Relative Phase Shift, (RPS). A classical module-based MFCC system is also used as baseline. Different training strategies are proposed and evaluated using both real spoofing samples and copy-synthesized signals from the natural ones, aiming to alleviate the issue of getting real data to train the systems. The recently published ASVSpoof2015 database is used for training and evaluation. Performance with completely unrelated data is also checked using synthetic speech from the Blizzard Challenge as evaluation material. The results prove that phase information can be successfully used for the SSD task even with unknown attacks.This work has been partially supported by the Basque Government (ElkarOla Project, KK-2015/00,098) and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Restore project, TEC2015-67,163-C2-1-R)

Use of the harmonic phase in synthetic speech detection

Special Session paper: recent PhD thesis descriptionThis PhD dissertation was written by Jon Sanchez and supervised by Inma Hernáez and Ibon Saratxaga. It was defended at the University of the Basque Country the 5th of February 2016. The committee members were Dr. Alfonso Ortega Giménez (UniZar), Dr. Daniel Erro Eslava (UPV/EHU) and Dr. Enric Monte Moreno (UPC). The dissertation was awarded a "sobresaliente cum laude” qualification.This work has been partially funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness with FEDER support (RESTORE project,TEC2015-67163-C2-1-R) and the Basque Government (ELKAROLA project, KK-2015/00098)

Use of the harmonic phase in synthetic speech detection

Special Session paper: recent PhD thesis descriptionThis PhD dissertation was written by Jon Sanchez and supervised by Inma Hernáez and Ibon Saratxaga. It was defended at the University of the Basque Country the 5th of February 2016. The committee members were Dr. Alfonso Ortega Giménez (UniZar), Dr. Daniel Erro Eslava (UPV/EHU) and Dr. Enric Monte Moreno (UPC). The dissertation was awarded a "sobresaliente cum laude” qualification.This work has been partially funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness with FEDER support (RESTORE project,TEC2015-67163-C2-1-R) and the Basque Government (ELKAROLA project, KK-2015/00098)

Anti-Spoofing for Text-Independent Speaker Verification: An Initial Database, Comparison of Countermeasures, and Human Performance

Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.In this paper, we present a systematic study of the vulnerability of automatic speaker verification to a diverse range of spoofing attacks. We start with a thorough analysis of the spoofing effects of five speech synthesis and eight voice conversion systems, and the vulnerability of three speaker verification systems under those attacks. We then introduce a number of countermeasures to prevent spoofing attacks from both known and unknown attackers. Known attackers are spoofing systems whose output was used to train the countermeasures, while an unknown attacker is a spoofing system whose output was not available to the countermeasures during training. Finally, we benchmark automatic systems against human performance on both speaker verification and spoofing detection tasks.EPSRC ; TÜBİTA