‘Going implicit’: using implicit measures in organizations

Implicit tests are increasingly being used and discussed in the field of Industrial-Organizational psychology. Despite their growing popularity, little is known about the types of implicit tests that exist, how they operationalize constructs, and how to improve their usefulness to predict relevant organizational behavior. We provide a timely contribution to practitioners and scholars who are considering adopting implicit measures in their organizations. By drawing on dual-processing theory, we reviewed the most prevalent implicit tests (Implicit Association Test, Picture Story Exercise, and Conditional Reasoning Test), and evaluated each against the following criteria: how they work, application areas, psychometric properties, perceptions of fairness, and faking potential. Based on prior empirical evidence, we provide ideas to improve these measures, how they may be applied in practice, and which avenues deserve future research. Together, these recommendations may enhance the value of implicit measures in organizations

Implicit memory

The Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, Second Edition is a comprehensive three-volume reference source on human action and reaction, and the thoughts, feelings, and physiological functions behind those actions

Implicit Resolution

Let \Omega be a set of unsatisfiable clauses, an implicit resolution refutation of \Omega is a circuit \beta with a resolution proof {\alpha} of the statement "\beta describes a correct tree-like resolution refutation of \Omega". We show that such system is p-equivalent to Extended Frege. More generally, let {\tau} be a tautology, a [P, Q]-proof of {\tau} is a pair (\alpha,\beta) s.t. \alpha is a P-proof of the statement "\beta is a circuit describing a correct Q-proof of \tau". We prove that [EF,P] \leq p [R,P] for arbitrary Cook-Reckhow proof system P

Implicit norms

Robert Brandom has developed an account of conceptual content as instituted by social practices. Such practices are understood as being implicitly normative. Brandom proposed the idea of implicit norms in order to meet some requirements imposed by Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following: escaping the regress of rules on the one hand, and avoiding mere regular behavior on the other. Anandi Hattiangadi has criticized this account as failing to meet such requirements. In what follows, I try to show how the correct understanding of sanctions and the expressivist reading of the issue can meet these challenges

Implicit cognition is impaired and dissociable in a head-injured group with executive deficits

Implicit or non-conscious cognition is traditionally assumed to be robust to pathology but Gomez-Beldarrain et al (1999, 2002) recently showed deficits on a single implicit task after head injury. Laboratory research suggests that implicit processes dissociate. This study therefore examined implicit cognition in 20 head-injured patients and age- and I.Q.-matched controls using a battery of four implicit cognition tasks: a Serial Reaction Time task (SRT), mere exposure effect task, automatic stereotype activation and hidden co-variation detection. Patients were assessed on an extensive neuropsychological battery, and MRI scanned. Inclusion criteria included impairment on at least one measure of executive function. The patient group was impaired relative to the control group on all the implicit cognition tasks except automatic stereotype activation. Effect size analyses using the control mean and standard deviation for reference showed further dissociations across patients and across implicit tasks. Patients impaired on implicit tasks had more cognitive deficits overall than those unimpaired, and a larger Dysexecutive Self/Other discrepancy (DEX) score suggesting greater behavioural problems. Performance on the SRT task correlated with a composite measure of executive function. Head-injury thus produced heterogeneous impairments in the implicit acquisition of new information. Implicit activation of existing knowledge structures appeared intact. Impairments in implicit cognition and executive function may interact to produce dysfunctional behaviour after head-injury. Future comparisons of implicit and explicit cognition should use several measures of each function, to ensure that they measure the latent variable of interest

Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias

In this chapter, we explore whether agents have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit bias. Recent research shows that implicit biases are widespread and they have a wide variety of epistemic effects on our doxastic attitudes. First, we offer some examples and features of implicit biases. Second, we clarify what it means to have an epistemic duty, and discuss the kind of epistemic duties we might have regarding implicit bias. Third, we argue that we have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit biases that have negative epistemic impact. Finally, we defend this view against the objection that we lack the relevant control over implicit bias that’s required for such a duty. We argue that we have a kind of reflective control over the implicit biases that we are duty-bound to eradicate. And since, as we show, we have this control over a wide variety of implicit biases, there are a lot of implicit biases that we have epistemic duties to eradicate

A Meta-Analysis of Procedures to Change Implicit Measures

Using a novel technique known as network meta-analysis, we synthesized evidence from 492 studies (87,418 participants) to investigate the effectiveness of procedures in changing implicit measures, which we define as response biases on implicit tasks. We also evaluated these procedures’ effects on explicit and behavioral measures. We found that implicit measures can be changed, but effects are often relatively weak (|ds| \u3c .30). Most studies focused on producing short-term changes with brief, single-session manipulations. Procedures that associate sets of concepts, invoke goals or motivations, or tax mental resources changed implicit measures the most, whereas procedures that induced threat, affirmation, or specific moods/emotions changed implicit measures the least. Bias tests suggested that implicit effects could be inflated relative to their true population values. Procedures changed explicit measures less consistently and to a smaller degree than implicit measures and generally produced trivial changes in behavior. Finally, changes in implicit measures did not mediate changes in explicit measures or behavior. Our findings suggest that changes in implicit measures are possible, but those changes do not necessarily translate into changes in explicit measures or behavior