Design of auction-based approach for market clearing in peer-to-peer market platform

This paper designs a market platform for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading in Transactive Energy (TE) systems, where prosumers and consumers actively participate in the market as seller or buyer to trade energy. An auction-based approach is used for market clearing in the proposed platform and a review of different types of auction is performed. The appropriate auction approach for market clearing in the proposed platform is designed. The proposed auction mechanism is implemented in three steps namely determination, allocation and payment. This paper identifies important P2P market clearing performance indices, which are used to compare and contrast the designed auction with different types of auction mechanisms. Comparative studies demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed auction mechanism for market clearing in the P2P platform.Comment: 6 page

Distributed and dynamic traffic congestion controls without requiring demand forecasting: Tradable network permits and its implementation mechanisms

Tohoku University赤松隆課

Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design

The different auction types are outlined using a classification framework along six dimensions. The economic properties that are desired in the design of auction mechanisms and the complexities that arise in their implementation are discussed. Some of the most interesting designs from the literature are analyzed in detail to establish known results and to identify the emerging research directions.Engineering and Applied Science

Resource Management in Distributed Camera Systems

The aim of this work is to investigate different methods to solve the problem of allocating the correct amount of resources (network bandwidth and storage space) to video camera systems. Here we explore the intersection between two research areas: automatic control and game theory. Camera systems are a good example of the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) and its impact on our daily lives and the environment. We aim to improve today’s systems, shift from resources over-provisioning to allocate dynamically resources where they are needed the most. We optimize the storage and bandwidth allocation of camera systems to limit the impact on the environment as well as provide the best visual quality attainable with the resource limitations. This thesis is written as a collection of papers. It begins by introducing the problem with today’s camera systems, and continues with background information about resource allocation, automatic control and game theory. The third chapter de- scribes the models of the considered systems, their limitations and challenges. It then continues by providing more background on the automatic control and game theory techniques used in the proposed solutions. Finally, the proposed solutions are provided in five papers.Paper I proposes an approach to estimate the amount of data needed by surveillance cameras given camera and scenario parameters. This model is used for calculating the quasi Worst-Case Transmission Times of videos over a network. Papers II and III apply control concepts to camera network storage and bandwidth assignment. They provide simple, yet elegant solutions to the allocation of these resources in distributed camera systems. Paper IV com- bines pricing theory with control techniques to force the video quality of cam- era systems to converge to a common value based solely on the compression parameter of the provided videos. Paper V uses the VCG auction mechanism to solve the storage space allocation problem in competitive camera systems. It allows for a better system-wide visual quality than a simple split allocation given the limited system knowledge, trust and resource constraints

Towards incentive-compatible pricing for bandwidth reservation in community network clouds

Community network clouds provide for applications of local interest deployed within community networks through collaborative efforts to provision cloud infrastructures. They complement the traditional large-scale public cloud providers similar to the model of decentralised edge clouds by bringing both content and computation closer to the users at the edges of the network. Services and applications within community network clouds require connectivity to the Internet and to the resources external to the community network, and here the current besteffort model of volunteers contributing gateway access in the community networks falls short. We model the problem of reserving the bandwidth at such gateways for guaranteeing quality-of-service for the cloud applications, and evaluate different pricing mechanisms for their suitability in ensuring maximal social welfare and eliciting truthful requests from the users. We find second-price auction based mechanisms, including Vickrey and generalised second price auctions, suitable for the bandwidth allocation problem at the gateways in the community networks.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

An Agent Based Market Design Methodology for Combinatorial Auctions

Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse e-marketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require an effective market design approach. This study proposes a comprehensive and systematic market design methodology for combinatorial auctions based on three phases: market architecture design, auction rule design, and winner determination design. A market architecture design is for designing market architecture types by Backward Chain Reasoning. Auction rules design is to design transaction rules for auctions. The specific auction process type is identified by the Backward Chain Reasoning process. Winner determination design is about determining the decision model for selecting optimal bids and auctioneers. Optimization models are identified by Forward Chain Reasoning. Also, we propose an agent based combinatorial auction market design system using Backward and Forward Chain Reasoning. Then we illustrate a design process for the general n-bilateral combinatorial auction market. This study serves as a guideline for practical implementation of combinatorial auction markets design.Combinatorial Auction, Market Design Methodology, Market Architecture Design, Auction Rule Design, Winner Determination Design, Agent-Based System

Essays on auction mechanisms and information in regulating pollution

Environmental regulation often has to be designed using asymmetric and incomplete information. Polluting firms, for instance, are normally privately better informed than the regulator with regard to the costs of reducing their emissions. However, even regulated firms may not have accurate information about their own abatement costs. The regulator is eager to know this private information in order to implement the most efficient environmental policy given the information at hand. In this thesis, I study, among other things, how auction mechanisms can be used to incentivize firms to reveal their private information to the regulator. One of the central questions in pollution control theory is whether a price instrument like an emission tax or a quantity instrument like tradeable permits is better in environmental or climate policy. In climate policy, emissions trading programs have been more popular both in Europe and the U.S. Also, auctions and in particular uniform price auction formats have been used as an initial allocation method in many trading programs. In the first two essays of this thesis, I study two-stage mechanisms for controlling pollution. In the first stage, the regulator conducts a generalized multi-unit Vickrey auction in order to allocate emission permits to firms. More importantly, the auction mechanism aims to collect private information from regulated firms. In the second stage, the regulator implements a range of environmental policy instruments, in the light of the information from the auction. In the first essay, the regulator uses either a constant price regulation or a program of tradeable permits with a fixed supply of permits. I show that firms have less incentive to bid sincerely in an auction when using a tax instrument compared to emissions trading. In the second essay, the regulator implements a tradeable permits program in the second stage, where the permit supply is elastic in price. Moreover, the permit market suffers some frictions, which increase the costs of trading. I derive incentive compatibility conditions for firms to bid sincerely in the first-stage auction given the regulation in the second stage and the various information structures. In the third essay, I compare the Vickrey and uniform price auction formats in allocations of emission allowances without an allowance resale market. Firms may collude and thus coordinate their bidding behavior in auctions. The Vickrey auction is efficient but the revenues decrease the more firms collude. However, the efficiency and revenues of uniform price auctions depend heavily on the coalition game and the structure of the market.Ympäristöpolitiikan ohjauskeinot on usein suunniteltava ilman täydellistä tietämystä päästöjen vähentämisen kustannuksista tai hyödyistä. Vaikka saastuttavien yritysten käsitys mahdollisista päästövähennysteknologioistaan voi olla epävarmaa, saattaa yrityksillä olla viranomaista parempi ymmärrys niiden kustannuksista. Viranomainen haluaisi saada yritysten tiedon käyttöönsä suunnitellakseen ohjauskeinot paremmin. Tässä väitöskirjassa tutkin muun muassa, miten huutokauppamekanismeja voidaan hyödyntää yritysten palkitsemiseksi, jotta ne paljastaisivat totuudenmukaisesti tietämyksensä viranomaiselle. Yksi keskeisimmistä ympäristökontrollin teoriaan liittyvistä kysymyksistä on perinteisesti ollut, tulisiko saastuttamista ohjata hintainstrumentilla kuten veroilla vai määräinstrumentilla kuten kaupattavilla päästöoikeuksilla. Ilmastopolitiikassa päästöoikeuksien kauppaohjelmat ovat olleet suositumpia niin Euroopassa kuin Yhdysvalloissa. Huutokauppaa on sovellettu monessa kauppaohjelmassa päästöoikeuksien alkujakomenetelmänä. Väitöskirjan kahdessa ensimmäisessä esseessä tutkin kaksivaiheista ympäristöohjausta. Ensimmäisessä vaiheessa viranomainen huutokauppaa päästöoikeuksia saastuttaville yrityksille hyödyntäen Vickrey huutokauppaa. Huutokauppamekanismin avulla viranomainen oppii yritysten puhdistuskustannuksista. Ohjausmekanismin toisessa vaiheessa viranomainen asettaa yrityksille erilaisia ympäristöpolitiikan ohjauskeinoja hyödyntäen oppimaansa. Ensimmäisessä esseessä viranomainen valitsee joko kiinteän hintaohjauksen tai päästöoikeuksien kaupan, jossa markkinoille jaettavien päästöoikeuksien määrä on kiinteä. Osoitan, että yritysten halukkuus paljastaa tietonsa totuudenmukaisesti huutokaupassa on rajoittuneempaa, kun käytössä on vero-ohjaus, kuin jos varsinaiseksi ohjauskeinoksi valitaan päästökauppa. Toisessa esseessä viranomainen valitsee toisen vaiheen ohjauskeinoksi päästöoikeuksien kaupan, jossa päästöoikeuksien tarjonta on joustava hinnan suhteen. Lisäksi päästöoikeusmarkkinoiden toimintaan liittyy kaupankäynnin kustannuksia lisäävää kitkaa. Johdan ehdot tietorakenteelle, jolloin yritykset paljastavat tietonsa totuudenmukaisesti huutokaupassa. Kolmannessa esseessä vertailen Vickrey huutokauppaa ja mm. EU:n päästökaupassa sovellettua yhtenäishinnoittelun huutokauppaa, kun yritykset eivät voi käydä kauppaa päästöoikeuksien jälkimarkkinoilla. Yritykset voivat kuitenkin koordinoida käyttäytymistään päästöoikeuksien huutokaupassa. Vickrey huutokauppa jakaa päästöoikeudet tehokkaasti, mutta huutokaupan tuotot alenevat yritysten koordinoidessa käyttäytymistään. Yhtenäishinnoittelun huutokaupan tulokset ovat riippuvaisia markkinarakenteesta ja koalitionmuodostuksen luonteesta