An Epistemic Approach to Coercion-Resistance for Electronic Voting Protocols

Coercion resistance is an important and one of the most intricate security requirements of electronic voting protocols. Several definitions of coercion resistance have been proposed in the literature, including definitions based on symbolic models. However, existing definitions in such models are rather restricted in their scope and quite complex. In this paper, we therefore propose a new definition of coercion resistance in a symbolic setting, based on an epistemic approach. Our definition is relatively simple and intuitive. It allows for a fine-grained formulation of coercion resistance and can be stated independently of a specific, symbolic protocol and adversary model. As a proof of concept, we apply our definition to three voting protocols. In particular, we carry out the first rigorous analysis of the recently proposed Civitas system. We precisely identify those conditions under which this system guarantees coercion resistance or fails to be coercion resistant. We also analyze protocols proposed by Lee et al. and Okamoto.Comment: An extended version of a paper from IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) 200

Extending Helios Towards Private Eligibility Verifiability

We show how to extend the Helios voting system to provide eligibility verifiability without revealing who voted which we call private eligibility verifiability. The main idea is that real votes are hidden in a crowd of null votes that are cast by others but are indistinguishable from those of the eligible voter. This extended Helios scheme also improves Helios towards receipt-freeness

A smart contract system for decentralized borda count voting

In this article, we propose the first self-tallying decentralized e-voting protocol for a ranked-choice voting system based on Borda count. Our protocol does not need any trusted setup or tallying authority to compute the tally. The voters interact through a publicly accessible bulletin board for executing the protocol in a way that is publicly verifiable. Our main protocol consists of two rounds. In the first round, the voters publish their public keys, and in the second round they publish their randomized ballots. All voters provide Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) proofs to show that they have been following the protocol specification honestly without revealing their secret votes. At the end of the election, anyone including a third-party observer will be able to compute the tally without needing any tallying authority. We provide security proofs to show that our protocol guarantees the maximum privacy for each voter. We have implemented our protocol using Ethereum's blockchain as a public bulletin board to record voting operations as publicly verifiable transactions. The experimental data obtained from our tests show the protocol's potential for the real-world deployment

Practical Attacks on Cryptographically End-to-end Verifiable Internet Voting Systems

Cryptographic end-to-end verifiable voting technologies concern themselves with the provision of a more trustworthy, transparent, and robust elections. To provide voting systems with more transparency and accountability throughout the process while preserving privacy which allows voters to express their true intent. Helios Voting is one of these systems---an online platform where anyone can easily host their own cryptographically end-to-end verifiable election, aiming to bring verifiable voting to the masses. Helios does this by providing explicit cryptographic checks that an election was counted correctly, checks that any member of the public can independently verify. All of this while still protecting one of the essential properties of open democracy, voter privacy. In spite of these cryptographic checks and the strong mathematical assertions of correctness they provide, this thesis discusses the discovery and exploit of three vulnerabilities. The first is the insufficient validation of cryptographic elements in Helios ballots uploaded by users. This allows a disgruntled voter to cast a carefully crafted ballot which will prevent an election from being tallied. The second vulnerability is the insufficient validation of cryptographic parameters used in ElGamal by an election official. This leads to an attack where the election official can upload weak parameters allowing the official to cast arbitrary votes in a single ballot. The final attack is a cross-site scripting attack that would allow anyone to steal or re-cast ballots on behalf of victims. We coordinated disclosure with the Helios developers and provided fixes for all the vulnerabilities outlined in the thesis. Additionally, this thesis adds to the body of work highlighting the fragility of internet voting applications and discusses the unique challenges faced by internet voting applications

DEMOS-2:scalable E2E verifiable elections without random oracles

Recently, Kiayias, Zacharias and Zhang-proposed a new E2E verifiable e-voting system called 'DEMOS' that for the first time provides E2E verifiability without relying on external sources of randomness or the random oracle model; the main advantage of such system is in the fact that election auditors need only the election transcript and the feedback from the voters to pronounce the election process unequivocally valid. Unfortunately, DEMOS comes with a huge performance and storage penalty for the election authority (EA) compared to other e-voting systems such as Helios. The main reason is that due to the way the EA forms the proof of the tally result, it is required to {\em precompute} a number of ciphertexts for each voter and each possible choice of the voter. This approach clearly does not scale to elections that have a complex ballot and voters have an exponential number of ways to vote in the number of candidates. The performance penalty on the EA appears to be intrinsic to the approach: voters cannot compute an enciphered ballot themselves because there seems to be no way for them to prove that it is a valid ciphertext. In contrast to the above, in this work, we construct a new e-voting system that retains the strong E2E characteristics of DEMOS (but against computational adversaries) while completely eliminating the performance and storage penalty of the EA. We achieve this via a new cryptographic construction that has the EA produce and prove, using voters' coins, the security of a common reference string (CRS) that voters subsequently can use to affix non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs to their ciphertexts. The EA itself uses the CRS to prove via a NIZK the tally correctness at the end. Our construction has similar performance to Helios and is practical. The privacy of our construction relies on the SXDH assumption over bilinear groups via complexity leveraging

XML Based Security Model for Enhancing the Integrity and the Privacy of E-Voting Systems

As the world is becoming more technological, using electronic voting could be very beneficial in elections rather using traditional paper-based election schemes. However, there are many security related issues that can cause significant problems in electronic voting (e-voting). Violating voters’ privacy or integrity of ballots would definitely cause serious problems with the entire election process. People may refuse to accept the electronic form of elections. Existing e-voting systems use sophisticated but inefficient, and expensive techniques to satisfy the security requirements of e-voting. Therefore, most of small and mid-size electoral populations cannot employ e-voting systems in their elections and experience remarkable benefits of e-voting. In this thesis, a new electronic voting approach is proposed using extensible markup language (XML) to verify and secure the integrity as well as to preserve the privacy of the voters. The evaluation results of this thesis show that the new approach is an implementation friendly, efficient, and also cost-effective approach to safeguard integrity and privacy related security requirements of e-voting systems for small and mid-size electoral populations