Maine Law Magazine - Issue No. 84

Contents: Feature: Taking an Innovative Approach Around Campus Faculty Notes: Professor Orlando Delogu Focus on Alums: J. Trevor Hughes ’95 Class News Alumni Eventshttps://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/maine-law-magazine/1084/thumbnail.jp

Arnold v. City of Stanley Clerk\u27s Record v. 1 Dckt. 43868

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7331/thumbnail.jp

Twitter and the #So-CalledJudge

Two-hundred-eighty characters may be insufficient to deliver a treatise on the judiciary, but it is more than enough to deliver criticism of the third branch of government. Today, these tweeted critiques sometimes come not from the general public but from the President himself. Attacks such as these come at a challenging time for court systems. We live in a highly politicized, polarized society. This polarization is reflected in attitudes toward the courts, particularly the federal courts. Unfortunately, public doubts about the court system come at a time when public understanding of the structure of government, and especially the court system, is abysmally low. All of this context raises a number of related questions. When the prolific executive tweeter calls out a federal judge, is President Trump just venting or has he tapped into a strong subset of American opinion on the judiciary? And, if so, does a “so-called judge” have a role in engaging, informing, perhaps even rebutting these opinions? Further, could 280 characters be an effective platform to use in fulfilling that role? This article will address the specific issue of judges using Twitter to promote the interests of the courts as institutions. After section II’s brief description of the mechanics of Twitter, section III will discuss why and how judges communicate through Twitter. Section IV will sound a note of caution based on two factors: 1) a web of judicial ethics rules that limit judicial speech (including Twitter); and 2) the nature of the Twitter experience and the way people use it, which can hinder attempts to effectively reach the desired audience. The article will conclude by arguing that in this day and age, when much of America gets its news from social media and those platforms are being used to delegitimize the judiciary, the third branch can ill afford to disengage. Judicial tweeting, within the limits of the ethics rules, should be encouraged rather than shunned

Court Review: The Journal of the American Judges Association, Vol. 57, No. 1

Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles, essays, and book reviews. Court Review seeks to provide practical, useful information to the working judges of the United States and Canada. In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case management, providing substantive information regarding an area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by providing background information (such as psychology or other social science research) that can be used by judges in their work. Guidelines for the submission of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page 32 of this issue. Court Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or reject material submitted for publication

The Limitations of Freedom of Expression in Theory and Practice (Between the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Egyptian Law)

The divergence of freedom of expression either in Muslim or Western States is one of the most controversial issues that continue to be debated. The scope of restrictions under Egyptian law, which apply Islamic or Shari'a norms, differ from American constitutional law. The purpose of this study is to examine how freedom of expression in the United States of America and Egypt are subject to different limitations. In order to put the study into context, the research examined the justification and methods of freedom of expression in both the United States of America and Egypt. As foundation stones of the debate, the study depended mainly on philosophical theories and many Islamic sources. The researcher examined various cases of freedom of expression and the sources of those cases varied in terms of the level of the Courts. The Egyptian experience can explain how the country’s Supreme Constitutional Court can develop the interpretation of Islamic law to be consistent with democracy. Also, the methods used by the U.S Supreme Court in interpreting the First Amendment, namely the categorical and balancing approach, can explain how the absolutist and pragmatic position of the First Amendment and the complexity of freedom of speech are treated. The plain approaches and the experiences either in the United States of America or Egypt are rich in their principles and norms which are based on the local particularities. The research findings suggest that, although there are some differences of scope and application between the laws of both countries, these should not create a general state of dissonance

Supreme Court Opinion Authorship Attribution on a Case-by-Case Basis

This thesis analyzes the authorship of Supreme Court opinions and the theory that Justices on that Court might be delegating portions, if not the majority, of opinion authorship to their clerks. I test the theories that as Justices age they are more likely to delegate, and that delegation has increased across all justices over the past several decades of the Court’s history. I employ a content analysis method known as stylometry to assign authorship attributions on a case by case basis and use those attributions to inform larger trends regarding authorship. I ultimately find that there is little evidence to support the age or time-period theories but that there is significant variation across Justices in attribution, indicating that clerks are likely playing a large and measurable role in opinion drafting