Honeypots and honeynets: issues of privacy

Honeypots and honeynets are popular tools in the area of network security and network forensics. The deployment and usage of these tools are influenced by a number of technical and legal issues, which need to be carefully considered. In this paper, we outline the privacy issues of honeypots and honeynets with respect to their technical aspects. The paper discusses the legal framework of privacy and legal grounds to data processing. We also discuss the IP address, because by EU law, it is considered personal data. The analysis of legal issues is based on EU law and is supported by discussions on privacy and related issues

Optimal Timing in Dynamic and Robust Attacker Engagement During Advanced Persistent Threats

Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are stealthy attacks which make use of social engineering and deception to give adversaries insider access to networked systems. Against APTs, active defense technologies aim to create and exploit information asymmetry for defenders. In this paper, we study a scenario in which a powerful defender uses honeynets for active defense in order to observe an attacker who has penetrated the network. Rather than immediately eject the attacker, the defender may elect to gather information. We introduce an undiscounted, infinite-horizon Markov decision process on a continuous state space in order to model the defender's problem. We find a threshold of information that the defender should gather about the attacker before ejecting him. Then we study the robustness of this policy using a Stackelberg game. Finally, we simulate the policy for a conceptual network. Our results provide a quantitative foundation for studying optimal timing for attacker engagement in network defense.Comment: Submitted to the 2019 Intl. Symp. Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Nets. (WiOpt

Finding evidence of wordlists being deployed against SSH Honeypots - implications and impacts

This paper is an investigation focusing on activities detected by three SSH honeypots that utilise Kippo honeypot software. The honeypots were located on the same /24 IPv4 network and configured as identically as possible. The honeypots used the same base software and hardware configurations. The data from the honeypots were collected during the period 17th July 2012 and 26th November 2013, a total of 497 active day periods. The analysis in this paper focuses on the techniques used to attempt to gain access to these systems by attacking entities. Although all three honeypots are have the same configuration settings and are located on the same IPv4 /24 subnet work space, there is a variation between the numbers of activities recorded on each honeypots. Automated password guessing using wordlists is one technique employed by cyber criminals in attempts to gain access to devices on the Internet. The research suggests there is wide use of automated password tools and wordlists in attempts to gain access to the SSH honeypots, there are also a wide range of account types being probed

A Honeynet within the German Research Network – Experiences and Results

A honeynet is a special prepared network which is not used in normal business. It is a kind of playground to watch and learn the tactics of crackers. The only purpose of a honeynet is to be probed, attacked or compromised. During the operation other systems may not be harmed by an attack originated within the honeynet. In this paper the design, realization and operation of a honeynet built within the German Research Network (DFN) will be described. Concepts for continuously monitoring and securing the honeynet are introduced. A selection of the results of the operation phase will be presented as well

Invited Paper - A Profile of Prolonged, Persistent SSH Attack on a Kippo Based Honeynet

This paper is an investigation focusing on activities detected by SSH honeypots that utilised kippo honeypot software. The honeypots were located across a variety of geographical locations and operational platforms. The honeynet has suffered prolonged, persistent and attack from a /24 network which appears to be of Chinese geographical origin. In addition to these attacks, other attackers have been successful in compromising real hosts in a wide range of other countries that were subsequently involved in attacking the honeypot machines in the honeynet. Keywords: Cyber Security, SSH, Secure Shell, Honeypots, Kipp

Detection and analysis of misuse in SIP-based networks

Die Sprachkommunikation über „Voice over IP“-Netzwerke, basierend auf dem Session Initiation Protokoll (SIP), verbreitet sich auf Grund von Funktionalitäts- und Kostenvorteilen zunehmend und wird die klassischen Telefonnetze in den nächsten Jahren vollständig ablösen. Zusätzlich zu den Netzen der Telefonanbieter wird die Sprachkommunikation über das SIP-Protokoll auch im Unternehmens- und Privatanwenderumfeld unverzichtbar. So bietet VoIP die Möglichkeit, sich unabhängig von dem aktuellen Aufenthaltsort über das Internet bei dem jeweiligen Heimatnetzbetreiber oder der eigenen Firma anzumelden und über das dortige Nutzerkonto Gespräche zu führen. Da die Telefonie somit von einer geschlossenen und vergleichsweise sicheren Plattform auf eine viel offenere Plattform in das Internet migriert wird, ergeben sich neue Risiken und Missbrauchsmöglichkeiten im Bereich der Telefonie. In dieser Dissertation werden Angriffe untersucht, die mit der Einführung von SIP-basierten Sprachdiensten im Internet entstehen und nicht aus Bedrohungen der Netzwerkschicht oder aus rechtlichen Vertragsbestimmungen resultieren. Das Ziel dieser Angriffe ist das Erlangen eines finanziellen Vorteils, indem ein Angreifer kompromittierte Zugänge für Auslandstelefonate oder für Anrufe zu Premiumnummern auf Kosten der Anschlussinhaber nutzt („Toll Fraud“). Für die Realisierung der Bedrohungsanalyse und der Angriffserkennung wurden Konzepte, ein Versuchsnetzwerk sowie die notwendigen Softwarekomponenten ergebnisorientiert entwickelt. Im Vergleich zu anderen Forschungsarbeiten wurden Untersuchungen mit Ködersystemen (Honeypots) weiterentwickelt und es wurde ein System für eine verteilte, automatische Angriffserkennung entwickelt. Dafür wurden SIP-Verkehrsdaten über einen Zeitraum von sechs Jahren in zwei Class-C-Netzwerken aufgezeichnet und mit einem neuen Analyseansatz unabhängig von einzelnen SIP-Nachrichten automatisch ausgewertet. Die Ergebnisse des Feldversuches in dieser Dissertation zeigen, dass die Bedrohungen für die SIP-Infrastruktur ansteigen und dass bereits eine Weiterentwicklung und Optimierung der Angriffswerkzeuge nachzuweisen ist. Die zunehmende Anzahl der Toll Fraud-Versuche mit internationalen Anrufzielen (und auch zu Premium-Rufnummern) verdeutlicht, dass bei einem unzureichenden Schutz der SIP-Server für die Nutzer und Betreiber sehr schnell ein erheblicher finanzieller Schaden entstehen kann. Es ist daher unerlässlich, die vorgeschalteten, systematischen Angriffsstufen frühzeitig zu erkennen und Abwehrkomponenten zu benachrichtigen. Für die automatisierte, verteilte Angriffserkennung in Echtzeit und für die Maximierung des Beobachtungsgebietes wurde für diese Dissertation das „Security Sensor System“ entwickelt. Mit Hilfe von leichtgewichtigen Sensoren wurde eine weltweite signaturbasierte Angriffserkennung realisiert. Zusätzlich zu der standortbezogenen Angriffserkennung werden Angriffe durch einen zentralen Dienst korreliert. Dadurch können Angreifer netzwerkübergreifend bzw. länderübergreifend identifiziert und somit Gegenwehrkomponenten in Echtzeit benachrichtigt werden. Der Vergleich der verschiedenen Messstellen im Internet belegt, dass die analysierten Angriffsmuster nicht nur im Netzwerk der Universität Duisburg-Essen, sondern zeitlich zusammenhängend auch an anderen Standorten auftreten. Dadurch wird deutlich, dass die ermittelten Ergebnisse auch für andere Netzwerke gültig sind und dass die Toll Fraud-Problematik bereits für alle Betreiber von SIP-Servern relevant ist.Voice over IP networks based on the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) are becoming more and more widespread in the Internet due to functionality and cost advantages and will soon replace the classic telephony networks. Therefore, support of open SIP-based interfaces is an increasingly important requirement for IP-based Public Branch eXchanges (PBXs) and provider systems. The VoIP service allows using the personal or company VoIP account from any location worldwide. The migration of the telephony service from a closed and comparatively secure environment to a network with open interfaces creates security issues and opens up new opportunities for misuse and fraud. In this thesis, attacks are analyzed which result from introducing SIP-based voice services and do not belong to the area of contract regulations or attacks on the network layer. The attacker’s goal is to gain immediate financial benefit by making toll calls (international, cellular, premium services) via cracked third party accounts (“Toll Fraud”). To realize the threat analysis and the attack detection concepts, a SIP-based testbed and required software components were developed. In comparison to the related work, analyses with Honeypots were enhanced and a mechanism for automatic, distributed attack detection was realized. Therefore, for gathering the required data, a Honeynet with two class-C networks captured the SIP traffic for a period of six years. The automatic analysis is based on attacks and operates independently of single SIP messages. The field test results of this thesis demonstrate that SIP-based threats increase over time and attack tools are optimized and enhanced. The increasing number of Toll Fraud attempts to international or premium numbers reveals that Toll Fraud attacks can cause the account owner substantial financial damage in a very short amount of time if there is insufficient attack detection and mitigation. Hence, it is necessary to implement an attack detection which is able to identify the different attack stages and sends a notification to mitigation components before a Toll Fraud call is established. In this thesis, the Security Sensor System was developed to maximize the monitoring scope and to realize the distributed, automatic attack detection in real-time. The light-weight sensor component provides worldwide signature-based attack detection. Additional to the location-based attack detection, all attack notifications are sent to a central service which correlates the incoming alarm messages and provides a comprehensive attacker identification to inform mitigation components in real-time. The comparison of different sensor nodes in the Internet shows that the analyzed attack patterns do not only occur in the University testbed, but also temporally coherent in other networks. Thus, the results are valid for different network environments and it is crucial to know that Toll Fraud attacks are already performed in reality

A profile of prolonged, persistent SSH attack on a Kippo Based Honeynet

This paper is an investigation focusing on activities detected by SSH honeypots that utilised kippo honeypot software. The honeypots were located across a variety of geographical locations and operational platforms. The honeynet has suffered prolonged, persistent and attack from a /24 network which appears to be of Chinese geographical origin. In addition to these attacks, other attackers have been successful in compromising real hosts in a wide range of other countries that were subsequently involved in attacking the honeypot machines in the honeynet