37 research outputs found
Optimal Timing in Dynamic and Robust Attacker Engagement During Advanced Persistent Threats
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are stealthy attacks which make use of
social engineering and deception to give adversaries insider access to
networked systems. Against APTs, active defense technologies aim to create and
exploit information asymmetry for defenders. In this paper, we study a scenario
in which a powerful defender uses honeynets for active defense in order to
observe an attacker who has penetrated the network. Rather than immediately
eject the attacker, the defender may elect to gather information. We introduce
an undiscounted, infinite-horizon Markov decision process on a continuous state
space in order to model the defender's problem. We find a threshold of
information that the defender should gather about the attacker before ejecting
him. Then we study the robustness of this policy using a Stackelberg game.
Finally, we simulate the policy for a conceptual network. Our results provide a
quantitative foundation for studying optimal timing for attacker engagement in
network defense.Comment: Submitted to the 2019 Intl. Symp. Modeling and Optimization in
Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Nets. (WiOpt