The significance of bidding, accepting and opponent modeling in automated negotiation

Given the growing interest in automated negotiation, the search for effective strategies has produced a variety of different negotiation agents. Despite their diversity, there is a common structure to their design. A negotiation agent comprises three key components: the bidding strategy, the opponent model and the acceptance criteria. We show that this three-component view of a negotiating architecture not only provides a useful basis for developing such agents but also provides a useful analytical tool. By combining these components in varying ways, we are able to demonstrate the contribution of each component to the overall negotiation result, and thus determine the key contributing components. Moreover, we are able to study the interaction between components and present detailed interaction effects. Furthermore, we find that the bidding strategy in particular is of critical importance to the negotiator's success and far exceeds the importance of opponent preference modeling techniques. Our results contribute to the shaping of a research agenda for negotiating agent design by providing guidelines on how agent developers can spend their time most effectively

Intelligent Agents for Automated Cloud Computing Negotiation

Presently, cloud providers offer “off-the-shelf” Service Level Agreements (SLA), on a “take it or leave it” basis. This paper, alternatively, proposes customized SLAs. An automated negotiation is needed to establish customized SLAs between service providers and consumers with no previous knowledge of each other. Traditional negotiations between humans are often fraught with difficulty. Thus, in this work, the use of intelligent agents to represent cloud providers and consumers is advocated. Rubinstein’s Alternating Offers Protocol offers a suitable technical solution for this challenging problem. The purpose of this paper is to apply the state-of-the-art in negotiation automated algorithms/agents within a described Cloud Computing SLA framework, and to evaluate the most appropriate negotiation approach based on many criteria

Mapping gender stereotypes: a network analysis approach

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023. 1193866/full#supplementary-materialIntroduction: Stereotypes have traditionally been considered as “mental pictures” of a particular social group. The current research aims to draw the structure of gender stereotypes and metastereotype schemes as complex systems of stereotypical features. Therefore, we analyze gender stereotypes as networks of interconnected characteristics. Method: Through an online survey (N = 750), participants listed the common female and male features to build the structure of the gender stereotypes. Participants also listed the common features of how members of one gender think they are viewed by people of the other gender to build the structure of gender metastereotypes. Results: Our results suggest that female stereotypes are characterized by a single community of features consistently associated such as intelligent, strong, and hardworkers. Female metastereotype, however, combines the previous community with another characterized by weak and sensitive. On the contrary, the male stereotype projected by women is characterized by a community of features associated such as intelligent, strong, and hardworker, but male in-group stereotypes and metastereotypes projected by men are a combination of this community with another one characterized by features associated such as strong, chauvinist, and aggressive. Discussion: A network approach to studying stereotypes provided insights into the meaning of certain traits when considered in combination with different traits. (e.g., strong-intelligent vs. strong-aggressive). Thus, focusing on central nodes can be critical to understanding and changing the structure of gender stereotypes.University of Salamanc

“Ndableg,” “Ra Sah Ngeyel”: Verbal Offense through Banners about the COVID-19 Pandemic

Frustration can be expressed in public in different ways. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the grassroots protestors in Yogyakarta vent their frustrations triggered by the uncertainty through banners, which are simple, yet send messages of the country’s wrongdoings in dealing with the pandemic. This paper discusses verbal violence through negative sentiments expressed in the banners the Yogyakarta grassroots organizations use to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic prevention campaign. This study collected the data from 20 banners displayed in rural areas in Sleman regency, Yogyakarta, during March through April 2020. The analysis applied a sociopragmatic approach. The findings reveal the banners’ strong negative tones targetted to the lower-working class which reflect an inaccurate understanding of the fundamental concept of Covid-19 preventive measures and mitigation. Stigmatization of the lower-working class is underway to hurt the cohesion of society. The negative tones can escalate people’s anxiety, counterproductive to Covid-19 pandemic mitigation as it is against the wisdom of coping with the pandemic with a peaceful mind. Therefore, it suggests that evaluation by the agents of authority is imperative to prevent misunderstanding of the Covid-19 pandemic and build effective communication skills

Fishing for a Career: Alternative Livelihoods and the Hardheaded Art of Academic Failure

Charting the course: The world of alternative livelihood research brings a heavy history of paternalistic colonial intervention and moralising. In particular, subsistence fishers in South East Asia are cyclical attractors of project funding to help them exit poverty and not ‘further degrade the marine ecosystem’ (Cinner et al. 2011), through leaving their boats behind and embarking on non-oceanic careers. What happens, then, when we turn an autoethnographic eye on the livelihood of the alternative livelihood researcher? What lexicons of lack and luck may we borrow from the fishers in order to ‘render articulate and more systematic those feelings of dissatisfaction’ (Young 2002) of an academic’s life’s work and our work-life? What might we learn from comparing small-scale fishers to small-scale scholars about how to successfully ‘navigate’ the casualised waters of the modern university? Does this unlikely course bring any ideas of ‘possibilities glimmering’ (Young 2002) for ‘exiting’ poverty in Academia

The Pinkerton Doctrine and Murder

[Excerpt] Suppose that A hires B to rob a bank in Massachusetts and A then hires C to rob a bank in Rhode Island. B and C have not met face to face, but each knows he is part of a conspiracy to rob banks in more than one state. All agree that no one will be killed in the robberies. A then procures D to get a car for use in the robberies. B uses D’s car to rob his bank. During the robbery of C’s bank, C pulls out a gun and shoots and kills the bank guard. Clearly, A, B, C, and D are all guilty of conspiracy to rob banks, the act to which they agreed. Clearly too, A, B, C, and D are not guilty of conspiracy to murder, because they never agreed to kill anyone. C, however, is guilty of murder, since he intentionally killed the bank guard without justification or excuse. But can A, B, and D also be charged with this murder? There are, of course, several ways in which one person may be guilty of a murder committed by another person. One is by the felony-murder rule, which historically has meant that one is guilty of murder if, in the course of committing a felony, one causes the death of another person. In this example, if the felony-murder rule applies, A, B, and D could be guilty of felony murder of the bank guard – a murder committed by their cofelon, C. But if the felony-murder rule is not applicable, either because the state has rejected the rule, as most commentators have long been urging states to do, or because the state legislature has defined felony murder as second degree murder and the prosecution wants to convict A, B, and D, as well as C of first degree murder of the guard, is there another basis for finding A, B, and D guilty? The doctrine of complicity, also known as aiding and abetting, is, of course, another way to make a person guilty of a murder committed by someone else. But would A, B, and D be guilty of murder of the bank guard on an aiding and abetting theory in this instance? On mens rea grounds, A, B, and D intended at most to encourage a robbery by C. In Model Penal Code terms, that was their purpose or “conscious objective.” But their purpose was not to encourage C to kill anyone. They had expressly agreed that no one would be killed. They did not know that C would kill during the robbery. If aiding and abetting requires a purpose to facilitate the particular crime at issue, A, B, and D would not be guilty of murder of the bank guard by aiding and abetting. On actus reus grounds, there also would be a problem with complicity. A did hire C to rob the bank. He did actively set in motion the crime which resulted in the killing of the guard. But what did B and D really do to assist or encourage the robbery by C, much less C’s murder of the guard? All they did was to agree to be part of a larger conspiracy to rob banks. One could argue that they never facilitated C’s specific robbery, and that they did nothing to facilitate his killing of the guard. There is, however, an alternative way in which A, B, and D can be convicted of C’s murder of the guard. If the court finds that A, B, C, and D were in a conspiracy to rob the banks, and if C committed murder in furtherance of that conspiracy, then A, B, and D are all also guilty of murder, as long as they could reasonably have foreseen that such an event would occur in the course of their conspiracy. They could all be guilty of first degree murder, even though A, B, and D never met the bank guard, never assisted or encouraged C to kill him, never wanted C to kill him or knew C would kill him, and never even visited the bank or entered the state in which the bank was located! The rule by which this result is reached, called the Pinkerton rule, is one of the most controversial doctrines in modern criminal law. Broadly stated, the rule is that “any conspirator in a continuing conspiracy is responsible for the illegal acts committed by his cohorts in furtherance of the conspiracy, within the scope of the conspiracy, and reasonably foreseeable by the conspirators as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.” This rule permits conviction of a crime that the accused did not intend, plan, want, or even know about, committed against a victim whom the defendant did not know or want to harm. The rule applies throughout the life of the conspiracy to all who originally agreed to join the conspiracy, unless the defendant overtly acted to disavow and/or defeat the conspiracy. The Pinkerton rule “is not universally followed.” It is rejected in the Model Penal Code. Many state courts have interpreted their statutes to require more than membership in a conspiracy for complicity in substantive crimes committed in the course of that conspiracy. Commentary on Pinkerton in the academic world, much like commentary on felony murder and on conspiracy in general, is overwhelmingly negative. On the contrary, this article argues that the Pinkerton doctrine, far from being an aberration, is rather more an illustration of our existing criminal law and of some of the important theoretical assumptions behind it. [...

Foreword

In this paper, we show that the consistency of closed-loop subspace identification methods (SIMs) can be achieved through innovation estimation. Based on this analysis, a sufficient condition for the consistency of a new proposed closed-loop SIM is given, A consistent estimate of the Kalman gain under closed-loop conditions is also provided based on the algorithm. A multi-input-multi-output simulation shows that itis consistent under closed-loop conditions, when traditional SIMs fail to provide consistent estimates

Of Republicans and Recessions: Why Does Big Business Vote for Them?

[Excerpt] The wild enthusiasm business gave Nixon\u27s new economic policy stems not only from a longstanding business preference for Republicans but a short-run expectation of profit windfalls. In a moment of economic crisis the President turned to business to clear up America\u27s problems. In fact, if the record of the last quarter-century is to be believed, not only will the nation\u27s trouble remain unsolved but business will not get the anticipated bonanza either. The politics of business is clearly Republican, but it is not so clear that the Republican Party is good for business